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2.2.11.7-25 RS Performance Data Daily Minimum/Maximum - SL-3 2.2.11-549
2.2.11.7-26 RS Performance Data Daily MinimumfMaximum - SL-4 2.2.11-550
2.2.11.7-27 RS Performance Data Daily Minimum/Maximum - SL-4 2.2.11-551
2.2.ii.7-28 RS Performance Data Daily Minimum/Maximum - SL-4 2.2.11-552 i
2.2.11.7-29 RS Performance Data Daily MinimumIMax_mum - SL-_ 2.2.11-553
2.2.11.7-30 SL-I Refrigeration System Data - Launch +6 Hours 2.2.11-555 _:
G.E.T.
2.2.11.7-31 RS - Food Temp History (DOY 136) 2.2.11-558 !/
2.2.11.7-32 RS - Food Temp History (DOY 137) 2.2.11-559 _
2.2.11.7-33 Radiator Bypass Valve Cycle 2.2.11-560 L
" 2.2.11.7-3h RS Performance Trend Data (Pre-act/Act/Post Act) 2.2.11-561
2.2.11.7-35 RS Performance Trend Data 2.2.11-562
2.2.11,7-36 RS Performance Trend Data 2.2.11-563
2.2.11.7-37 RS Performance Trend Data 2.2.11-56h
2.2.11.7-38 RS Performance Trend Data 2.2.11-565
,: 2.2.11.7-39 Refrigeration System Secondary Loop Leakage 2.2.11-567
Tracking (i0 Day e Averages)
i 2.2.11.7-h0 Refrigeration System Primary Loop Leakage (i0 Day 2.2.11-568
_. ' e Averages )
?
2.2.11.7-hi Refrigeration System Primary Loop Leakage (i0 Day 2.2.11-569
, e Averages )
_2
i .2.11.7-_2 Refrigeration System Secondary Loop Leakage (i0 2.2.11-570
Day e Averages )
_- 2.2.11.7-43 Refrigeration System Food Freezer Temperature Trend 2.2.11-576 i
2.2.ii. 8-1 Habitation Are a Pressure Control System 2.2.11-597
2.2. ii. 8-2 Habitation Area Latching Vent Valve IB7_535-501 2.2.11-598
! _.2. ii.8-3 Habitation Area Solenoid Vent Valve 2.2.11-600 :
_.2.11.8-_ Pressurization and Pressure Control System Habita-
2.2.11-601
I tion Are_ N_n-Propulsive Vent '-_
2.Ii.9-i Vacuum SysternSchemat ic 2.2.11-609 _:
: 2.2.11.i0-1 Pneumatic Control System 2.2.11-626
2.2.12. i-i Suit Drying Station 2.2.12-h
_.2.12.1-2 Suit D_ring Perform z;c_ CX-5 Test_n_ (UT in GRMS) .._.;._.12-I! _
!,
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2.2.12.2-1 Suit Drying Station 2.2.12-22
2.2.12.2-2 PGA Support Equilx_ent Stowage 2.2.12-23
2.2.13.2-1 SWS Equipment Stowage 2.2.13-7
2.2.13.2-2 OWS Stowage 2.2.13-9
2.2.13.2-3 OWS Stowage Compartments 2.2.13-10
2.2.13.2-4 Tissue Dispenser - Installation 2.2.13-12
2.2.13.2-5 Fecal Bag Dispenser 2.2.13-14
2.2.13.2-6 Towel Dispenser 2.2.13-16
2.2.13.2-7 Trash Container 2.2.13-18
2.2.13.2-8 Food Boxes 2.2.13-19
2.2.13.2-9 Food Freezers and Food Chiller 2.2.13-21
2.2.13.2-10 Urine Freezer 2.2.13-24
2.2.13.2-11 Film Vault 2.2.13-26
2.2.13.2-12 Equipment Restraints - Internal 2.2.13-28
_.2.13.2-13 Plenum Bag 2.2.13-32
2.2.13.2-14 Tool and Repair Kits 2.2.13-35
2.2.14.1-i Model DSVT-321 Weigh and Balance Kit 2.2.14-4
2.2.14.1-2 Model DSV7-322 Forward and Aft Hoist Kit 2.2.14-5
2.2.14.1-3 Model DSV7-323 Stage Transporter 2.2.14-7
2.2.14.1-4 Model D6V7-324 Stage Cradles Kit 2.2.14-8
2.2.14.i-5 Model DSV7-325 Stage Handling Kit 2.2.14-9
2.2.14.1-6 Model DSV7-335 Handling Kit 2.2.14-10
2.2.14.1-7 Special Tool Kit (DSV-4B-305) 2.2.14-12
2.2.14.1-8 Desiccant Kit, Secondary, Saturn S-IVB (DSV-4B-365) 2.2.14-13
2.2.14.1-9 Beam Kit, Cover Hoist, Saturn S-IVB Stage 2.2.14-14
(DSV-4B-368)
2.2.14.1-10 Support Kit Dummy Interstage and Engine Protective 2.2.14-15
_, (DSVI4B- 392)
2.2.14.1-11 Desiccant Kit, Static, S-IVB Stage (DSV-hB-450) e.2.14-17
2.2.14.1-12 Dynamic Desiccant Trailer 2.2.14-18
i 2.2,14.1-13 Weigh and Balance Kit, Stage (DSV-4B-345) 2.2.14-19
_ 2.2.14.2-1 Solar Array Hoisting and Handling Kit Model 2.2.14-26
._ DSV7-304
_ 2.2.14.2-2 Solar Array Hoisting and Handling Kit Model 2.2.14-27
DSVT-304
: 2.2.14.2-3 Hoisting 0per&tions 2.2.14-28
_ 2.2.14.2-4 Model DSV7-305 2.2.14-29
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2.2.14.2-5 Solar Array Hoisting and Handling Kit Model 2.2.14-30
DSV7- 305
2.2.14.3-1 Plan View of Flared Aft Interstage Access Kit 2.2.14-34
Model DSV7-326
2.2.14.3-2 Model DSVT-326 Flared Aft Interstage Access Kit 2.2.14-35
2.2.14.3-3 Model DSV7-326 Basic Platform Assembly " .,_.214-36
: 2.2.14.3-4 Handling Kit Flared Aft Interstage (DSVT-4B-307) 2.2.14-37
2.2.14.4-1 SMMD Handling Fixture Model DSVT-345 2.2.14-47
2.2.14.4-2 Model DSV7-345 2.2.14-48
_. 2.2.14.4-3 Model DSV7-346 LBNPD in Shipping Container 2.2.14-49
2.2.14.4-4 LBNPD With Hoisting Adapter Installed Model 2.2.14-50
DSV7-346
2.2.14.4-5 Fork Lift (P/O Model DSVT-349) 2.2.14-51
_; 2.2.14.4-6 Model DSVT-347 Handling and Installation Kit 2.2.14-52
2.2.14.4-7 Model DSV7-347 Handling and Installation Kit 2.2.14-53
2.2.14.4-8 Control Console in Handling Fixture Model 2.2.14-55
DSVT-348
2.2.14.4-9 Control Console on Equipment Handling Cart Model 2.2.14-56
.! DSVT-348
_ 2.2.14.4-10 Installation of Control Console MI31 Model 2.2.14-57
_ DSVT-348§
_2.2.14.4-II Motor Base Handling GSE Model DSV7-348 2.2.14-58
I - 2._ 2.2.14.4-12 Model DSV7-349 Fork Lift Configuration A .2.14-59
I
2.2.14.4-13 Model DSV7-349 Fork Lift - Configuration h 2.2.14-60
¢ 2.2.i4.4-14 Model DSV7-349 Hoisting GSE for ESS Console and 2.2.14-61
'- Metabolic Analyzer
( 2.2.14._-15 Model DSV7-349 MI71 Ergometcr Handling GSE 2.2.14-62
9.2.14.4-16 Model DSVT-351 B_4D Handling GSE 2.2.14-63
: 2.2.14.4-17 BMMD Handling GSE Model DSVT-351 2.2.14-64
2.2.14.4-18 Right Side View of ASMU on Donning Station 2.2.14-65
! 2.2.14.4-19 Model DSV7-352 ASMU Adapter 2.2.14-66
"_ 2.2.14.4-20 Right Side Donning Station on IB85337-I Cart Model 2.2.14-67
_' DSV7-352
•_ 2.2.14.4-21 Model DSV7-352 Positioning ASMU on Donning Station 2.2.14-68
ii 2.2.14.4-22 Model DSV7-352 Installation of Protective Cage 2.2.14-69
_: 2.,.14.4-23" PSS Bottle Handling Hook Model DSV7-352 '_,..2.14-70
_ 2.2.14.4-24 Model DSV7-352 PSS Bottle 2.2.14-71
2.2.14.4-25 Model DSVT-353 Common Flight Stowage Containers 2.2.14-73
:_ Handling GSE
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_ 2.2.14.4-26 Model DSVT-353 AMS support 2.2.1h-74
*i 2.2.14.4-27 Model DSVT-353 AMS Handling Adapter Assembly 2.2.14-75 •
_ 2.2.14.4-28 Model DSV7-355 Exp S063 Handling Kit 2.2.14-76 •
*_ 2.2.14.4-29 Model DSV7-355 Alignment Fixture 2.2.14-77
2.2.14.4-30 Model DSVT-357 Exp S183 UV Panarama Handling 2.2.14-78 '
_ and Installation Kit
_ 2.2.14.4-31 Exp TO20 FCMU Handling and Installation Kit 2.2.14-79 _
_, DSV7-359
<
_ 2.2.14.4-32 Photometer Container Handling GSE Model DSV7-361 2.2.14-81
2.2.14.4-33 Model DSV7-361 Photometer Handling GSE 2.2.14-82
2.2.14.4-34 Model DSV7-361 Sample Array Container Handling GSE 2_2.1h-03 _ '_"
2.2.14.4-35 Inverter Handling GSE DSVT-367 2.2.14-84 _
2.2.14.4-36 ETC Stowage Container Handling GSE DSV7-367 2.2.14-85
2.2.14.4-37 Model DSV7-367 ETC Handling GSE 2.2.14-86 j_
2.2.14.4-38 Model DSVT-367 ETC Support Stand 2.2.14-87
2.2.14.4-39 Model DSVT-372 A9 Container Handling GSE 2.2.14-89 _
2.2.14.5-1 Meteoroid Shield Handling Kit - DSV7-302 2.2.14-92
2.2.14.5-2 Meteoroid Shield Handling Kit - DSV7-302 2.2.14-93
2.2.14.5-3 Meteoroid Shield Handling Fixture 2.2_14-94
2.2. lb. 5-4 Meteoroid Shield GSE Hardware for Installation 2.2.14-95
2.2.14.5-5 Hoist and Rigging Fixture Assembly 2.2.14-96
2.2.14.5-6 Model DSV7-371 Meteoroid Shield Counter Balance 2.2.14-98 ;
Kit
2.2.1h.6-1 Crew Quarters Veritcal Access Kit 2.2.14-I03
2.2.14,6-2 Vertical Crew Quarters Access Kit Model DSV7-303 2.2.14-104
2.2.14.6-3 Access Platform Assembly 2.2.14-105
2.2.14.6-4 Access Platform to Support Rail (Rolling Position) 2.2.14-106
2.2.1h.6-5 Access Platform to Support Rail (Locked/Unlocked 2.2.14-i07 _
Position)
2.2.14.6-6 Access Stands for Installation of Kit 2.2.14-i08 _,
2.2.14.6-7 Crew Quarters Access Kit Model DSV7-303 2,2,14-109
2.2.14.6-8 Crew Quarters Floor Plates DSV7-303 2.2.14-110
2.2.14.6-9 Plenum Area Access EqUipment 2.2.14-111 ....
2.2.14.6-10 Model DSV7-307 Upper Dome Protective Cover/Access 2.2.14-i12
Kit
2.2.1_.6-ii Dome Protective Cover/Access Kit and Forward Skirt 2.2.1h,-i13
Access Kit _=
_ 2.2.14.6-12 LH 2 Tank Dome Protective Cover/Access and Forward 2.2.14-i14
Sklrt Access Kit ..- _,
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2.2.14.6-13 LH2 Tank Dome Protective Cover and Access Kit Model 2.2.14-115
DSV7- 307
2.2.14.6-ih LH2 Tank Dome Protective Cover and Access Kit Model 2.2.14-116
DSV7-307
2.2.14,6-15 Protective Covers 2.2.14-117
2.2.14.6-16 Model DSVT-311 Hoist Assembly 2.2.14-119
2.2.14.6-17 Model DSVT-311 Dolly Track 2.2.14-120
2.2.14.6-18 Model DSV7-311 Food Container Handling GSE 2.2.14-121
2.2.14.6-19 Model DSV7-311 Urine Return Container Handling GSE 2.2.14-122
2.2.14.6-20 Model DSVT-311 Storage Container Handling GSE 2.2.14-123 A
2.2.14.6-21 Model DSV7-311 Water Container Handling GSE 2.2.14-124 ;
2.2.14.6-22 Model DSV7-311 Portable Water Tank Handling GSE 2.2,14-125 >
2.2.14.6-23 Film Vault Drawer Handling GSE Model DSlr[-311 2.2.14-126
2.2.14.6-24 Model DSV7-311 Portable Water Tank Checkout 2.2.14-127 '
Handling GSE i
2.2.14.6-25 Model DSV7-311 HSS Care 2.2.14-128
2.2.14.6-26 Cable Weight Assembly Installation Model DSVT-311 2.2.1&-129
2.2.1&.6-27 Hatch Transportation Kit Model DSV7-311 2.2.14-130
2.2.14.6-28 Hatch Transportation Kit Model DSV7-317 2.2.14-131
2.2.14.6-29 Handling Fixtuye for Access Panel Meteoroid Shield 2.2.14-132
Segment
_r%f
2,2.].4.6-30 Flared Aft Inte_.'tage Access Kit Model DSVT-3_o 2.2.14-134
2.2.14.6-31 Plan View of Flared Aft Interstage Access Kit Model 2.2.14-135
DSV7-326
2.2.14.6.-32 Model DSV7-326 Flared Aft Interstage Access Kit 2.2.14-136
2.2.14.6-q3 Model DSV7-326 Basic Platform Assembly 2.2.14-137
2.2.14.6-34 Forward Skirt Access Kit Model DSV7-328 2.2.14-138
2.2.14.6-35 Dome Portective Cover/Access Kit and F_zward Skirt 2.2.14-139 1
Access Kit
2.2.14.6-36 Basic Platform Assembly 2.2.14-140 _
2.2.14.6-37 Basic Platform Assembly "_ith Upper Level Platform 2.2.14-141
2.2,14.o-38 Forward Skirt Access Kit - Access Kit Modification 2.2.14-142
'_ 2.2.14.7-1 Model DSV7-327 Aft Umbilical Carrier 2.2.14-148
2.2.14.7-2 Aft Umbilic_d Kit,, Checkout Stand (DSV-hB-346) 2.2.14-149
_' 2.2.14.7-3 Umbilical Kit, Forward Launcher (DSV-4B-316) 2.2.14-151 _
i (DSVT-375) _
i 2.2.14.8-! Vacuum Pumping Unit Installation (DSVT-314) 2.2.14-153
2,2,14.8-2 Fluid System S,_hematic (DSVT-314) 2,2.14-155 _:
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• 2.2.14.8-3 Refrigeration Subsystem Service Unit DSVT-315 2,2,14-156 _
: fro_+ View (Door Removed)
2.2.14.8-4 Refrigeration Subsystem, Service Unit 2.2.ih-157
_ 2.2.14, 8-5 A_c___s_ry Kit Mechanical Test (DSV7-316) 2.2.14-159
! 2.2.!4,8-6 Accessory Kit - Mechanical Test (DSVT-316) 2.2.14-160
! Pressure Decay Leak Detector Schematic 2=
2.2.14.8-7 AccessolV Kit Mechanical Test (DSV7-316) 2.2.14-162
4
2.2,14.8-8 Aiz Content Tester Assembly P/N IB87918-I 2.2.14-163
: (DSV7- 316 )
_.2.14.8-9 Accessory Kit Mechanical Test (DSVT-316) 2.2.14-]64 i
2.2.14.8-10 Flexible H(,se End Fitting GSE - P_ Coolanol-15 2.2.14-170
" 2.2.14.9-i Ground Thermal Conditioning System DSVT-301 2.2.14-175
2.2,14.9-2 Ground Thermal Conditioning System System 2.2 14-176
Configuration DSV7-301
2.2,14.9-3 Ground Thermal Ccnditioning System DSV7-301 KSC 2.2.14-177 :
Operational Configuration
2.2.14.9-4 G_ound Thermal Conditioning System DSVT-301 CCU 2,2.14-178 •
Mechanical Schematic ::
2.2.]4.9-5 TCU Temperature vs. Flowrate 2.2.14-181
2.2.lb.10-1 Ground Thermal Conditioning System DSVT-334 2.2.1_-188
2.2.14.10-2 Ground Thermal Conditioning System DSV7-334 2,2,]4-189
2.2,14.10-3 Ground Thermal Conditioning System DSVT-334 2,2.14-190
2.2.1h.10-h Ground Thermal Conditioning System OWS Interior 2.2.14-191
DSV7-334
2.2.14.11-1 Distribution System, Environmental Control Kit 2.2.14-197 '
(DSV7-344)
2.2.14.11-2 Normal Operational System, VAB (& Pad Contingency) 2.2.14-198 !;
DSV7-3_ _,
2.2.14.12-i Accessory Kit Mechanical Test (DSV7-316) 2.2.14-20Z
2.2.14.12-2 Accsssory Kit - Mechanical Test (DSV7-316) 2.2.14-20_ _"
: Scientific Airlock Leak Test Kit Schematic
2.2.14.13-i HSS Water Subsystem Checkout and Sterilization 2.2.1_-207 :_
Console DSV7-312
2.2.14.13-2 OWS Checkout and Sterilization Water Subsystem, 2.2.1)_-208
• HSS (DSV7-312)
: 2.2.14.13-3 OWS Checkout and Steriliz&tlc,n Water Subsystem, 2.2.14-209
HSS (DSV7-312)
2.2.1_.13-4 Water Subsystem &_E DSVT-312 2.2.14-210
2.2.1_.14-i Checkout Kit, Wa' e Memagement System (DSV7-373) 2.2.14-215 :
; 2.2.14.14-2 Ground Support Equipment - Waste Management - 2.2.14-216 :
_ Fecal/Urine Collector Air Distribution Test
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2.2.1_.16-I Leak Test and Checkout Accessories Kit DSV7-300 2.2.14-225
2.2.1_.16-2 Leek Test and Checkout Accessories Kit.I_V7-300 2.2.14-226
2.2.1_.16-3 Leak Test and Checkout Accessories Kit DSVT-300 2.2.14-227
2.2.1h.16-h Leak Test and Checkout Accessories Kit DSVT-300 2.2.1h-z2,,
C.2.lb.16-5 Leak Test and Checkout Accessories Kit DSVT-300 2.2.14-229
2.2.1b.16-6 Pneumatic Pressurization Console 2.2.14-230
2.2.14.16-? Gas Heat Exchanger (DSV7-332) 2.2.14-232
2.2.1h.16-8 D6V7-350 Vacuum Pump External View 2.2.1h-23_
2.2.i4.16-9 Mode._ DSV7-363 M509 Sphere Pressurization Schematic 2.2.14-235
2.2.14.16-10 DSVT-364 System Schematic 2.2.14-236
': 2.2.1_.16-ii 1B5675-9-i P_ol Assembly from DsV-hB-493A Kit 2.2,14-238
2.2.15.2-1 Watez Pressurization _anel - 500 2.2.15-2
2,2.15.2-2 Trash Disposal Airlock - 634 2.2.15-3
2.2.15.2-3 Portable Water Tank 2.2.15-4%
2.2.15.2-h Waste Management Compartment Water Dump Valve - 831 2.2.15-6 ,
2.2.15.2-5 Waste Processor Door - Waste Processor Control & 2.2.15-7
Display Panel - Waste Processor Circuit Breaker
Panel- 817
2.2.1.5.2-6 SMMD Operation/Calibration - S_4D Reading Versus 2.2.15-8
Processing Time
2.3.2-i PO327 Material/Component Usage Form 2.3-3
2.3.2-2 Aluminum Foil Insulation Installation 2.3-28
2.3.2-3 Closed Installation System (Overall Conce_t) 2.3-33
2.3.2-4 Wire Trough Installation Tank Sidewall - IB7_713 2.3-3_
2.3.2-.5 Wire Trough Installation Crew Quarters Ceiling - 2.3-35
iBT_Tlb
2.3.2-6 Wire Trough Installation Tank Sidewall - IB74713 P.3-36
2.3.2-7 Flex Trough Usage (General Concept) 2.3-37
2.3.2-8 Rigid Trough 2.3-38?
2.3.2-9 Application of Connector Boot Assembly to Tubing 2.3-39
2.3.2-10 Wire Trough Typical Section at Wire Clamp 2.3-40
2,3.2-11 Wire Trough Fire Break and End Fitting 2.3-_!
_ 2.3.2-12 General Ill_ination Fluorescent Bulb 2.3-50
2.3.2-13 Cross Section of Lens Assembly 2.3-52
2.3.2-14 General Illumination Floodlight 2.3-53
2.3.2-15 Refrigeration Subsyztem Braze Fitting for Transi- 2.3-55
tion from Aluminum to CRES Tubing
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2.3.2-16 Refrigeration System 9omponent-to-Boss Fluid 2,3-56
Connection
2.3.2-17 Refrigeration System Flare Tube Connector (MC) 2.3-58
2.3.2-18 Refrigeration Subsystem - Refrigeration Pump Unit 2.3-59
Enclosure
2.3.2-19 Shrouded Coolant Combustibility Test-Al Tape Intact 2.3-61
2.3.2-20 Shrouded Coolant Line Combustibility Test Sample - 2.3-62 !
A_ Tape Removed
2.3.2-21 Shrouded Coolant Line Combustibility Test Sample - 2.3-63 :_
A1 Tape Removed " ii
2.3.2-22 Shrouded Coolant Combustibility Test - A1 Tape 2.3-64
Intact %
2.3.5.1-1 Allowable Surface Area of High Vapor Pressure 2.3-90
Materials i
2.3.5.1-2 S-13G Thermal Control Coating Test Results 2.3-92
2.3.5.1-3 S-13G Paint Predicted Outgassing Rate as a F_nction 2.3-93 :
of Time in Orbit
2.3.5 .i-_ 0WS External Coatings 2.3-94 $
3.1-i Reliability and Safety Inter-relations Between 3-3 _
Functions and Activities
3.2.2-1 Design Review Flow Chart 3-17 _
5.5-1 OWS-I Post Manufacturing Checkout Schedule 5-60
(Page i of 2)
5.5-1 0WS-I Post Manufacturing Checkout Schedule 5-61
L.
(Page 2 of 2)
5.6.1-1 Spacecraft Overall Schedule - Skylab i 5-8_
6.i.i-I Memorandum - Orbital Workshop Configuration 6-2
Definition
6.1.2-1 Skylab - 0W8 Change Request Form 6-4
7.2-1 MDAC-W/H08C Coordination Interfaces 7-5
7.2-2 HOSC 8kylab Operations Support Facility Layout 7-7
7.2-3 Skylab Data Flow 7-11 /°
7.2-_ Action Request Flow 7-17 /
* 7.3.2-1 Orbital Workshop Prelaunch an4 Mission Support Team (-20
7.3.2-2 0WS Mission Support 7-21 _.
'_, 7.3.4-i Overall Action Item Flow 7-24 _;
:' 7.3.6-1 0WS Mission Support Center Location and General 7-32
,_ Layout
_'< 8.1.2-1 Orbital Workshop Solar Array System 8-10
l
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: 8.i.2-2 Refrigeration System 8-12
_ 8.1.2-3 Fi]anVault Paekaglng 8-13
8.1.2-4 Thrtmter Attitude Control System 8-15
8.1.2-5 OWS Environmental Control System 8-16
8.1.2-6 Skyla b Personal Hygiene Syst_ 8-i_
o 8.I.2.7 Water System 8-19
8.I.2-8 Waste Manage_nt System 8-20
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: 1.2.2.5-1 S_ylab Missions - Calendar Day/Day of Year/Mission 1-14
Day
1.2.2.5-2 3WS Experiment Activity 1-16
2.2.1.2-1 Orbital Worksnop Internal Color Requirements 2.2.1-29
2.2..1.3-1 TC--9 Qualification Test: TACS _phere Installation 2.2.1-158
2.2.1.3-2 TACS Nitrogen Gas Storage Spheres Production 2.2.1-161
Acceptance Test
2.2.1._-i Aft Interstage - Design Ultimate Loads 2.2.1-179
2.2.i.5-1 SL-I Orbit al Workshop Module Wieght Growth 2.2.1-188
2.2.2.1-1 Meteoroid Shield Test Verification Summary 2.2.2-25
2.2.2.1-2 Problem Summary Subsystem Habitation Area Tank - 2.2.2-32
Meteoroid Shield
! 2.2.2.2-1 Meteoroid Protection Test Verification Summary 2.2.2-47
2.2.2.2-2 Meteoroid Proection Structural Evaluation Sum_ 2.2.2-50
! 2.2.3-1 Thermal Control System Performance Summary 2.2.3-5
2.2.3-2 A/M Cooling to OWS 2.2.3-15
2.2.3-3 Environmental/Thermal Control Subsystem Design 2.2 3-19
Parameters
• 12.2.3-4 Convective Heater Design Parameters 2.2.3-39
!
12.2.3-5 Radiant Heater Design Roquirements 2.2.3-43
!
2.2.3-6 HPI Design Parameters 2.2.3-62
[2.2.3-7 0rblte£ Workshop Optical Coatings 2.2.3-68
I
12.2.3-8 H_t Pipe Design Parameters 2.2.3-81
•; 2.2.3-9 0WS Thermal Control System Optical Properties 2.2.3-95
Requirements Verification
2.2.3-10 Average F-_w Velocitie_ Test Eata 2.2.3-104
_ 2.2.3-11 SL-2 Ventilation Duct Flow Summary 2.2.3-117
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: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
D
A Angstroms
AC Alternating Current
ACE Acceptance Checkout Equipment
ACQSS Acquisition Sun Sensor
ACS Attitude Control System
ADP Acceptance Data Package
: ALgA Astronaut Life Support Assembly
AM Airlock Module
APCS Attitude & Pointing Control System _
ARC Ames Research Center
ASAP Auxiliary Storage and Playback
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount
ATMDC Apollo Telescope Mount Digital Computer
BTU British Thermal Units _,
CBRM Charger Battery Regulator Module
CCB Change Control Board
CCOH Combined Contaminants, Oxygen, Humidity
CCS Command Communication System
C&D Control and Display
CEI Contract End Item
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
CG Center of GravityC
CL Centerline
Cluster SWS plus CSM (used synonymously with "Orbital Assembly")
CM Command Module
CMG Control Moment Gyro
CMGS/TACS Control Moment Gyros Subsystem/Thruster Attitude Control
Subsystem
C/O Checkout
COAS Crew Optical A!igrLment Sight
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
COFW Certificate of Flight Worthiness
COQ Certificate of Qualification
cps cycles per second
CRS Cluster Requirements Specification
CaM Command Service Module
C&W Caution and Warning
DA Deployment Assembly i
db Decibel
dc Direct Current
DCS Digital Command System -'-"
DCSU Digital Computer Switching Unit ,,
4
DDA Drawing Departure Authorization ._
DDAS Digital Data _ddres8 System
°' deg. Degree
DTCS Digital Test Commnd System _
DTMS Digital Test Measuring System
xxxtx
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ECP Engineering Change Proposal
ECS Environmental Control System
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
F_:I Electromagnetic Interference
EPCS Experiment Pointing Control Subsystem
EPS Electrical Power System
ERD Experiment Requirement Document
ESE Electrical Support Equipment
ESS Experiment Support System ,,
ETR Eastern Test Range
EVA Extravehicular Activity
"F Degrees Farenheit
FAg Fixed Airlock Shroud
fc foot candles
FM Frequency Modulation ._
fps feet per second
PSS Fine Sun Sensor
ft. Feet
g Acceleratlcn due to Earth's Gravity
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
Grms G Level, root mean square
GSE Ground Support Equipment
H20 Water
He Helium
HSS Habitability Support System
Hz Hertz
ICD Interface Control Document
lOP In Orbit Plane
IU Instrumentation Urit
IU/TACS Instrument Unit/Thruster Attitude Control Subsystem
IVA Intra-Vehicular Activity i
JSC Johnson Spacecraft Center
_z Kilohertz
KSC Kennedy _paceflight Center
LCC Launch Control Center '_
LCG Liquid Cooled Garment ,_
LH2 Liquid Hydrogen •
LO2 Liquid Oxygen
LRC Langley Research Center ._
LV Launch Vehicle
LVDC Launch Vehicle Digital Computer
MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
MGSE Maintenance _round Support Equipment _
MHa Megahertz
_._,D Mission Requirements Document .,__
MS Margin of Safety
m/see. Millisecond :'
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MSFN Manned Space Flisht Network ._
MSOB Manned Spacecraft Operations Building '_
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N2 Nitrogen
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NHB NASA Handbook
NiCd Nickel Cadmium
NM Nautical Miles
02 Oxygen
OA Orbital Assembly (SWS and CSM - Used synonymously with
"Cluster")
OWS Orbital Workshop
AP Differential Pressure
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PCS Pointing Control System
PMC Post Manufacturing Checkout
POD Planning Operational Dose
psi pounds per square inch
psia pounds per square inch absolute
psid pounds per square inch differential
Q Heat
RCS Reaction Control System
RF Radio Frequency
S-IB First Stage of Saturn I-B Launch Vehicle
S-If Saturn II
SAL Scientific Air Lock
SAS Solar Array System
SCN Specification ChanEe Notice
SL Skylab Frogram
SM Service Module
SWS Saturn Workshop (PS/MDA/ATM/AM/OWS/IU/ATM Deployment
Assembly)
AT Differential Temperature
TACS Thruster Attitude Contr_1 System
TCRD Test and Checkout Requirements Document
TCSCD Test and Checkout Specification and Criteria Document
UV Ultra Violet
VAB Vehicle Assembly Building (HI-Bay)
Vdc Volts direct current
VHF VerTHigh Frequency
NMS WasReManagement System
WSS Water Subsystem
Z-LVfE) Z Axis in Local Vertical (Earth Resources Attitude Mode)
Z-LV(R) Z axis in Local Vertical (Rendezvous Attitude Mode)
m
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2.2.4 Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS)
2.2.4.1 Design Requirements - For most of the nine-month long Skylab mission,
:r
'! the primary source of attitude control was the control moment gryos
(CMG's) which provided the pointing accuracy and stability necessary
for many Skylab astronomical and earth resources experiments, s_d
which maintained the solar inertial attitude necessary for the Skylab _
: solar arra_-s. A propulsive attitude control system, (ACS) was needed
_ to provide control during CMG spinu_ (the first ten-hours of the :
mission), to handle docking tra_sients and large maneuvers beyond '
? the capability of the CMG's, to desaturate the CMG'_ when necessary, •
!
and to provide a contingency capability in case of CMG failure. This _
system, designated TACS (thruster attitude control s?ste'm), was re-
qui"ed to provide a total of 61,000 lb-sec (271 x l05 N-sec) of
: impulse. A high thrust level of 50 lbf (222 N) was required at the
start of the mission x'orseparation transients, a 20 ibf (89 N) thrust
minimum was required for each of the three dockings with Apollo
command modules, and a lO lbf (l_k N) minimum was specified for the
_ rest of the mission.
: I Because of the ample pay!oacl capability of the Saturn V Booster, thed sign was not subj ct to the severe weight constrai ts n rmally im-
.!
posed on such a system. This permitted selection of an ambient gas ;
t
system to minimize development costs and maximize reliability. Nitro-
Ben was selected as the propellant to minimize contamination of Skylab _
external equipment and to avoid the complexity of preventing conden- _
sation in cold propellant lines that would have resulted from use of -:
* $
.i ;
, 2.2.h-i _:
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ma heavier gas. The thrust requirement permitted deletion of system
; pressure regulators. Thrust level was allowed to decay with bottle
pressure in a simple blowdown mode.
Y
• TACS thrust requirements and predicted system performance are shown
on Figure 2.2.4.i-i.
/
:_ 2.2.4.2 System Description - The schematic shown in Figure 2.2.4.2-i identi- !
! fies the major TACS components: 6 thruster nozzles, 24 solenoid
v
valves with integral filters (6 quad-redundant assemblies), 2 supply
: llne filters, 22 propellant storage spheres, and a fill disconnect.
The location of the TACS on the Skylab spacecraft and the mounting
of key components are shown in Figures 2.2.h.2-2 and 2.2.4.2-3.
The thruster nozzle has a 50:1 expansion ratio and a bell-shaped ex-
i pansion contour. These features were selected to maximize specific
impulse while confining the exhaust plume to minimize impingement on
the vehicle which could c_neel part of the thrust. ::
The TACS solenoid valve is illustrated in Figure 2.2.h.2-_. A small
pilot poppet, integral and coaxial with the main poppet, controls
: pressure forces that open the main poppet. The pilot poppet and main
poppet are linked mechanically so that energizing the solenoid coil
0
opens the valve against the springs at low supply pressure. When the
solenoid is deenerglzed, both poppets are pressure-unbalanced closed
to assure leaktight sealing. •
The supply line filters utilize a multilayer etched-disk construction
to provide I0 uicron nominal filtering capability_
1974020216-040
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The nitrogen supply spheres are of the same design as those used in
_,,cS-!_rB ambient he!i_un r_pressurization system. They are constructed
J
of welded titanium segments, and are qualified for operating pressures
up to 3200 psia (2.2 x 107 N/m2). The maximum loading pressure of
the TACS supply was therefore established at 3200 psia. The storage
_ spheres were loaded through , self-sealing disconnect located at the
vehicle skin. The disconnect was hard-capped prior to launch to pro-
vide extra protection against leakage.
r
" The propellant supply and distribution system was induction brazed
(Figure 2.2.4.2-5) at all tubing connect points to minimize leakage.
A modification to the inlet fitting of each sphere and the addition
_ of a bi-metal Joint (Figure 2.2.4.2-6) provided the capability of
"in-place" brazing. Fluxless induction brazing provided a lightweight
leakproof Joint.
The TACS electrical subsystem was developed to (i) utilize Airlook
Module (AM) po_er; (2) accommodate command or control signals from
the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) Digital Computer, the Instrument
Unit (IU) Flight Control Computer, the AM Digital Command System and
the 0WS switch selector (depending on the mode of oper_tlon and the
; phase of the mission); and (3) provide instrumentation measurement
:_ capabilities for telemetry and Skylab panel display monitoring
requirements.
: The electrical system utilizes separate redundant circuits and compon-
ents to protect against single-point failures and employs high relia-
bility in parts selection and design while ensuring compatibility of
cc_mand signals, control s.gnals and power measurement signals with
the interfacing system and equipment.
" 2.2._-8
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[Relay logic and control circults_ with solid-state time-delay circuits,
were selected as the electrical configuration. Relays were nhosen
because of:
o High reliability w based on past experience
o Excellent isolation features for interface compatibility
: o Nonloading circuit features
o No status change from loss of power
o Compatibility with the installation environment and structural
load conditions.
2.2.4.3 Testing - The TACS was certified for the Skylab mission after success-
ful completion cf the following development and qualification test
programs:
o Development Test
TC-I Thruster Module Assembly (single valve, dual valve and
\
module )
TC-10 Bi-metal Joint
TC-12 TACS Valve -
Phase I Lip seal evaluation
; Phase II Production module life cycle
; Phase III Backup seal evaluation
_. TC-I4 TACS pressure switch ':
p 2.2._-ii
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o Qualification Test
TC-2 Thrust_r module assembly
Phase I Manifold assembly
• Phase IA Pretest evaluat_ on - single end dual valve
Phase IIA Pre-vibration and shock
Phase III Modules and manifold
TC-9 TACS pressure sphere
TC-I3 TACS pressure switch and temperature transducer
t
The purpose of each test program, problems uncovered end resolutions
are listed as follows:
A. TC-1 Thruster Module Assembly - The purpose of the test was to
evaluate and establish a production configuration for the TACS
valve. The development valves were tested at the valve, dual
_: valves and module levels to evaluate: functional, performance,
and dynamic characteristics under various environmental end
system conditions. The major problems uncovered during the test
program end resolutions were as follows:
l/ Internal Leakage - Redesigned seat and poppet configurations
_ and change material to vespel. Increased pre-load on main
poppet springs and chemical de-burring of all machined parts.
2/ Response Anomalies - Increased vent holes in plunger from
2 to _ and micro-lube lip seal.
2.2.4-12
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3/ Loss in Suppression - Changed to high reliability diodes and
i new supplier.
: h/ Erratic Response - Added secondary seal to the lip seal to :
c -'
( minimize the leakage rate into solenoid chamber and a physical
.; stop to limit the main poppet travel.
B. TC-2 Thruster Module Assembly - The purpose of this qualification
: test was to establish the flight worthiness of the TACS valve, i
module and cluster (3 modules). The TACS pressure switches,
temperature transducer, filter, flex tubings and manifold were
• included in the test specimen. The test hardware was subjected .
to and successfully met all the design parameters except for
_ressure switches which were sequentially qualified under Line
Item TC-I3. The problems and resolutions are listed below.
'i
l/ Main Seat Crack. - One of the 12 valves in the test program s
failed after being subjccted to 3000 cycles. The failed
valve was replaced and all 12 valves completed 35,000 cycles
, under ell launch and orbital environments. After extensive
analysis the cracked seat was detennlned to be a random
failure and the v_ive was considered acceptable for flight
since the maximum expected operating life was 3100 cycles. _
'f
2/ Pressure Swi'tches - The components were deleted from thi_
line item and quallfled under Line Item TC-13 due to external ..-.:-
lea_age and failure to respond during repeat cycling of the
._. TACS module.
: 2.z.4-13 _
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_ 3/ Temperature Transducer - The component failed to function
t
during pretest and was deleted from this line item. The
: component was qual_ fied under Line Item TC-13.
C. TC-9 TACS Pressure Sphere - The purpose of this test was to
qualify the TACS pressure sphere installation for oOWS usage.
_ The test specimen ir_!uded a TACS pressure sphere assembly with
temperature (transducer) probe, bi-metal Joint and a segment of
_ the thrust structure. The test specimen was qualified without
':: any problems.
i D. TC-10 TACS Bi-Metal Joint - The purpose of :his test was to
evaluate the design configuration of the Joint and the suitability
for production use. Special purposes were to determine the redund-
ancy of the Joint, pressure and load capabilities, weld Joint and
sphere neck configuration, and tooling and welding procedures.
Six test specimens were successfully tested to demonstrate the
! acceptability of the bi-metal Joint configuration for production
i_ usage.
E. TC-13 TACS Pressure Switch and Temperat._re Transducer - The purpose
! of this test was to qualify the TACS pressure switch and tempera-
ture (probe) transducer for OWS usage. The components were
demonstratmd to be adequata for the OWS mission requirements since
both the pressure switch and temperature transducer functioned
properly after being subjected to vibration, shock, and cyclic
testing. The only problem was with the pressure switch.
I
• 2.2._-i_
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Pressure switch had external leakage and failed to function
properly after accumulating approximately 6300 cycles or approx-
imately 4300 cycles after being subjected to vibration and
shock. T_is was considered an acceptable service life since the
: maximum operational llfe would be 3100 cycles and the talkback
parameterE5 were not critical.
F. TC-14 TACS Pressure Switches - The purpose of the development
_ test was to evaluate the performance of the TACS type pressure
switches with diaphram materials made from CRES 302 and Kapton.
• Four pressure switches, two with CRES 302 and two with Kapton
diaphram, were subjected to proof, leak, functional s_d 35,000
cycles at the expected orbital temperatures. The results appeared
to indicate that the pressure switches with Kapton were better
than with CRES 302 diaphram. Both test specimens with Kapton
d_aphrem completed the test program without any problems. One
_f the test specimens with CRES 302 diaplu-am developed a leak
after 8261 cycles and the other specimen successfully completed
the test _,rogram without any problem. There were no pass/fail
criteris for this test program.
2.2.4._ Mission Results - The TACS successfully fulfilied all vehicle control
demands imposed upon the system throughout the missi_'_. The TACS was
the primary _ystem for attitude control following S-II separation
until the CMG's were sufficiently spun-up to permit transfer to ATM/
CMG control. Following transfer to CMG control, the TACS continued ....
to function as a supplemental system to correct large attitude error
rates and provide momentum relief for the CMG's. FiA_re 2.2.4.4-i
shows the TACS usage history.
,: 2.2.k-15
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Impulse consumption significantly exceeded the predictions during the
early portion of SL-I/2 _ad during most of SL-4_ Th_ excessive usage
was attributed to the following mission an_nalies:
A. ATM/CMG switchover occurred ten-hours later than scheduled due
to rate gyro drift which resulted in a higher than normal rate
of CMG momentum buildup.
B. Due to the loss of the meteoroid shield, several "unplanned"
attitude maneuvers were conducted for vehicle thermsS conditioning
purposes.
C. Periodic CMG momentum Gages were performed while meintaining the
off-nominal vehicle attitud_ (i.e., -45° pitch) for thermsl condi-
tioning prior to JSC parasol sunshield deployment.
D. Large veLicle perturbations were associated with the SEVA and EVA
activities to deploy the malfunctioned SAS panel.
E. Several unsuccessful "hard dockings" were attempted.
F. Failure of CMG No. 1.
Total usable impulse at liftoff was approximately 82,000 ib-sec
(3.64 x l05 N-sec). This was 2!,000 lb-sec. (.93 x l05 N-sec)
: greater then the minimum requirement of 61,000 lb-sec (2.71 x l05
N-see). _.
,)
J
?
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On DOY 32V, CMG No. i failed. The predicted TACS usage during the
planned EREP and Kchoutek Observation Program and during E-¢._'s w_
5
significantly higher for two CMG operations. This raised concern as
to the accuracy with which TACS remaining impulse was known. A
i comparison of apparent and actual TACS specific impulse was made
L
using APCS momentum data from 80 pulses along with thruster flowrate
data from Qual Testing. At a TACS storage pressure of 1280 psia
(8.82 x 106 N/m2), the average Isp w_s 78 seconds on the hot side
i
(ll3°F, 318°K), and 66 seconds on the co__d side (-59°F, 222°K).
These values were respectively 2 percent and 7 percent higher than
: the nominal predictions. The estimated accuracy of the results is
[
; +6 percent.
No detectable system leakage was found in a series of mass calcula-
\
tions during each of the storage periods.
2.2.4.5 Conclusions and R_commendations - The negligible leak rate of the
TACS system has verified the adequacy of bi-metal Joints and "!n-
place" induction brazing for long term storage systems. The ability
of the TACS valves to remain leak tight after extensive orbital
usage has verified the adequacy of the valve design, materials, and
testing program.
The unanticipated high propellant consumption during the early part
of the mission caused concern that TAC8 might be depleted prematurely.
Future design_ should _nciude the cap&bilit_ to interconnect systems
using similar working fluld_ such as the mACS Lnd the AM 02 and N2
supplies which had ample _'eserves.
: 2.z.h-18
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:2.2.h.6 Development History
A, Th_ TACh system flown on the OWS wa_ the basic system conceived
• when the Skylab concept evolved from utilization of a passivated
propulsive stage to a completely outfitted Workshop. Although
little TACS system evolution occurred, many studies were made
and tests accomplished to make sure that the system chosen would
fulfill all mission requirements and provide maximum reliability.
Some of the major studies made were as follows: /-
i/ Many different gases wez: considered as propellants. Nitrogen .:
was chosen, although a comparatively large sto:-age voltnne was _
required. Handling and performance familiarity, availability,
compatibility and safety considerations were decisive factors
in choosing nitrogen as the propellant.
_. 2/ Several system configurations were considered:
o Regulated system
o Blowdown system
o Regulated plus high pressure blowdown system
o Pressure switch (bang-bang) system
o Regulated plus pressure switch solenoid valve system
The blowdown system was chosen primarily for system simplicity
(high reliability).
L
3/ System redundancy and gas supply isolation (in addition to
quad redundant control valves which were a part of the basic
system concept) were extensively studied. Among the systems ,_
C
studied were:
1974020216-057
mo Completely independent redundant systems
c Gas sup_!y isolated _.__thpyrotechnic valves
o Gas supply isolated with parallel solenoid valves snd
check valves
'_ o Gas supply isolated with combinations of the above
It was found that the basic system reliability could be
improved as much as 13 perce_it; however, the overall attitude
_ control system improvement would be only a fraction of one
r
percent. In light of schedule impact and cost, it was de-
cided to stay wzth the simple, existing baseline system.
4/ In addition to the foregoins items, miscellaneov_ development
items occurred as follows:
a. Vibration isolators were installed on the thruster modules
when it was found =hat launch vibration tended to bounce
the valve poppets and cause temporary leakage.
:
_ b. Redundant sleeves were added to the bimetallic Joint
(titani_n to steel) when problems were encountered on
other programs with a similar Joint.
B. The heart of the TACS system was the Oua_ redundant TACS valves.
These valves were pilot operated solenoid valves specifically
designed for this agplication to meet fast response and very low
leakage requirements. Brief development history comments on these
valves are as follows:
2.2.4-20
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rI/ Several different main poppet seal materials and configurations
of the TACS valve were evaluated in the initial phase of test-
i,_. The configuration that displayed the optimum combina-
• tion of sealing characteristics was a conical poppet with
; an "L" section sealing surface made from du Pont Vespel seal
material. This configuration was used in all development
valves and subsequently on production valves.
_ 2/ It was noted that when the valves were tested in the quad
redundant module, the upstream valves did not seal effectively -_
with a high inlet pressure and low Ap. However, all valves
exhibited sufficient sealing characteristics at moderate
. (approximately i0 percent of inlet pressure) or high AP's.
This problem was solved by assuring the presence of a moderate
to high AP across the upstream valve, by slowing the closing
: response of the downstream valve. This was accomplished by
shunting the Zener diode in the valve's voltage suppression
circuit.
3/ Duri,_ high temperature testing, electrical shorts developed
in the magnum solenoid coil wire. This problem was resolved
by changing the coil wire to constantan, changing the insu-
lation from teflon to polyimide, wrapping the wire on an
aluminum spool, and potting the entire assembly to provide
greater heat dissipation.J
! 2.2.4-21
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{h/ A probl_a with plunger flanges bending was found in the
I downstream valves. It was determined that. prpssure surges
from upstream valves caused rapid acceleration of the main
poppet which resulted in impact loads imparted to the plunger °
flange. This resulted in slow pneumatic response within the
: valve. This proble_n was resolved by incorporation of a main
poppet stop which precluded impact of the plunger fl;mge. _:
-_-- 5/ Repeat cycle testing revealed the existence of a leak.path
: around the backside of the lip seal. This leakage adversely ,
affected valve response at pressures between 1750 to 3200
J
psig. This problem was resolved by incorporation of a static
; seal behind the primary lip seal.
)
2.2.5 Solar Array System - In this section the Solar Arrsy System (SAS)
design requirements, system description, testing, mission results and
development history are presented. The SAS is made ._p of a structural
beam/fairing assembly, solar panels, deployment mechanism, ordnance
deploy._ent devices, power units, and associated wiring and cabling.
The system supplies the electrical puwer to the Airlock Module (AM)
for distribution to the power-using equipment. The SAS design require-
; ment was to provide an average of 10,496 watts between 51 and 125
volts during the sunlight portian of each orbit.
I
2.2.5.1 Design Requirements - The SAS was designed for installation on the
OWS. Structural modifications were made to accommodate mounting the
_ solar array panels. A dry nitrogen gas purge system was provided for
pre-launch purge of the solar array panels. The SAS was designed to
satisfy the following requirements:
o During the primary deployment mode, the SAS shall be capable of
being deployed starting at any time from 20-minutes after liftoff
to 105-minutes after liftoff. Total deployment time shall vary
from nine minutes maximum for deployment initiation 20 minutes
after liftoff to fourteen minutes maximum for deployment initiat_
lOS-minutes after liftoff.
o Deployment of the SAS shall be automatic.
a. Primary control shall be from the OWS switch selector.
b. A backup deployment command shall be available at the OWS and
AM interface. •
2.Po5-I
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! o When deployed, the panel surfaces shall be in the OWS Position II -
Position IV plane with the active surfaces facing in the direction
of the Position I plane.
b
o The o_dnance devices used to initiate deployment of the array
wings shall not damage the OWS structure, contaminate the solar
panels, or deter the proper operation of the solar array.
o The solar array panels shall consist of a number of separate _
J
groups of connected modules whose outputs shall be routed to the
OWS/AM interface by a two-wire (positive and return) circuit.
o The average available power from the array if measured at the AM/
OWS interface and integrated over the sunlight portion of the
orbit at the end of the mission shall not be less than i0,h96
watts with the Skylab in solar inertial orientation. This power
i shall be distributed over 8 individual sources (groups of modules)
with at.available average of not less than 1,312 watts each. This
power shall be available at a minimum voltsge of 51 volts at the
AM/OWS interface and the voltage shall not exceed 125 volts. Each
module shall be diode isolated from all other modules within its
group. Each group shall be electrically isolated from all other
groups.
o Thc_ packaged solar array wing assemblies shall be capable of with-
standing dynamic environments, induced by transportation by land
; (truck), water (including barge on ocean), and air without experi-
encing system degradation.
I
t
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o The SAS beam/fairing shall protect tilesolar panels and deployment
mechanisms and be self-venting through the induced environments
of the Skylab ascent trajectory.
o The SAS shall be capable of withstanding the vibration and shock
levels associated with SWS maneuvers .roddocking operations.
-_.2.5.2 System Description - The SAS for the OWS is made up of two wings,
each consisting of a forward fairing, be_/fair.:_g, three wing
sections and mechanical and ordnance systems required to deploy the
SAS in orbit.
Each wing section contains ten identical active solar panels for a
total of 30 panels per wing or 60 panels per system. Two additional
panels are included in each wing section to provide spacing between
active pea_els and the beam fairing; one is a truss panel and the
other a "dummy" panel. A typical SAS wing assembly is shown in
Figure 2.2.5 •2-1.
A. Electrical - The solar panels are approxlnately °7 by i21-in.
(68.6 by 307.3 cm). Each panel contains four separate and
_ electrically isolated solar cell modules. Each module contains "i
616 2 x h cm solar cells made up of four parallel strings, each
with 15h cells connected electrically in series. The four strings
are connected electrically in parallel at the module output
terminals. Figure 2.2.5.2-2 shows a typical solar module - four
_i per solar panel.
k
I
I :
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The electrical power is routed from each solar cell module •
through stabilizer beam channels on the backside of each wing
i
i _ section, inside the beam fairing, and then into the forward
_ skirt of the OWS. Inside the forward skirt, solar module power :
enters the power unit which provides diode _solation and bussing
into eight groups of 15 modules each. Power is then routed from
:_ i_ the power unit to the OWS/AM interface. The eight 15 module
groups from each wing are paired to make eight solar array groups
!
: (SAG) of 30 modules each. Each of the eight groups is in turn
. connected to one of the AM power conditioning groups (PCG) to
form the OWS/AM electrical power system. Figure 2.2.5.2-3
illustrates a typical SAG/PCG interface.
Solar array temperature is determined by 20 temperature trans- ::'
ducers, ten on each wing. Transducer locations were defined ;
based upon predicted temperature profiles for each wing.
B. Mechanical/Deployment - The beam/fairings are deployed at about
h2 minutes after llftoff. Release of beam fairings is accomplished
by means of an ordnance system. The beam fairings are held :
against the OW8 by means of six tie-down modules, each of which
contains a frangible _ension llnk and two explosively actuated ,
expandable tube assemblies (Figure 2.2.5.2-h). The tie-down
• modules are installed between the OWS and the beam fairings at
: the time the SAS is installed on the OWS. Mounting holes on the
outboard side of the tie-down modules mate with fittings on the "'-_,
beam/falring. The inboard side of each tie-down module is
equipped with a track and slide and has a mounting-hole pattern
2.2.5-6 i
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Iin the track to mate with the interface-hole pattern on the
forward and aft skirts. Beam fairing depleyment is actuated and
controlled by a viscous damper driven by a compression spring
; about a skewed hinge axis. A latch is provided to lock th__ beam
fairing in the deployed position and latching is verified by
micross-itches.
After the beam fairings have been deployed and ar_ latched in
the deployed position, the solar array penels are deployed by
%
means of a damped mechanical system. The folded and stacked
panels are stowed in the beam fairing cavity by means of mechanical
latches which retain the hinged edges of the stacked panels. The
latches at each edge are interconnected by a mechs.nical linkage
to form an assembly whi . serves as a cinching mechanism for the
panel stack. The elements of th._s system are shown on
Figure 2.2.5.2-5.
Five cinching mechanisms are provia_d for each panel stack (or
wing section), and each mechanism is held in the latched _ _i-
tion by means of a frangible link (or tension strap). The panels
in the stack are preloaded one sgainst another by Jackscrew ad-
Justment prov" sions incorporated in the latches. This preload is
carried in the links of the cinching mechanism such that when the
tension strap is severed, the preload is relieved, springs rotate
the mechanism and the latches release the wing sections to permit
deployment. _ redundant pair of explosively actuated expandsble
tubes installed in each wing extended the length of the beem
fairing cavity and m_'te with the 15 tension straps which retain I
I
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I the three wing sections. The hinged solar panels and stabilizing
l
_- I beams are released from their restrained position by the ordnance
system. Springs throughout the system provide the energy to
4eploy the solar psnels. The deployment rate is controlled by a
viscous d_mper in each wing section. The deployed position of
the panels is maintained by positive latches. A rotary potentio-
meter indicates the position of the panels during deployment.
?
The SAS vent system consists of one vent module on each of three
• sealed beam fairing compartments. The vent module is an
acoustically actuated system designed to preclude beam fairing
overpressurization during ascent and provide pressure relief
during pre-launch nitrogen purge. System actuation and purge
venting occur immediately prior to launch vehicle liftoff. The
acoustic actuation device is triggered by the acoustic environ-
ment developed by the launch vehicle engines.
2.2.5.3 Testing
The Solar Array System Test Prob,_z, consisted of development, qualifi-
cation, and speci_l testing of component level and assembly level
hardware. Although the SAS for +.heOWS was a completely new deslgn,
all elements were qualified at the highest level of assembly wherever
possible. CerTain "common ordnance" devices used in the beam fairing
and wing section release systems had been qualified in other programs.
Following identifies the development, qualification, and special tests
performed for the SAS. Requirements and results are shown for each
electrical and structural/mechanical component and assembly tested.
' 2.2.5-11
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A. Development Tests
: i/ Solar Psmel (SA-13)
o Requirements - Evaluate the structural integrity of the
/ panel being subjected to launch and boosh dynamics of
vibration, shock, acoustics and on-orbit thermal vacuum
cycling. Evaluate electrical performance by exposure to
simulated solar _'_diation of thermal cycles.
o Results - The structural integrity of the panel was satis-
factory. Electrical performance was not degraded by
exposure to the environments. Post test inspection demon-
strated that the design changes inplemented after earlier
engineerin,g model tests were a_fective. O:,e open prayer
: tab was noted, and a small number of rear side open solder
: Joints. The noted defects had no measurable effect on
panel function. The test demonstrated the design feasi-
bility and provided the confidence to proceed into
producti< n.
2/ SAS Wing Release Ordnance Expandable Tube and Link Assembly
(SA-14 )
o Requirements - Develop a specific expandable tube and
tension strap or llnk for releasing the -_,towedsolar array
panels. Evaluate the performance of the ordnance device
after being subjected to launch and boost vibration --
envi ronment s.
2.2.5-12 i
i
]9740202]6-072
O Results - Five specimens were used in the test. Three
specimens were tested and design changes were required in
the expandable tube fuse retention method and the dimen-
sions of the frangible link. The lest two specimens were
_ tested with the design changes included and performance
was satisfactory.
3/ Actuator Damper, Beam and Wing Section Deployment (SA-18)
o Requirements - Evaluate structural and functional charzc-
teristics of actuator damper under extreme temperature and
pressure ranges. Evaluate seals and damping materials.
o Results - Structural integrity of design was proven.
Seals in system leaked under temperature extremes and
material was changed. Characteristics of actuator force
and damping characteristics of fluid were determined.
4/ Actuator Damper, With Broken Spring (SA-20)
o Requirements - Demonstrate c_pability of actuator u,_mper
to function with sufficient deployment driving force if
actua _r spring had a broken coil.
o Results - Actuator damper demonstrated adequate margin to
deploy beam feiring with one coil of the compression spring
broken.
2. _:.5-13
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5/ Magnetic Latch, Vent Valve (SA-21)
^ o_ ,._,,_+Q _ Evaluate capability of a m84_netic latch to
function under acoustic driving force. Develop magnetic
materials and forces required to meet design acoustic
requirements.
o Results - Acoustic panel size and magnet force were
determined. Change of magnet force with temperature was
unresolved and left for development as part of vent module
assembly, Latch mechanism capability was demonstrated.
6/ Vent Module (SA-22)
o Requirements - Evaluate vent module functional perform-uce,
and demonstrate the structural capability to withstand
pre - and post - _ii_ht environments.
o Results - Development testing brought out design changes
required. Magnet force was redesi_ned to compensate for
. temperature changes affecting force. Structure was changed
to reduce restriction to air flow. Relief valve body
material was changed to withstand v_bration loads. Satis-
factory completion of testing of critical functions of
'_ latch operation under acoustic loads.
J
2.2.5-I_
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7/ S,_SBeam Fairing Release (SA-I7)
o Requirements - Develop the configuration of expandable
tube and frangible tension strap for the beam fairing.
Evaluate the performance of the frangible link and expand-
able tube after exposure to cyclic loading and worst cBse
thermal conditions.
_ o Results - Twelve _pecimens were used in the test. Results
: exceeded i0,000 cycles and showed a i00 percent margin on
strap severance. A redesign was made to keep the tabs in
the link from breaking loose. Five specimens of the re-
design were fired satisfactorily.
8/ One-Third Wing Assembly (SA-2)
o Requirements - Evaluate the ability of the wing section to
deploy following exposure to liftoff and boost vibration,
acoustic, and shock environments under predicted tempera-
ture extremes. The test specimen shall selve as a test
bed for environmental testing of other test items - Solar
Panel (SA-1), Wing Section Ordnance Release (SA-15),
Actuator Damper (SA-19) and Vent M,_dule (BA-23) and
structural qualification testing of the deployed wing
section for deployed loads.
2.2.5-15
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Io Results - Deployment capability successfully demonstrated
following several developmental problems which beea_,.e
apparent during test and were corrected by redesign.
Developmental problems included -
(i) Tang on cinch bar broke. Material change and increase
in cross section required. L
(_) Actuator-Damper rod broke. Piston rod redesign to
distribute load.
(3) Stabilizer beam hinge fitting broke. Material change
in fitting required.
(h) Cinch bar would not lock in open position again._t
seal in low temperature deployment. Redesigned cinch
bar with stronger deployment springs.
(5) Wire routing had areas of abrasion. Revised wlri_,g
installation at the staJ._lizer beam to solar panel
interface. Added protective grommets at various
points.
(6) Silicone rubber bumper stuck to aluminum panel tmder
cold test conditions. Added teflon to b_,_per to solve
problem.
?.2.5-16
1974020216-076
9/ SAS Wing Release Ordnance System (SA-15)
o Requirements - Evaluate the ordnance release system using
the one-third wing assembly as a test bed. Evaluate firing
the primary and back-up system after exposure to the launch
and boost vibration, acoustic, and shock environments.
o Results - The primary and back-up systems were operated
with a programmed delay of 100 milliseconds between firings.
All five frangible links separated in a satisfactory manner.
10. Beam Fairing Hinge Assembly (SA-16)
o Requirements - Evaluate the capability end demonstrate the
structural integrity of forward fairing structure, and
hinges and latch to sustain limit and ultimate loads for
launch, boost, staging, dynamic, thermal, beam fairing
deployment and transient response from CSM docking.
o Results - Evaluation of results of static equivalent of
all load conditions indicated forward fairing, forward beam
fairing structure, hinges, latch, and actuator damper
satisfactorily withstood all predicted critical loads.
2.2.5-17
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B. Qualification Tests
i/ Solar Panel (SA-I)
o Requirements - Demonstrate the solar panel will function
r
within specification requirements and be stracturally
sound when subjected to vibration, acoustic and shock
environments associated with liftoff and boost and thermal
!v
vacuum cycling simulating on-orbit conditions•
'_ o Results - Panel functioned within specifications after all
testing was completed. The structural integrity was main-
tained under test conditions. After hO0 thermal cycles
the number of open prayer tab solder Joints on a single
cell were exceeded. Analysis indicated this condition to
be an isolated case. Nine-hundred additional thermal
cycles were run on the SA-I panel and 800 cycles were per-
formed on another production panel in line item ST-18.
The panel was successfully qualified.
2/ Power Panel (SA-3)
o Requirements - Demonstrate that the unit will function
within specification limits after being subjected to the
launch and ascent dynamic loads.
o Results - Exceeded allowable reverse leakage current in i
one diode. Requirement i0 p_ at 400V; maximum lee.kage was
65 _A. Actual usage will allow milliamps leakage at 150V.
,?
&nalysis concluded that it was a random failure caused by
varnish on the substrate internal to the diode.
2.2.5-18
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Experienced external surface defects on diode modules.
< Analyses concluded th,at cause was contamination in the form
f
of tape, tape adhesiv=, and silicone in the region of the
c
i epoxy/heat si1_k interface. Cleaning and contamination con-
T
trol procedures were tightened, and a module rework process
was developed to preclude recurrence of surface defects.
3/ Confined Detonating Fuse (CDF) Manifold Installation (SA-5)
; o Requirements - Demonstrate the ordnance components will
; function properly after being subjected to the launch,
and boost vibration environments.
o Results - All ordnance components functioned satisfactorily.
_/ Actuator Damper, Beam and Wing Section Deployment (SA-19)
; o RequlrementJ - Demonstrate structural and functional in-
i
tegrity of beam fairing and wing section deployment actu-
ator dampers (two configuraticns) under and following
exposure to simulated critical environments including
• vibration, shock and temperature extremes.
o Results - Actuators demonstrated capability to function
properly under all environmental tests. Act_mtor was
pressurized to ultimate and exhibited adequate factor of
_ safety.
?
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L5/ Vent Module (SA-23)
o Requirements - Demonstrate functional capability and
ability to withstand pre and post flight environments.
o Results - Functional capability of the operation of the
relief valve, pendulum assembly, door release and opening
mechanism was demonstrated. Flow coefficient and leak
rate requirements were verified
6/ Cinch Bar Deployment (SA-26)
o Requirements - Demonstrate the capability of the cinch
bar to deploy e_zdlatch after exposure to lift off and
boost environments while operating under extreme cold
temperature conditions.
o Results - Cinch bar tested in one-third beam fairing test
! bed operated satisfactorily and locked open under extreme
temperature conditions following exposure to lift off and
boost dynamic environments.
7/ Solar Array Wing Assembly (SA-_)
o Requirements
a. Forward Fairing end Hinge - Demonstrate structural
integrity of forward fairing and hinges when subjected
to lift off and boost vibration and shock environment_
w
: and combined loads from thermal stresses.
• I
, I
t
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b. Beam Fairing - Demonstrate the capability of the beam
fairing to deploy after exposure to lift off and boost
i vibration, shock and thermal environments. Deployments
to be performed under the influence of lateral thermal
gradients which increase the effective deployment
energy. Actuator damper temperature to be controlled
to evaluate damper performance under worze case condi-
tions of maximum damping force and maximum damping
load.
7,
c, Wing Section - Demonstrate capability of wing section
to deploy following exposure to lift off and boost
vibration and shock environments, and under the in-
fluence of lateral thermal gradients which distort
the beam.
d. Solar Panel - Demonstrate capability to function prop-
erly after exposure to lift off, boost and deployment
v_bration and shock environments.
o Results
a. Structural integrity was maintained. No deformation
or bind was e_ident in hinges.
b. Structural integrity was maintained. Hardware quali-
fied for functional performance included beam fairing
_ actuator damper, latch, and ordnance release system.
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Deployment of wing was made under worst ca_.e thermal
deformation loads as well as simulated _lomalies in
the ordnance release system. Five of the ordnance
tie-down fittings were released then the sixth fitting
subsequently released. All tests were satisfactory.
c. Hardware qualified for functional performance were
wing section retention and release (cinch bar) system,
ordnar,ce release, wing section actuator damper, wing
section hinge deployment springs, and hinge latches.
All i_ems functioned satisfactorily.
d. Solar panel performance after environmental and deploy-;
ment tests, showed no electrical degradation from the
: test environment_. Wir_ harnesses from panel_ to
umbilical showed no abrasion or wear.
¢
C. Special Tests
i/ Sunlight Cell Test (ST-7)
o Requirements -Establish values of current and temperatur _
coefficients of a group of representative glassed cells
using the solar simulator and verified using natural
sunlight.
o Results - The test demonstrated cell sunlight performance
and its cor:_lation with solar simulation performance. The
, test determined cell voltage temperature Coefficients.
' 2.2.5-22 ,,.
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2/ Sunlight Panel System Test (ST-81
I
1 o Requirements - Using two grou_s of representative flight
panels determine electrical ch&racteristics.
a. Determine the sunlight performance capability of two
30-module power groups.
b. Mismatch losses of modules.
e. The air mass equals zero (AMO) current voltage (I-V)
characteristics of modules.
d. The correlation factors to be used for J_xtrapolating
terrestial data to AMO sunlight condition_.
e. Mismatch losses of power groups.
f. The basic design compatibility of the power source
with the PCG,
o Results - Testing was performed oatdoors in natural sun-
light at ambient temperature and at a minimum sunlight
intensity of 100 mW/cm 2 and, when anslytically corrected,
established the true performance of the 0WS sclar array.
! This +est demonstrated panel module, Solar Array Croup
! (SAG) and SAS sunlight performance and its compatibility
with the airlock _odule power conditioning equipment.
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3/ Solar Cell Module Shadow Test (ST-9)
o Requirements - Study and evaluate cei± I'aiiure mechanisms
and module string configurations under changing shadow
conditions.
c Results - Module and cell testing was accomplished unaer
solar simulation ,zith various initial temperature_ and
shadows. C_ 1 chara-teristies, the optimum module string
arrangemen'. _o minimize cell failure as a result of shadow-
i , 2d affezt of thermal cycling on interconnects and
associated solder Joints were determined.
4/ Solar Panel Thermal Cycle Test (ST-18)
o Requirements -Perform thermal cycles in a vacuum to
_etermi,,edegradation of solar i nel performance.
o Results - One panel uzed in the solar panel qualification
test was cycled an additional 900 cycles (.!300total) and
a second panel was tested for 800 total cycle_. Test
results proved confidence in the solar panel capability to
successfully complete the required number of orbital
th:rmal cycles. De£radation rate data was accumulated and
_u_vticelly combined with the results of t:.eST-9 test.
The restlt was a pred._eted array performance degradation,
from therma_ cycling, h 8 percent for the mission.
IL
I
;I
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5/ Solar Cell Test (ST-29)
o Requirements - Investigate_ though x-ray and radiograph
techniques, causes for separation of materials in SAS
solar cells. Effects of material variables, type of
solder, and solder schedule on solder wettability and
Joint strength will be studied.
o Results
a. A total of 212 solar cells were removed from pro-
duction panel_ after each panel had been x-rayed.
Cells and P-contact interconnects were subjected to :_
pull and peel tests, and metallurgicel analysis using
Electron Microprobe analyzer, SEM, and metallograph on
selected cells, interconnects, and solder Joints.
b. A total of 205 specially manufactured solar cells were
tested to determine the cause of solder dewetting arid
low solder Jci_t stzength. Effects of such variables
_t Titanium thickness, silver thickness, solder thick-
ness, deposition atmosphere, solder type, and solder
schedule were investigated using radiography, metallo-
graphy, SEM, electron microprobe, colorimetric chemical
analysis, and pull strength tests.
Analysis of above test results and radiographs of all pro-
duction pA,Aels concluded that the SAS could lose only
._ 0.55 percent of its power output from P-contact solder
Joint failure over the mission.
]
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4Contacts having the lowest pull strength tend to fail in
the tit&nium layer, while others generally failed in
solder cohesion or in tensi)e strength of the Kovar inter-
connect itself. A normal cell, therefore, has adequate
contact strength, but in rare cases, the cohesive strength
of the titanium layer is deficient.
: The reliability of solar cell contacts can be improved by
cell manufacturing process modifications, particularly in
the _acuum deposition phase.
Uadiographic inspection of solar panels can prcvide useful
information on relative thickness of the solder coating on
solar cells.
6/ Vent Module Storage and Operational Test (ST-15)
o Requirements - Verify capability to survive out-of-doors
storage for extended time period and position modules to
verify dcors actuate when exposed to Apollo 16 launch
acous [ic environment.
o Results - Two vent modules were placed so that Apollo 16
engine acoustics would be at the same levels ss the
modules would se? on the 0WS. The doors actuated at
Apollo 16 engine start. Two _its were placed outdoors
in an atmosphere similar to latu_ch site. After four
months in atmosphere units were tested and dcor deployment
mechanisms successf1_lly demonstrated.
?..2.5-25
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7/ Spring Loaded Magnetic Latch Test (ST-16)
o Requirements - Demonstrate repeatability of magnetic
: latch to operate aft_.rextended period of time in the
latched position.
o Results - Fifty specimens were fabricated and tested at
six week intervals in lots of six. No failures were
encountered in all tests.
8/ Expandable Tube and Strap for Beam Fairing (ST-2h)
o Requirements - Test expandable tube and strap assembly
at maximum temperature conditions to assess generation
of loose tabs.
o I_esults - First specimen fired geuerated loose _abs.
Thermal tape was ";r_pped around strap and tabs were
contained on the remainder of the specimen. The thermal
tape was a flig}_t configuration.
.2.5.h Mission Results - Evaluation of SAS performance has been based on
review of launch films and upon real time data from HOSC, user tapes,
and MOPS data from NASA/MSFC.
A. Gromud Purge and Venting - A GN2 blanket parge was maintained on
the solar panels from the time the "_ings were mated to the 0WS in
the VAB until the vent valves opened Just prior to lift-off.
Periodic checks of the relative humidity in the beam cavities
were made to monitor effectiveness of the purge. The maximum
readings recorded were seven (7) percent which was well below the
2.2.5-27
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maximum allowable requirement of fifty-five percent. Launch
films were only focused on Wing ,,_."-1. A ._.. ..:ow......._ _h_ launch
films revealed that all vent module valves on wing No. 1 were
open as the vehicle started ascent. It is assumed that the vent
module valves on wing No. 2 were also open as all --entvalves
operated in the same acoustic range. There was no "nstrumenta-
tion carried to monitor venting performance. Deduction from
post-flight analysis was that the purge and venting system per-
formed as required.
B. Launch and Ascent - At approximately 63 seconds into the Skylab 1
flight, the vehicle experienced structural failure of the OWS
Meteoroid Shield. This failure ..:latchedand partially deployed
SAS Wing 2 Beam Fairing, as ev u -:d by the fairing secu£_d bi-
level event measurement KT211-h26 and indications of the light
impingement on the _olar cells verified by an increase in the
Solar Array Group (SAG) voltages.
Following S-II cutoff at 589.172 seconds, all SAG voltages, with
the exception of M104-52h, SAG 4 voltage, exhibited an increase
as SAS Wlng 2, no longer restrained by the launch vehicle sccelera-
tion forces, started to deploy. The S-II retro-rocket exhaust
plume impinging on GAS Wing 2 contributed to the loss of the wing
causf.ng it to rotate rapidly and tear off, thereby severing all
electrical conn__ctions at approximately 593 seconds. At this time
all SAG voltage measurements dropped to the level of PCG batteries, '--
which indicated no further illuminat_on cf any solar panels, and
2.2.5-28
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mall SAS current measur,:_ ,ts dropped to zero. Subsequently, no
valid _ _ .... _,e _ _ s.ny o_ t_ _A_ Wing o +o_po_o+_,_o
or position measurements.
SAS Wing 1 attempted to deploy at the nominal time but was con-
strained in a partially deployed configuration by remnants of
the Meteoroid Shield. Wing section nartial deployment in this
configuration allowed sunlight to illuminate some solar cell
modules and provide power approximately equivalent to one normally
deployed module (i/240 of total SAS capability). Although insig-
nificant in terms of supplying cluster loads, this output was
utilized to allow some recharging of the AM batteries.
C. 0n-Orbit Deployment - Due to the loss of the OWS SAS Wing 2 at
orbital insertion, and the entanglement of the meteoroid shield
with Wir_ i, deployment of the SAS was non-nominal. The separa-
tion commands, Electric Bridge Wire (EBW) units, and the ordnance
systems functioned as designed. The command sequences and results
are shown in the following EBW Data Histor_j. The SAS Wing 1 Beam
Fairing ordnance was successfully deSonated at the proper time by
the preprcgrammed primary cammand. The Beam Fairing left its
secured position and partiall.y deployed until it was constrained
by the remnants of the meteoroid shield. The backup system EBW
was cnarged and fired by ground command and operated nominally,
but th_ backup system was ineffective in further denloying the
restrained beam fairing. The SAS wing section EBW responded to
the primary Char£e _,d Reset commands, but was prevented from
firing the ord,_ance for deployment by sn J.nterlock which is only
I
1
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Isatisfied by full deploymer_t of both Beam Fairings. The backup
system "_as charged and fired by ground com_and and the Wing
Sections weze observed to partially deploy until contact with
the OWS tank wall was made.
EBW DATA HISTORY
,. PRIMARY SYSTEMS
TIME COE_AND ISSUED CMD
: MEASUREMENT GMT GET (SEC ) SOUR,CE REMARKS
M7061 SAS FAIRING
EBW FU 2 CHG 18:10:00 2h00 IU S/S 9 SAS WING I
EBW FU 2 FIRE 18:10:05 2h05 IU S/S 53 FAIRING SE-
EBW FU 2 RST 18:10:i0 2410 IU S/S i0 CURE9 _[7212
INDICATED
MOVEMENT AT
18: i0:06
M7067 SAS WINGS
EBW FU 2 CHG 18:22:00 3120 IU S/S ii EBW DID NOT
EBW FU 2 FIRE 18:22:05 3125 IU S/S 51 FIRE - INTER-
LOCKED WITH
FAIRING
I
SECONDARY SYSTEMS
M7060 SAS FAIRING
EBW FU i CHC- 19:08:22 5902 DCS-182 PRIMARf SYS.
EBW FU i FIRE ].9:08:42 5922 DCS-163 RELEASED
EBW Fd i RST 19:09:10 59,_ DCS-183 FAIRING
M7066 SAS WINGS
EBW FU 1 CHG 19:20:56 6656 DCS-.172 SAS WING 1
BW FU 1 FIRE 19:23:26 6806 DCS-162 POSITION G7008
EBW F5 1 RST 19:24:01 6841 DCS-173 INDICATED MOVE-
MENT AT 19:23:28
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iI In support of MSFC, activities were initiated at MDAC and TRW todevise methods to fully deploy Wing _{o.i. Analysis of data
indicated the wing uas constrained with the Beam Fairing deployed
approximately 6°. Thermal analysis predicted the fluid in both
the beam fairing and wing section actuator dampers would be
frozen. It was determined that if the astronauts could free the
beam fairing from the meteoroid shield constraint th,t additional
force would be required to break the actuator damper link to
allow full deployment of the beam fairing. A series of tests
were run at MDAC and TRW using two test specimens from the SAS
development and qualification program.
The first tests were _erf'ormed to determine the load required to
"break" a frozen actuator damper which in turn would allow the
beam fairing to rotate around the hinge line. The tests were
perfo.med utilizing an :_ctuator damper qualification test speci-
men and a simulated SAS forward fairing attached to a plate simu-
lating the 0WS forward skirt with a stub section of the S_S beam
fairing attached to the forward fairing through the main hinge
components. A SAS beam deployment tripod, designed and built for
this purpose, was attached to the specimen. The actuator damper
was chilled to a frozen state and a ±c.qdwas applied to the tri-
pod through a cable in the direction ,,fthe MDA. Failure occurred
at a cable force of 102 ib, (hS_N) in the clevis fitting in the for-
ward fairing to which the actuator damper was attached. Analysis
confirmed the clevis was the structural weak point in the system;
however, a bolt internal to the actuator damper was very marginal
at the loads applied.
2.2.5-31
i
] 9740202 ] 6-09]
mm
The full SAS qualification test wing was mounted in a deployment
fixture at TRW and subsequent tests were made on this specimen
to complement underwater testing and mockup testing which was
conducted at MSFC.
The first series of tests on the qualification wing were per-
formed to determine the parameters of deployment assuming (i) a
partially deployed beam fairing, (2) an astronaut pull force on
the tip of the beam fairing and (3) _ frozen actuator damper.
The load was applied at the free end of the beam fairing utiliz-
ing a simulated "shepard's hook." Significant findings from
these tests were; a force of i0 to 20 Ibs (h4 to 90N) applied
by the "hook" would in most cases fail the clevis; however, _n
some cases the internal bolt in the actuator damper woul; fail
first. The greatest deployment energy occurred for the case when
_he bolt broke which allowed both the actuator spring force and
: the astr_laut force to be applied to wing deployment. The latch-
up forces were within the demonstrated structural capability
limits, however, they were high enough to _how the adv_,bility
o_ slowing the deployment with an external force.
Utili:-ing the qualification wing test set-up, a series of tests
were run utilizing a washcloth squeezer bag as a source for apply-
ing +he load on the beam fairing to break the actuator damper
clevis. The first series of tests proved a squeezer bag placed
between the beam fairing and the 0WS tank wall when pressurized
i to approximately 5 psig (34.5kN/m2) with GN2 could develop enough
forces to break the clevis. Access for positioning the evacuated bag
2.2.5-32
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between the beam fairing and the OWS was minimal but appeared
adequate. The next series of tests used the squeezer bag and
was performed to demonstrate the capability of a back-up tether
system to successfully stop the beam fairing swing from energy
i
imparted into the beam fairing by the squeezer bag. A solid
link was put in place of the clevis and actuator damper and tests
were performed using various pressures in the squeezer bag to
: test the structural capability of the SAS. The purpose of the
J
tests was to see how much load could be applied if the beam
: fairing was constrained by debris on the underneath side.
Pressures were stabilized in the bag at different levels with nc
structural damage to the SAS. Tests with squeezer bag demonstrated
a method to deploy the beam fairing using GN2 to break the clevis
and additional energy to break loose any restraining debris.
The next series of tests were run with the qualification specimen
held at about 6° with different pieces of meteoroid shield con-
straining the beam ralring. The purpose of the tests was to
determine the feasibility of breaking the meteoroid shield re-
straining angle by applying a load at the end o_ the beam fairing.
Loads were applied up to 100 ibs (445N) with no failure occurring.
The specimen was then used to test methods where the astronaut
could _o EVA and pry loose the restraining angle. Using a pry bar
: consi_tin_ :f = section of fireman pole with a pinch bar attached
/ at one _nd a man was suspended in a sling and pried on the angle .....
The sling simu±ated a zero-g effect. The angle was pried _< _se
" effectively.
j 2.2.5-33
1974020216-093
The last series of tests using the qualification specimen were
performed with a frozen actuator damper and a tether rope. The
J
i tests were performed to demonstrate the feasibility of using the
astronaut to apply a lifting force on the tether to break the
clevis. The method _roved out was to attach an adjustable tether
or nylon strap betwe_-n the SAS forward vent module and the forward
_ end of the SAS. A crewman properly tethered then positioned him-
self in a squatted position with the tether over his shoulder.
L
The crewman then stood erect to create the load in the tether
t
' necessary to break the clevis. This method was proven to be
successful. It was found in the testing _ second crewman was
needed to provide a counter force t._ ti_obeam fairing if necessary,
because the stability of the first crewman was poor immediately
following the release of the clevis.
A series of tests were run at TRW to determine the deployment
cha_'acterist_"s of the wing section actuator dampers under
extreme cold conditions. The test specimen used was a qualifica-
! tion test actuator damper placed in a col(_chamber. Test results
showed that below -50°F (227°K) the actuator damper fluid visco-
sity would increase to a point to stop extension of the actuator.
For nominal SAS deployment, the worst case design predicted
temperature of the actuator damper was -16°F (2h6°K) and the
damper had been qualified at -25OF (251°K).
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A thermal analysis was made which predicted the wing sect: on
actuator d_=pers would be at approximately -50°F {227°K) or below
at the time the beam fairing would be released and the fluid
would cool down further since the SAS _oul£ no longer be adjacent
to the warm OWS stage. The analysis showed a-45 ° pitch maneuver
could be made to direct _3olarheating on the beam fairing top sur-
face to warm the frozen wi_.g section actuator dsmpers mud allow
wing section deployment.
On DOY 158 the astronauts went EVA to attempt to deploy SAS
Wing No. i. & bolt cutter was used to sever the angle restrain-
ing the beam fairing. A tether was tied to the SAS vent module
and the astronaut stood erect under the tether applying a force
to the beam fairing and breaking loose the actuator damper. The
beam _,iring deployed to the full open position in apprcximately
15 secoL'ds. The wing sections partially de_]oyed and then slopped
due to the temperature of the actuator dampers. A -_5° pitch
maneuver was made allowing solar heat to warm the beam fairings.
In soproximately 5 hours the wing sections had deployed 100
percent.
D. On-Orbit Performance
l/ Electrical - Full deployment of SAS Wlng 1 beam fairing and
its +hree (3) w_.ng sections was completed on DOY 159 at
approximately 00:30 GMT hours following 2_ days of orbital
storag_ in the partially deployed configuration. This re-
sulted in full po;_er generating capability on that wing or
approximately 1/2 of the total design capability of the SAS.
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I The power was to be available at a voltage of between 51 volts
: and 125 volts at the AM/OWS interface. With tne loss of
Wing 2, the power required became noc less than 5,248 watts
total for Wing 1 only and 656 watts for each SAG at the end
of mission. Predicted SAS performance degradation from all
causes was 8.3 percent _'orthe mission. This converts to a
minimum available average of 5,723 watts total aria715 watts
from each SAG at the beginning of the mission. The voltage
requirement ,,'asnot affected by the loss of Wing 2.
As shown on Figure 2.2.5.4-1, pz_dicted Beginning of Mission
(BOM) SAS performance ranged between a minimum of 6,120 watts
and a maximum of 6,920 watts. Maximlnn and minimum average
power output accounted for variations in beta angle and solar
flux, and a performance degr .dation of 8.3 percent over the
mission.
SAS performance was analyzed for sampled orbits beginning with
100 percent Wing 1 deployment on D0Y 159. Array performance
was plotted for an average array temperature +145°F (335°K)
anl shows an available average a_'rsypower of between 6,500
watts and 7,050 watts. The increase in power over the period
of the mission occurs for two reasons; (1) solar flux increased
from a minimum (Aphelion) near the beginning of the mission,
I; to amaximum (Perihelion) at approximately 1974 D0Y 005, and(2) no measurabl p rf rmance degradation has been detected.
IZ:
for solar inertial orbits at beta angl.s from 0° to "3,5°.
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' At low beta sngles, the SAS sees the sun approximately
61 perc-_nt of the time, and since a large Depth of Discharge
; ; (DOD) on the PCG batteries occurs, the S_S operates at peak
t
r
power for se,eral minutes. At beta angles above 69.5 °, con-
tinuous sunlight orbits take place, and battery charge/
discharge _ycles do not occur; hence, the system does not
t
op' rate at peak power, and only small variations are seen
in 5AS voltage and current.
Figures 2.2.5.4-2 thru 2.2.5.h-16 show typical SAG voltage
and current profiles for 1973 DOY's 159, 175, 339, and 197h
DOY 03_. Data for DOY 175 is included to illustrate high
beta, continuous sunlight, SAG characteristics_ while DOY 339
[
; shows voltage and __urrent profiles during one orbit of peak
; power operation.
I
From analysis of DOY 159 and 034 data, it is seen that the
voltages and currents for each of the groups are similar
except where, (i) modules are shadowed, or (2) a low current
reading exists. In solar inertial vehicle orientation,
J
shadowing from the ATM solar array results in the loss of i
less than one module from SAG 5, less than two (2) modules
from SAG 6, and one full (i) module from SAG 8. Only one or
two cell strings are lest from SAG 5. For SAG 6, one module
is always shadowed and up to two additional strings are
shadowed on the second module. The variation in the number
of strings shadowed is a result of small variations from true
solar inertial vehicle orientation, and appears to w riz'y the
+0.5 degree vehicle control accuracy.
-
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The lower current on SAG 4 on Figure 2.2.5.h-3 is because of i
an anomaly in the current measurement. If the current for
SAG 4 were as low as indicated, the battery of PCG h would
take much longer to recharge than the other batteries. There
has been no indication that Battery h has taken longer for
recharge than any other battery supplied by a 15 module SAG.
The events of an orbit can be followed on Figure 2.2.5.4-2.
The data begins near the end of the sunlight portion of an
crbit. As the solar arrs_ goes into shadow the currert drops
to zero and the voltage drops to the AM PCG battery voltage.
. During this period the batteries provide the power to the
loads and their depth of discharge will depend upon the load
and the duration of the shadowed portion of the orbit. When
the arrays come into sunlight they are cold, and the voltages
are at their peak values and decrease as the array warms up.
The current is high because of the increased loads while the
batteries are recharging. When the batteries reach voltage
limit, the charge rate decreases resulting in a drop in the
current and a rise in voltage. After the batteries are fully
charged the current remains nearly constant at the lower
values shown and the voltage continues to vary as a function
of temperature with a slight rise in voltage prior to end of
sunlight portion of the orbit corresponding to the small
decrease in temperature that occurs ....
2,_.5.51 _ t
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One slice of the D0Y 159 was analyzed in detail when all
SAG's were operating near maximum power; that is, when the
combination of battery charging s_idbus loads pl-esent the
maximum demand and the operating point of the SAS is controlled
by the PCG peak power tracker. The data slice was at 6.5
minutes after sunrise. At this time, the ave-age transducel
temperature was determined to be 21.SOF (267°K).
In order to determine average array temperature from the trans-
ducer data, a correction factor was derived based upon the
solar panel thermal characteristics. The AT correction factor
is a function of (1) time from sunrise, and (2) beta angle.
Figures 2.2.5.4-17 and 2.2.5.4-18 are representative of how
the AT factor varies nominally with time from sunrise a_
beta angles of 0° and 73.5°.
A AT correction factor for the DOY 159 data slice was deter-
mined to be +32°F (273°K), and when added to the average
transducer temperature, an average array temperature of
+53.80F (2850K) was determined.
The voltage and current for each SAG was also determined at
this time slice and plotted against SAG prediction cures
in Figures 2.2.5.4-19 thru 2.2.5.4-21. These figures repre-
sent the performance predictions for 15, l_, and 13 module
SAGS. in all cp_es; except for SAG 4, the performance
exceeded the predicted values. Analysis of PCG input and
output power values and battery charge current measurements
indicated normal PCG 4 operation, and that SAG 4 was producing
2.2.5-55
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rpower comparable to the other SAG's having no shadowed
modules. For purposes of SAS performance evaluation, SAG 4
_' current was assumed to be equal to the average of SAG's i,
2 and 3 currents. Using this method of evaluation, it was
concluded flat SAG 4 current also exceeded the predicted
: value. Average array power, at 145°F (335°K), wa_ deter-
mined to be 6,700 watts.
: SAG 1 voltage and current profiles are shown on Figure
&
2.2.5.4-6, 73.5° beta orbit on DOY 175. SAG voltage was
fairly constant at 75 volts _d SAG current measured 2 to 3
_ amps. These values are consistent with the constant array
_ _- temperature at high beta angles and the fact that the PCG
batteries demand only trickle charge current. Figure 2.2.5.2-7
shows voltage and current performance for SAG 1 for DOY 258,
b
beta angle = -37°.
Figures 2.2.5.2-7 and 2.2.5.2-8 show voltage and current
i performance for SAG i for DOY 339, beta angle = -9°, EREP
No. ll maneuver to Z-LV (Z-axis Local Vertical) was concluded
at GMT 1634 on DOY 339. Battery Depth of Discharge (DOD) was
great enough following the maneuver to cause all SAGS/PCGS to
remain in the peak power tracking mode for one entire sola_
inertial orbit. Using MOPS data, array performance at about
5 minutes after sunrise was analyzed. The average temperature
transducer measurement was +12.3°F (262°K), the AT correction
factor was determined to be +32°F (27S°K), and the resulting
average array temperature was +44.3°F (280°K). Average SAS
power was found to be 6970 watts at +145°F (335°K).
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" I_i As a verification of the above method of determining average
array power from instantaneous values of SAG voltage, current,
and temperature, data from user tapes was analyzed for SAG 1.
! Voltage, current, and temperature plots (Figures 2.2•5.h-7,
2.2.5.4-8 and _.2•5.h-22, respectively) were integrated and
• _verage values cf each sere determined. Using this technique
the resulting average array power was found to be 69h0 watts
which correlates within less than 0._ percent with the 6970
e watts obtained usi_:g the instantaneous or single data slice _
_ method.
DOY 03h - Voltage and current performance characteristics for
_ " SAG's 1 thru 8 on DOY 03_, beta 0°, are shown on Figares
2.2.5.4-9 thr_ 2.2.5.h-16. The characteristics are the same
as those recorded on DOY 159, with the exception of time in
peak pcwer operation. Calculated average array performance,
at +145°F (335°K), was 6895 watts.
?
2/ Thermal - With the loss of Wing 2, the operating temperature
of the SAS is determined from the outputs of ten (i0) tempera-
ture transducers on Wing i, corrected as a fanction of beta
angle and elapsed time since orbital sunrise, The solar panel _
_ transducer temperatures are cyclic with each orbit with the
maximum and minimum temperatures dependent upor _'hebeta
angle of the orbit m_d the orbital _herma]. environment
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As the beta angle increases, time in the earth's shadow
decreases and total sunlight orbits occur for beta angles
above approximately 69.5°. Figures 2.2.5.4-22 thru 2.2.5.4-25
7
sho_, typical SAS temperature transducer profiles for the
!
! following days of year.
FIGURE 2.2.5.4-22 2.2.5.4-23 2.2.5.4-24 2.2.5.4-25
DOY 159 175 339 034
BETA i0° @-9° 0°
Maximum and minimum temperatures of the i0 transducers are !
plotted.
Comps.rison of actual temperature profiles with predicted
profiles shored g_od correlation; however, two (2) differ-
ences do exist. These can be seen in Figure 2.2.5.4-26 for
one orbit on D0Y 216 at a beta angle of -2°. Differences are
shown in the maximum temperature and the temperature gradients
across the wing.
The lower predicted maximum temperature, occurring at or
before orbital noon, was based on the assumption that the SAS
would be operating at peak power continuously in sunlight.
In reality, peak power operation ends when the batteries
approach full charge, and this generally occurs in the first
15 minutes of sunlight in a solar inertial orbit. When
operating below peak power, the array efficiency drops and
self heating increases.
; _ 2.2. ;'-6b :.
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The larger gradient of the a,bual temperature is a result of
the loss of the meteoroid shield. The meteoroid shield in
the vicinity of Wing 1 was painted black and had a low
reflectivlty. The loss of the shield exposed the high
reflectivity gold surface and resulted in increased albedo
reflection from the OWS tank, and in the area where the
parasol did not shade the OWS tank, direct solar reflection
from the tank to the SAS.
Figure 2.2.5.4-27 is a plot of temperature transducer measure-
ment history, and shows high and low temperature maximum and
--- minimum transducer readings at orbital noon and prior to sun-
rise. The trend toward slightly warmer temperatures at a
given beta angle is attributed to increased solar intensity
as the mission progressed; hence, it appesxs that no measure-
ab'e degradation of solar panel thermal characteristics has
taken place,
2.5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions - The design requirement for the solar array system
(SAS) was I0,h96 watts at the end of the _ission. One wing was
lost luring ascent, which cut the potential power source in half.
\
Investigation and analysis of the Skylab ascent anomaly concluded
that the loss of SAS Wing 2 and the failare to deploy Wing 1 on
time was a direct result of the meteoroid shield failure. The "-_
\
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primary and back-up command sequences, the EBW electronic units,
and associated instrumentation and interlock circuits functioned
as designed. The deployment mechanisms in Wing 1 functioned tc
fully deploy the wing. It is concluded the purge and venting
systems performed as designed.
E0M requirements of 5,248 watts minimum avers4_e power, and a
f
voltage between 51 volts and 125 volts at the AM/0WS interface
were fulfilled. Minimum average array power ranged between
6,500 watts and 7,050 watts at +lh5°F (3350K), with the variation
being attributed to (i) measurement inaccuracies, (2) ch_iges in
solar flux which reached a maximum approximately 19Th D0Y 005,
and (3) the absence of any measureable performance degradation.
Throughout the mission, SAG voltages remained between 51 volts
(during peak power tracking) and 125 volts (at sunrise). SAG
voltages typically ranged between 58 volts and 99 volts.
Predicted SAS performance degradation from all causes was 8.3 !
percent for the mission; the major contributor being thermal
cycling effects, followed by charged particle and ultraviolet
radiation.
It is concluded that the orbital environmental encountered by the
?
SAS was very nominal, and in particular, the extremes of thermal .;
environment were less severe than those assumed in pre-flight ::
analyses and testing. Additionally, there was no measureable
. q
degradation of solar panel thermal control surfaces.
)
r
2
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The power margin at the end of mission is also a result of some
conservatism in original performance predictions.
o The early program concern over the discrepancy between the
AM power requirement and predicted array performance resulted
in concentrated efforts to make the best possible use of
available array area and to ensure providing a minimum of 51
volts at the AM/OWS interface.
o Shadowing analyses considered 17 out of 2hO modules would be
shadowed for entire orbits (5° TACS control). In reality
only 3 equivsdent modules (of ]20 Wing 1 modules) were shadowed
- during CMG control (+_0.5°).
o Power calculations assumed 3-sigma maximum instantaneous values
of heat flux for entire orbits. In actuality the effects of
the random behavior of earth IR and albedo are not well known.
o The assumption of an eight degree mis-orientation error
existing continuously between the array and the sun was overly
conservative.
B. Recommendations - The SAS design, manufacture and test program
f
resulted in a SAS that performed equal to or in excess of all
specification requirements. Some of the decisions made were
influenced by schedule, test status, hardwAr_ production status,
and the status of interfacing hardware. A review of major
decisions and recommendations for any future production of solar
arrays follows:
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I i/ Beam Fairing Assembly - The SAS design incorporated a
structural memb r to function as both a beam to support the
solar panels and a fairing to protect the solar cells and
?
deployment mechanisms from ground environments as well as
ascent thermal and aerodynamic forces. The dual purpose of
the structure coupled the deflections of the fairing with
the panel stack and the panel cinch bar supporting mechanism.
The articulation requirement set the basic design of the
structure. It is recommended that for future designs of
large solar arrays the articulation requirement be carefully
weighed in the initial design.
2/ Actuator-Dampers - The actuator dampers, used to both deploy
and control the rate of deployment of the wings, used an
orificed fluid for damping. The damping characteristics of
the fluid were highly dependent on the thermal environment of
the dampers. It is recomnended that a type of actor, thermal
blanket be employed on designs of this type. In the case of
Skylab, the wing 4eployment dampers were frozen before full
deployment after being in orbzt long after the design period.
The astronaut was used to break the link connecting the damper
rod allowing Wing 1 to fully deploy.
3/ Vent Modules - The requirement to maintain a purge atmosphere
on the wings prior to lift-off was made late in the SAS
development program. As the mating electrical interfaces
i
were already designed and fab='icated, a decision was made to
design the vent valves to operate mechanically with no
i
2.2.5-73
1974020216-133
interface between the SAS/OWS structure. An acoustic actuated J
valve was designed and developed to provide the venting I
J
function. The disadvantages of this type of valve were the
lack of capability to close the valve in the case of pre-
mature opening and the lack of an automatic talkback on valve
position. The valve operated at lift-off and did not pre-
: maturely open. It is recommended the use of this type of
valve be limited because of its inherent disadvantages.
h/ Solar Panel and Solar Cell Size - Among the most significant
trade-offs made during the design phase were solar panel and
solar cell sizes. It was desired to m_ximize the power ob-
tained from the area available. The Zxh am solar cell size
was selected and proved cost effective from a fabrication and
assembly standpoint. Other sizes considered were 2x2 and
i
2x6 cm.
The solar panel [2x10 ft (0.61 x 3.05 m)] vs. the solar
module [2x2-1/2 ft (0.61 x 0.76 m)] trade-off resulted in the
decision to use the panel approach. The equivalent of four
solar modules were contained in one solar panel, thereby
optimizing the useful ares. Although larger test chambers
and fixturing was required in some instances, handling proved
relatively simple; and after a short learning period, panel
damage and required rework was infrequent. No panel replace-
ment was required during or after final assembly and installa-[ ,--
tion. In-place call repair techniques were developed and
I applied satisfactorily.
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As the cell and panel size tradeoffs were cost effective and
did optimize power available it is recommended future designs
use the panel large cell concept.
5/ Wire Harness Design - Round wire cable (RWC) vs. Flat
Conductor Cable (FCC) was anether major tradeoff. The
decision to use RWC was made to avoid the costs in time and
money associated with development of a space qualified con-
nector for FCC, and to take advantage of the subcontractor's
experience in RWC design. Few new processes and procedures
were necessary, s_d fabrication, installation, and main-
_ tenance were straight forward.
Numerous deployment tests and on-orbit deployment supported
the decision in favor of RWC. It is recommended future designs
employ the RWC unless major flexing problems are identified
early an the Drogram.
6/ Electrical Interfaces - The decision to eliminate all con-
nector interfaces between the solar module and the OWS power
unit interface was based upon reliability and voltage drop
considerations. While intermediate interfaces in the cabling
may have facilitated production and assembly in some instances,
system performance has supported the chosen approach. It is
recommended this design concept be used on future arrays.
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7/ Dark E1 Testing - The development of the Dark El test concept
and equipment permitted the establishment of individual module
characteristics in the absence of sunlight. These character-
istics were then verified during assembly, integration, and
test phases. The Dark EI test concept is recommended for
implementation on future solar syray programs when it is
desired to verify array performance capability without the
need for costly and time-consuming deployment and large area
_ solar simulation.
8/ Sunlight Testing - On-orbit performance cf the SAS has shown
i good correlation with the pulsed Xenon solar simulation tests
performed on all panels during acceptance testing. Likewise,
the sunlight tests performed under line items ST-7 and -8
correlated well with the simulator and orbital performance.
It is recommended that future array performance verification
_ rely upon proven solar simulation methods, and where array
compatibility with power conditioning equipment is of concern,
a solar array simulator be used to verify that interface.
9/ Instrumentation Changes - Utilize one solar cell on select
solar panels to more accurately determine array temperature
in sunlight. This will eliminate the uncertainty in the :ell
temperature determination caused by the AT between the tempera-
ture transducer and the solar cell. Tha AT changes rapidly
as a function of time from sunrise and i_ strictly an analy-
tical valve.
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i0/ Thermal Control Paint - The increased power (approximately
130 watts) did nct Justify the difficulties encountered in
the application, maintenance, and repair of the Z-9_ paint
used on the rear of the solar panels. Its use in future
applications of this type is not recommended.
ii/ Ordnsmce Release Systems ,_The completely contained expand-
able tube ordnance system used for release of the beam fair-
ing and panels provided a reliable, redundant release system.
This comple+ely contained system, developed several years
earlier for releasing the meteoroid shield, was found readily
adaptable for both the release of the stowed beam/fairing
as well as release of the stowed panels. The systems, as
developed for SAS, used expandable tubes of quite different
lengths, demonstrating the versatility of the concept. The
beam/fairing system required expandable tubes approximately
one ft. (30.28 cm) long, while the wing section system require_1 an
expandable tube design of over thirty ft. (9.1hm) in length. The
Sky!ab I crew, in making its visit to the orbiting laboratory,
had a unique opportunity to assess the damage that had
occurred during the boost phase. Photographs verified proper
ordnance function of the SAS systems. Further use of this
type of gas-contained system on futur_ space programs is
reconmended especially where equipment, such a_ that with
optically critical surfaces, cannot tolerate the contamination
produced by most ordnance systems. _
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l12/ O_erall Testing and Quality Control - Close attention was J
given to details of quality and workmanship duriz_ all
levels of fabrication, assembly, nd integration. No direct r
measure is available as to tb value t]_is attention con-
tributed to the power output of the arrays. It is recommended
future comparative testing be accomplished to determine the
value on large arrays.
The test program was planned for development and qualification
at a high level of assembly. As the test program progressed
new tests had to be added to pick up detail components.
It is recommended on large complex arrays, the detail com-
ponents be extensively development tested to preclude failure
of large assembly tests.
2.2.5.6 Development History - During the design phase of the Wet Workshop the
Solar Array Wing Assemblies were being dcsigr_d by the NASA, MSFC for
fabrication and checkout at the MSFC. At the decision point to con-
vert from wet to dry workshop the SAS was parti_lly designed and part
of the development testing was completed. A decision was made by
NASA to have ._{DACt%ke over the SAS design, development and fabrica-
tion as part of the wet to dry conversion in 1969.
At the time of turnover the 31an was to finalize the MSFC design to
meet the requirements for launch as a dry workshop. The requirement
for artictLlation was deleted, but a decision was made to provide space --.
in the design for incorporation at a future time for ar articulation
motor and sun sensors. At this time the CEI requirement for the SAS
2.2..5-78
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lwas, "...provide 11,200 watts at the S-IVB/fairing interface, at
the beginning of mission, at 55°C (328°K), without shadowing."
The CEI requirement was evaluated and it was concluded that, (1) SAS
power at the end of mission should be specified, (2) on-orbit degrada-
tion should be accounted for (approximately 6 percent), (3) shadowing
by the ATM solar arra_ and the OWS structure should be consid, red,
(4) the 550C (3280K) array temperature was too low, and shc'ildhave
been a cund 70°C (3h3°K), and (5) performance should be specified at
the AM/OWS interface.
To meet the cluster requirement it was determined the SAS should pro-
vide a minimum average of 10,496 watts and a minimum of 51 volts at
the AM/OWS interface.
The MSFC design was assessed and it was estimated that 8,719 watts
would be available at the AM/OWS interface at the end of mission, at
70°C (343°K), with ATM shadowing. To meet the end of mission require-
ment and stay "within the same design envelope the solar panel rather
than the solar module concept was adopted. This concept allowed for
more solar cells per available unit area and an overall reduction in
system weight.
In November 1969 a make-or-buy decision by MDAC was made to sub-
contract the complete wing assemblies except for the ordnance release
: system. TRW, Inc. was selected as the sub-contractor and an award
to TBW was made in March 1970 to build the wing assemblies in accord-
ance with MDAC specification drawing 1B79083. The pre±iminary design
drawings and all information generated by MSFC in design of the SAS
were furnished to TRW to be used in the S%S design.
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R_ At the start ef the TRW design the basic MSFC concept was adopted
".-itha few exceptions. The _=_-_ conductor cable was replaced with
j.
round wire cable. This decis'.onwas made to avoid the costs in time
and money associated with development and qualification of a space
qualified flat ccmductor connector and to take advantage of TRW's
experience in z'oundwire cable. The solar cell layup was changed
from a flat layout to an overlapping shingle type layo,,t to provide
for more solar cell area per panel. The wing section ordn_ice re-
T
; lease system was defined as an expandable tube tension link system
using the design developed for the meteoroid shield. Th= venting
system for the beam/fairing had not been defined in the MSFC design
and the original TRW concept was for vent holes on the sides of the
torque boxes.
During the design and development phase TRW, MDAC and NASA worked
together and developed a criteria document to control workmanship
requirements in the solar cell soldering and layup process. The
criteria upgraded the final configuration of the solar panels.
During this phase TRW analysis showed the retention mechanism of the
solar panels for the launch mid boost phase would induce high torque
mcments with a large residual force in the bars during solar panel
release on orbit. To solve this problem the design was changed to two
small cinch bars connected through a tension length. During this same
; period, the supplier for the beam/fairing explosive bolt advised MDAC
that the on-orbit contamination requirement could not be met. A o--:
decision was made to use the expandable tube concept. The design
change required a complete new design of a yoke _d tension fitting
and redesign of the mating structure on the beam/fairing.
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At the preliminary design review a ven+ing system was still undefined.
Between the preliminary design review and the critical design review
a task team worked on a venting analysis and evolved a design concept
of a three compartment beam/fairing with an aft facing fairing over
a vent hole in each compartment. A spring loaded flapper was over
the exit to preclude retrorocket plume from being ingested into the
cavities. During the sam_ period new docking loads and a requirement
to be able to maneuver from solar inertial to a Z-local vertical
attitude was added to the program. The structure and the panel to
panel hinges had to be strengthened to handle the new loads.
The critical design review was held in January 1971. Apprc',al of
the venting system, ground purge system, and actuator/damper design
were left open for completion of detail design and analysis. The
requirement for maintaining relative humidity on solar cells at or
below fifty percent was discussed, but no decision was reached as to
the validity of the requirement. A research of available test data
and experience in the solar array industry revealed no history on
exposure of solar cells for long terms at relative humidities above
sixty percent. A requirement was imposed to maintain the atmosphere
around the solar cells below fifty-five percent relative humidity
except for excursions to sixty percent not to last ove- eight hours.
The relative humidity requirement forced a change in the ground purge
from a high volume air to a blanket GN2 purge. To accommodate the
!
GN_ purge required closing the vent ports and sealing the beam/ ,.-
fairing cavities to withstand a seventy knot wind on the launch pad.
In parallel with the design to change the purge requirement, wind
tunnel test results of the Skylab configuration showed a more severe
2.2.5-81
1974020216-141
venting profile on the SAS than had been incorporated in the design.
To provide a minimum impact on the OWS the SA$ be__m/fairing was
moving out so the aerod_%qamic excursions would not make contact
between the beam/fairing and the 0WS. The seal between the OWS and
the beam/fairing had to be completely redesigned to bridge the large
gap. A vent module was added incorporating an accoustic actuated
vent valve.
During the completion of the stress analysis in May of 1971, the
thermal excursions of the beam/fairing at the time of release were
: determined to be too large to clear the ordnance tie down fittings.
Q
Ramps and rollers were added to the ordnance fittings to ensure a
clean separation at release. The force imparted to the beam/fairing
by conversion of the thermal to mechanical energy in the rollers
caused a design change in the supporting structure at the tie-down
fittings and the viscosity of the actuator damper to be increased to
absorb a portion of the energy.
All design changes were incorporated into the hardware prior to the
start of qualification testing. The scope of the test pro_ram was
continually increased to test all of the configurations of components
and the worst case design conditions. The qualification testing of
the SAS wing assembly was completed in July 1972 and the fl_ flight
wings were delivered in September 1972.
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I 2.2.6 Electrical Power Distribution System
2.2.6.1 Design Requirements
A. General Requirements - The &eneral requirements of the Orbital
Workshop (OWS) Power Distribution System were that the OWS was
to be considered as a load for the power which is distributed
ITom the Ai_-lock Module (AM). Therefore, no power is generated
within the OWS Power Distribution System (i.e., the OWS Solar
Array System is treated separately in Section 2.2.5).
The primary requirements for this system were to:
o Distribute power (redundant where required)
o Provide circuit protection of all distribution wiring
i
o Limit voltage drop within system to prescribed levels
o Provide control (switching) capability for the various
loads within the OWS.
B. Detail Requirements
i/ Common Requirements
a. Materials, Parts and Processes - Material considerations
shall be per Contract End Item (CEI) Specification
i CP20g0J_C paragraph 3.3.3
b. Thermal. - Touch (surface) Temperature - Material con-
siderations/design limitations shall be per CEI ._
Specification CP2080JIC, paragraph 3.1.2.1.6.3
i
B
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Module/Subsystem Operational/Nonoperational Temperature
- limitations shall be per CEI Specification CP208OJIC,
paragraph 3.3.1.1.2.1
• c. Induced Loads - Module/subsystem shall be designed to
withstand/operate within the environment defined in
_: CEI Specification CP208OJIC, paragraph 3.3.1.1.2
_: d. Maintainability - Subsystem maintenance considerations
shall be per CEI Specification CP208OJIC,
paragraph 3.1.h
e. Useful Life -Module/component useful life considera-
tion shall be per CEI Specification CP208OJIC,
paragraph 3.1.6
= f. Component Construction - Containers of electrical sys-
tems shall be hermetically sealed, p':z_ed, pressurized,
= or encapsulated, where necessary. If containers are
_ pressurized, they shall be capable of maintaining a
minimum of 2 psig (13.78 kN/m2) of GN2 for 2h hours
l
: under the specified environmental conditions. All
; switching devices shall be contained in hermetically ';
sealed containers. Solenoids, transducers, squirrel-
cage induction motors, and similar hardware having no
circuit switching devices shall be _-rmetically sealed, ._
purged, pressurized, or encapsulated with compatible /
material, Precautions against sparking or metal-to-
metal contacts shall be t_ken for all devices that have 4
moving parts.
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Bused connector design requirements shall be as
specified in MDAC Drawing IB57771 and in accordance
with the requirements of MSFC-PROC-186. All connectors,
accepted to the previous design requirements, are inter-
changeable with those counectors manufactured to these
new requirements. New part numbers shall not be
assigned. Exceptions applicable to MSFC-PROC-186 are
defined in CEI Specification CP208OJIC, paragraph
3.3.1.5.5.1.
, Potting of electrical connections using epoxy resin
compositions shall conform to MSFC-PROC-196, except
that potting personnel shall be trained at the contractor's
facilities, given qualification tests by the contractor,
and issued a certification by NASA and the contractor.
All threaded electrical connections used for OWS equip-
ment interconnecting wire harnesses, except vibration
accelerometers and amplifier coax connectors, shall be
lockwired.
g. Radiated/Conducted Interference - The subsystem shall be
designed to minimize conducted and radiated interference,
_dd shall not be susceptible to conducted and radiated
interference. However, in no case shall this subsystem - -_
exceed the limits sp,:cif_ed in MDAC-WD Drawings 7883816
• and Design Memo SlW-h0. _
%
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Line shielding shall be used only for suppressing unde-
sireable interference. Except fo_" coaxial cables,
shields shall not be used as a functional current
return. The shield of a coaxial cable and the outer
shield of _riaxial cable used for rf shie?ding shall be
grounded to local vehicle structure at both ends and at
i every break in the cable. The television (T.V.) sub-
system is an exception to the coax shield grounding
requirement and is not grounded to the vehicle. For
the remaining cases, only the signal source end of the
shield shall be grounded to local vehicle structure.
. The shield may, however, be connected to a pin on the
equipment connector for reference inside the equipment.
Shielding shall not be used o,1 power lines, which shall
b_ routed and twisted together wherever possible. 'l_ne
cases of all electrical equipment shall he grounded in
accordance with the requirements of the DAC Drawing
7883816. No electrical connections shall be made to the
equipment cases from any return line. Case gro_md shall
be terminated to a pin on a connector.
The subsystem components shall be capable of withstanding
transient voltages of +._50 volts for 10 microseconds at
a repetition rate of i0 cycles per second imposed at
the power input and elevated by 28 vdc in addition to "-
the requirements of paragraph h.3.k.l.3 of MDAC-WD :
7883817. ,
f
4
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h. Lightning Protection - Bonding for protection against
the effects of lightning shall be in accordance with
MIL-B-5087 except for the requirements of paragraph
3.1.1.1.2. Tunnel cover segments shall be electrically
bonded to adjacent segments using bonding straps as
defined in MIL-B-5087. The covers shall be electrically
bonded to the 0WS at both ends and at intervals not
exceeding 5 feet (1.5 meters).
i. Circuit Considerations - Conductor sizes shall be
selected to limit the voltage drop from the Air!ock
Module (AM) OWS interface to the OWS equipment loads,
to 1.5 vdc maxim_n.
The conductors shall be sized and electrically protected
so that maximum wire temperature does not exceed h00OF
(204°C) and the fuse current for wires is not exceeded.
Where circuit protection controls multicircuit_, with
individual series circuit protection for each load, a
fault on an individual circuit shall not result in a
loss of capability to operate the remaining loads.
Electrical cables and wire harnesses for the exterior
0WS equipment shall conform to ABMA-PD-E-53 and ABMA-PD-
C-711 except as follows:
, 1. Lacing cord used on ca -_s and wire harnes_ _s shall
conform to MIL-T-43435, Type I, Finish B, Size 3.
7
i
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2. Wire bundles, harnesses, and cables m%y be spot
tied in lieu of continuous lacing, as specified in
paragraph 3.2.7 of ABMA-PD-E-53.
3. Delete the requirements for serving adjacent to
branches, breskouts, and connectors on blaekbox or
panel interconnecting harnesses, as specified in
_ paragraph 3.2.7 of ABMA-PD-E-53.
4. The high-voltage capability required for a 1,000
volt "hi-pot" test in paragraph 4.7.3.3 of ABMA-PD- [
C-711 shall be deleted.
5. Insulation resistance tests may be conducted within
the temperature range of 69°F (20.6°C) to 95°F
(35°C) in lieu of limits set forth in paragraph
4.7.3.2 of _MA-PD-C-711.
All f_mctions which cross an interface [the Junctor of
different contractor supplied/controlled end-items shall
be controlled by an interface control document (leD)].
The ICD shal; contain all pertinent data pertaining to i
the interface function. All OWS related ICD's shall be
; as identified in MSFC doctment CM-023-003-24, "Skylab _
0WS Interface Contro _ Documentation Contractual Index
and Status Report".
_j
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The OWS wiring design shall provide the capability for
L
post-_uate verification of the AM to OWS electrical inter-
; face. Bused pins and test connectors shall be provided
_ where functional operations will not provide the required
! veri fi cati on. h
Power to mission-critical loads shall be distributed by
- at least two positive isolated buses with separate
connectors .
: J. Circuit Isolation - All circuits shall be isolated from
structure ground. Two-wire single point gro_md circuits
shall be employed. The single point ground shall be in
the AM or Command Service Module (CSM).
All wiring and equipment using different AM bus power
shall be physically and electrically separated.
2/ AM/OWS Interface
a. Power Characteristics - The 0WS shall receive 28 +2,
-2.5 vdc from the AM at the OWS/AM interface. This
voltage shall have the following characteristics:
I. Bus noise - The total alternating current (ac) com-
ponent of the voltage shall not exceed 1.0 volts _
: peak-to-peak for all frequencies from 20 Hz to 20 KHz. _.
2. Under Voltage - Voltage shall not fall below 25.5 vdc
by more than 3 volts and shall return to the steady
state voltage within one second.
2.2.6-7
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3. Over voltage - Voltage shall not exceed 30 vdc by
more than 3 volts and shall return to the steady
state voltage within one second.
h. Transients - Transient voltage at the interfaces
shall not exceed +50 volts with a pulse width not
; greater than i0 microseconds.
T
5. Only DC power of the quality described above shall
be available to any OWS load. Any requirement for a
higher quality DC power or AC power shall be satis-
fied by equipment within the load.
6. All functions crossing the AM/OWS interface shall be
as identified in ICD _0MB559h.
3/ Internal Requirements
?
a. Internal (Habitation Area) Subsystems - The Pow,;r Dis-
tribution System shall provide via a centralized control
panels power distribution to all internal OWS subsystems,
such as:
1. _e_aal control system
: 2. Internal lighting system
3. E_periment support system
h. Habitability support system i
I 5. Communication system •
" _ 6 Caution and Warning systemo
i 7. Urine dump heater system8. Refrigeration system
I
2.2.6-8
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9. Viewing window heater system
_ i0. Utility outlets
ii. Television system
b. Zero-Gravity (G) Equipment Connection/DisconLection - _].i
: 0WS connectors that are to be demsted in orbit shall be
: designed to preclude the occurrence of a hazardous condition
caused by clectrical arcing when connecting and disconnecting
equipment _nd shall be designed for one-handed operation
under zero-g conaitions. Reference Figures 2.2.6.1-1 and
2.2.6.1-2.
c. Wiring Installation/Protection -Wiring shall be installed
from the interface to a power distribution panel, which
: shall be located in the experiment area.[
All wires in the pressurized area shall be protected by
circuit breakers. Circuit breakers shall be selected for
their ability to provide the nominal current required, and
to protect the minimum wire gage used in the event of in-
advertent shorting.
Termination of internal wire harnesses for fans, lights,
," experiments, and communication equipment shall be determined
on an individual basis, i.e., permanently mounted receptacles
or pre-lnstalled pigtails. The internal cables and wire
; harnesses shall be compatible with the OWS operation
: environments.
All harnesses shall be protected to prevent physical damage
by the c_.ew.
2.2.6-9
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d, Extension Cables i Extension cables shall be provided to
supply power to the portable 0WS equipment. Quantities _e
as specified in I-SL-008, and three configurations shall be
provided as follows:
i. 15 foot (4.672 meter) ?ong utility cables with plugs
(pin contacts) on one end and rece_'tacles (socket con-
tacts) on the other end.
t
2. 15 foot (h.672 met=r) long high power cables with plugs
(pin contacts) on one end snd receptacles (socket
contacts) on the o her end.
3. One foot (.3048 meter) long high power adapter cables
with plugs (pin contacts) on one end and plugs (socket
contacts) on the other end.
o. Bus Kill Switches - The 0WS power control and displs_v con-
sole shall provide a master power switch to control power
to each OWS bus. The AM shall also provide manual control
capability and supply Digital Command System (DCS) commands
to control (0N/0FF) OWS bus power.
4/ External Requirements
a. External Subsystem - Wiring shall be _nstalled external to
the pressurized compartment to supply power to the following
subsystems :
i. Instrumentation System
_ 2. Solar Array System (SAS)
: 2.2.6-12
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3. Thruster Attitude Control System (TACS)
h. Meteoroid Shield J[rstem
5. Command System
6. Airlock Module Umbilical Requirements Support System
7. Habitation Area Pressure Control System
: Each external subsystem shall be provided power froz t_'o
separate power and return buses.
t
.2.6.2 System Description
[
A. General Description - The Workshop ER ctrical Power Distribution
System provides the means for distributing power from the AM to
all loads within the OWS. In addition to power distribution
from the internal OWS power buses, power is distributed from
airlock power sources to allow operation of exte :hal subsystems
[
such as TACS, instrumentation, etc. The OWS power distribution
system accepts the AM power at the OWS/AM interface. Th-_s inter-
face iE called the "octagonal ring" and is located external to
the airlock module.
For the internal systems, power is routed from the "octagonal
ring" to hermetically-sealed "feedthroughs", which are motulted
in the forward dome of the OWS. From the "feedthroughs", the
power is routed to an electrical dlspl_y and control console
located within the experiment compartment of the workshop. This -
console (in conjunction with remote control panels) contains all :
necessary switches, circuit breakers, and indicators to allow
crew control of the 0WS electrical system.
2.2.6-13
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RPower for the external systems is routed from the "octagonal i
i
ri:_" to various bused connectors mounted on electrical equip-
I
ment panels located in the forward and aft skirt of the OWS. i
The electrical equipment p___els contain the necessary fuses and z1
control modules for control and protection of the external I
i
systems. I
B. System Details
• i/ Common Details
a. Flammabxlity - Material selections for the OWS Power
: Distribution components locateo within the habitable
interior were govered by MSFC-SPEC-IOI. This is the
specification for flammability, odor, and outgassing as
modified by CEI CP208OJIC, paragraph 3.3.3.
b. Induced Loads - System ccmponents /modules /panels are
selected/designed to withste_nd astronaut-induced loads i
as well as flight induced loads. The design is verified
by the OWS Development and Qualification Test and/or
analyses for every OWS panel, module, and component.
c. Maintainability - Each component part is designed to
assure proper installation within the CWS. Circuit
breaker and control and dlspl_v p_mels and panel mounted
modules are mounted in such a w_ as to expedite any .
rework, testing or removal and replacement of co_#onents
J
mounted to these panels.
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d. Component Construction - All switching devices are
contained in env!ror---entaliy sealed containers, as
< specified in the applicable electrical component Design
Requirement Drawing (DRD). Other containers are hermeti-
cally sesuled or encapsulated, where necessary, to pro-
tect parts contained in them and to satisfy %he system
design requirements.
The leakage rate for hermetically sealed containers does
10-8not exceed 1 x standard cubic centimeters per second
(SCC/S) of heli_ at a one atmosphere press_re differ-
ential. The leakage r'te for env_ronmentally sealed
containers does not xceed 1 x 10 -5 SCC/S of helium at
1 atmosphere pressure differential (101.3 kN/m2).
All insulated conductors on the OWS are teflon <overed
nickel coated copFer stranded with a 1,000 v rating.
The wire gauges used are 12, 16, 20, and 22 single
conductor, plus 20 and 22 gauge triple conductor shielded
and Jacketed. The conductor insulation material is TFE
teflon. The Jacket material is FEP teflon. The shield
material is silver coated copper. The 16, 20, and 22
gauge conductor consists of 19 strand wire. The 12
gauge conductor is comprised of 37 strands of wire.
e. Radiated/Conducted Interference - The subsystem is
designed to minimize conducted and radiated interference,
and is not susceptible to conducted and radiated
interference.
2.2.6-15
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Each component part of tnls subsystem is designed to
effect an electrical bond when installed in the OWS.
The bonding techniques are in accordance w_th MDAC-WD
7883816 and Design Memo OWS 38, except that cadmi_n or
zinc plated hardware a_e not used. Bonds are Classes H,
L, and R for panels to the console and structure and
Class S for other applications, as defined in MIL-B-5087.
f. Circuit Isolation -Wire harnesses carrying different
bus power are physically and electrically isolated.
J The power control console is cempartmented and e_closed
. to provide flammability and physical damage protection.
1,000 volt wire is used to provide additional protection
; against shorts and wire damage.
Hard anodize finish is used on the inside of the power
control console to provide additional 500 volts minim_
breakdown protection. Sufficient wire bundle string
ties are used to prevent a loose wire from reaching
structure ground. Wire harness design meets or exceeds
all mechanical support criteria Outlined in MIL-W-816OD.
Wiring internal to the OWS is routed through a closed-
trough system for flammability and physical damage
protection. The closed trough sy3tem consists of rigid . __
troughs, flex troughs, interchange boxes, convoluted
rublng, and connector boots. Barriers within these
devices wiii cause a flame to self-extinguish.t
Reference Figures 2.2._._,i, 2.2.6.2-2 and 2.2.6.2-3.
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iI Designated connectors on the wire harness have +ethersattached to prevent the mating of a connector to the
wrong receptacle.
g. Circuit Considerations - The system is designed to pro-
vide _ ¢oltage between 2h-30 vdc to all 0WS end-items.
° All subsystems are supplied power from two (2) power
buses which are electrically and physically sepa/'ated.
All conductors are electrically and physically protected.
In the event of a fault, the sizing of the circuit
protection device limits the temperature of the con-
ductor insulation to less than h00°F (20h°C) and limits
the current to a value which is less than the fusing
current of that conductor. This protection is from the
voltage source at the point of connection to the end-
iterns.
The wiring in the OWS is categorized by function and
installed with physical separation dictated by the
category. The OW8 subsystem wiring is categorized and
installed per the following:
i. Category 1
(a) All power wiring
(b) Solenoid and rel_y coil wiring
_ 2.2.6-20
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m2. Category 2
(a) 0-5 v analog signals
(b) Bi-level measurements
3. Category 3*--Low Level, 0-20 mv analog circuits
h. Category h--RF coaxial lines (above 150 kHz)
5. Category 5*- Multiplexer wiring
(a) Timing inputs and outputs
(b) Power inputs and outputs
(c) Analog outputs and return
_ (d) Bi-level outputs
6. Category 6*--Audio signals for communications
7. Category 7--Speaker intercom interface circuit
i.
8. Category8--3 phase, bOO Hz
9. Category 9--3 phase, 36 Hz
i0. Minim_ Edge Distance Separation for Wire Runs in
incheu (centimeter)
*Shielding required
?
t
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mCat/Inches 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
i 0 3 6 3 3 4 3 6 3
2 3 0 4 3 3 3 3 12 3
3 6 4 0 5 5 4 4 12 6
4 3 3 5 0 3 3 3 12 3
5 3 3 5 3 0 4 3 12 3
6 4 3 4 3 h 0 3 ]o_ 4
7 3 3 4 3 3 3 0 12 3
8 6 12 12 12 12 12 12 0 6
9 3 3 6 3 3 4 3 6 0
3 inches = 7.62 centimeters 6 inches = 15.24 centimeters
4 inches = 10.16 centimeters 12 inches = 30.48 centimeters
5 inches = 12.7 centlmeters
ii. General Ground Rules
i
(a) Power and return routed together (twisted if
at all possible and close to ground plane).
S
W_thout exception, categories 8 and 9 wiring
are twisted.
h. System Measurements - The measurements used to evaluate
the OW$ Power Distribution System are as follows:
i i. Caution & Warning Indications Location
r,eg Bus i (2) Low (AM Panel (Pnl) 207)
Reg Bus 1 (2) High (AM Pnl 207)
OWS Bus i (2) Low (AM Pnl 207 & OWS .--_
Pnl 616)
#
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2. Status Lights Locatien
OWS Bus 1 (2) On (_34Pnl 206)
0WS Bus 1 (2) Off (AM Pnl 206)
AM Bus 1 to Reg Bus 1 (2) (AM Pnl 206)
AM Bus 2 to Reg Bus 2 (i) (AM Pnl 206)
3. Meters
Reg Bus i (2) Voltage (AM Pnl 206)
0WS Bus 1 (2) Voltage (OWS Pnl 617)
Reg Bus 1 (2) Current (AM Pnl 206)
0WS Bus 1 (2) Current (AM Pnl 206 & OUS
Prl 617)
4. Telemetry Channels
M151 E?S Bus 1 Voltage
M152 EPS Bus 2 Voltage
M169 EPS Bus 1 Current
M170 EPS Bus 2 Current
M153 Reg Bus 1 Voltage
M154 Reg Bus 2 Voltage
MI61 Reg Bus 1 Fine Voltage
M162 Reg Bus 2 Fine Voltage
M163 Reg Bus 1 Current
M164 Reg Bus 2 Current
M182 Reg I 0WS i Tie
K183 Reg 2 0WS 2 Tie
M7002 OWS Bus 1 Voltage
M7003 0WS Bus 2 Voltage
M7004 OWS Bus 1 Current
M7005 0WS Bus 2 Current
M7400 OWS Bus 1 voltage Umbilical (Umb)
M7401 0WS Bus 2 Voltage (Umb)
K177 AM i to Reg Sel
K178 AM 2 to Reg Sel
M155 AM Bus 1 Voltage
M156 AM Bus 2 Voltage
M159 AM Bus 1 Current
MI60 AM Bus 2 Cur_'ent
K323 Deploy Enable
K328 Deploy Arm
K179 Deploy Bus 1 ON/0FF
K180 Deploy Bus 2 ON/0FF
K194 Sequential Bus 1 ON/0FF
K195 Sequential Bus 2 0N/0FF
M167 Reg/Xfer 1 Current
M168 Reg/Xfer 2 Current
2.2.6-23
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2/ AM/OWS Interface - The receptacle mechanical arrangement
on the "octagonal ring" of the airlock mcdule is designed
to provide maximum signal category separation as well as
maximum physical separation for redundant cizcuits. Wire
harness routing from 0WS camponents to the interface is
routed from the forward skirt over the forward dome of the _
0WS to the AM/OWS interface while maintaining the separatio_-
reluirements. The AM/OWS Electrical ICD is 40M35994.
3/ Internal Systems - The major elements of the internal dis-
9
tribution system consist of a main contrcl and displs_v con-
sole, and associated remote contro± panels. These system
elements are designed and constructed to contain the
t
necezsary cJ =uit breakers, switches, and displays to allow i
operation of all the internal subsystems.
The system receives its power from th'.AM by two (2)
separate isolated bus_s, each of which is protected by nine'
parallel 12-ampere circuit breakers. Inter_al ,,WSend-
items are then supplied power from these two (2) isolated
buses. Each end-item is also protected by a circuit
bre _er. The ground ret_n paths from end-items are bussed
together with eight (8) terminal Junction blocks and then
routed to the AM for single point grounding.
Th_ feeder circuit breaker panel (Panel No. 615) contains _ "
the 18 circuit breakers that feed AM pow__" co 0WS buses I
and 2. The remaining circuit breaker panels contain the
i
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circuit breakers that control individual loads. The
voltage and current measurements for OWS buses 1 and 2
are on Panel No. 617.
The display and control panels are proassembled, including
all interconnections _rid interfsce wlring, prior to assembly
to the equipment console in the OWS. Panels and components
mounted on the console are designed and constructed in
accordance with their applicable Design Requirement Drawings
(DRD's). Circuit breakers, switches, and displays are
mounted on panels in a systems oriented manner, r SFC-STD-
.... 267A is used as a guide for the astronaut-panel interface.
Design features are standardized to the greatest extent
feasible. Such features include but are not limited to:
a. Captive fasteners for attachment to the equipment con-
sole. Such fasteners are compatible with the in-
flight tool kit.
b. A means of maintaining the panel in an open Fosition
during zero-"G" environments.
c. A means to prevent _ -ertent actuation of switching
devices oy an astronaut during zero-"G" environments.
!
All OWS control m d displays are designed to be ccm,patible
with astronaut ,tion.
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The controls and displays are arranged by function and
subsystem conforming to a left-to-right, top-to.bottom
progression. This conventien is commensurate with the
cultural traditions normally encountered in the I_ASA space
programs. Horizontal progression is preferred to v__rtical
progression.
- Switches, circuit breakers, and other control devices are
: protected from inadvertent actuation. Methods used include :
partial recessing with barrier protection and full recessing.
Controls are placed to prevent damage or inadvertent actuation.
Switches and circuit breakers that are toggle-lever actuated
hav_ wicket barriers. The spacing between barriers is not
less than i inch (2.54 cm) nor greater thsr 1.125 inches
(2.70 cm). Rotary control knobs are rece_.':.-d,fully skirted,
and not less th_l 2 inches (5.08 cm) in _i_eter.
Two (2) momentary toggle switches are provide_ on the power
nd display console to allow the crew _o r_otely control
an AM relay network that can enable or disable either OWS _'
bus.
Accessory cables are provided with a non current carrying
small gauge wire cable that is slightly short,__rthan the
current carrying wires to provide strain relief. The cables
; are f_bricated with zero-"G" plugs/receptacles to facilitate
2.2.6-26
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connection/disconnection in a zero-"G" environment. High
power accessory cables are color coded blue to prevent con-
fusion between high power accessory and low power utility
outlet cables.
Electrical outlets are provided at convenient locations
throughout the forward compartment and crew c_Ipartment.
Utility outlets capable of delivering 6 amperes are provided
for additional 1_ghting, cameras, area circulation fans,
etc. They are divideJ into two (2) circuits and distributed
to allow loads to be connected to either bus 1 or bus 2.
Each utility outlet circuit wiring is protected by 6 _nperes
circuit breakers in the Control and Display panel. These
outlets u.ilize the low power utility outlet cables.
High power accessory outlets capable of delivering 12 amperes
are provided for photographic lights s_id vacuum cleaner.
These outlets are divided into two (2) circuits _;d each
circuit is protected with a 12 ampere circuit breaker in the
same way as the utility outlets. These outlets utilize the
high power accessory cables. Television outputs provide
power and signal routing for the _7 cameras. Scientific
Airlock (SAL) outlehs provide power for experiments (20
; amperes) and signal routing for experiment instrumentation.
The types of outlets (utility, high power, TV, SAL, and "-
instrumentation) are not mutually interchangeable.
n i",n7
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4/ External Systems - Power is distribute_ from AM Pus i and
Bus 2 to the external OWS subsystems. Physical and
4
electrical separaticn of the harnesses carrying different
bus power is maintained. This power is routed directed
from the "octagonal ring" down the OWS dome to _he various
forward and aft skirt panel bus modules. The power is then
distributed to the various loads of the particular sub- :"
system per the design requirements of that subsystem.
All wiring crossing the AM/OWS interface is protected by
_" or OWS located circuit protection devices depending upon !
which side of the AM/OWS interface the power or signal
originates. On the OWS side of the AM/OWS interface circuit
protection is provided by fuses and current limiting
resistors.
2.2.6.3 Testing
A. Testing Program - A testing program for the Power Distribution
Subsystem and its component parts was c_ _,,etedto verify that
all of the CEI imposed and designer impc requirements were
satisfied by the subsystem hardware. Test__ng was conducted in
three (3) distinct phases; development, qualification, and system
tests. Development tests primarily consisted of component level
testing as a part of the normal design evolution process and
therefore are not elaborated on any further in this report.
However, the attendant qualification and system level test per-
formed on this subsystem are delinated below.
; 2.2.6-28
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i/ Qualification Tests - Qualification test line items for the
Power Distribution Subsystem were: ES-7, ES-II, ES-13,
ES-Ih, ES-15 and CS-3. For each of these line items,
individual Test Control Drawings (TCD's) and Detail Test
Procedures (DTP's) provide the detail test requirements and
procedures followed in conducting the qualification tests.
_e test results are documented in individual line item test
reports. Table 2.2.6.3-1 provides _ cross reference of
line item number and components tested vs. TCD, DTP and test
report.
In addition to the individual line item test reports identi-
/
fled in 2.2.6.3-1, the Test and Assessment Document (TAD)
for Orbital Workshop 1 and the Backup Vehicle (MDC G0h2h)
provides a cross reference of design requirements vs. method
of verificat_on, including rationale detailing how each OWS
hardware item is qualified. ;
2/ System Tests-Huntington Bcach- The following tests, as
documented in Report MDAC G3069, were performed in the
Vehicle Checkout Laboratory (VCL) at Huntington Beach.
6. Continuity Compatibility Procedure (1B66984) - Prior to
the application of power to the O_J, the continuity :_
compatibility test wmg conducted to ensure confidence
J
in the OWS electrical system wiring. For the Power
Distribution Subsystem, the test verified (continuity
wise):
i
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o Isolation between power buses and return buses.
: o Isolation between different power buses.
o Isolation between different return buses.
o Isolation between power buses and OWS structure.
o Isolation between return buses and OWS structure.
o Individual conductor resistance was within a speci-
fied limit.
b. Power Distribution Subsystem Test and Checkout
k
Procedure (1B83585) - This test verified that the dis-
tribution of electrical power to the Orbital Workshop
end-items is :
o Adequate (voltage is within limits at rated loads).
o Compatible with end-item (voltage polarity is correct).
o Properly controlled and separated (thermostats,
switches and circuit breakers correctly apply/
interrupt power from the designated busses).
c. All Systems Test Countdown Procedure (AST), IB85235 -
This test verified the power distribution subsystem's •
compatibility with all of the OWS electrical subsystem
Electromagnetic Interference (F24I) generation/
susceptibility is within desi_,, r_.quirements limits.
The AST was the final demonstration, at Huntington Beach,
of 0WS flight readiness. This was a functional test
with all 0WS systems active in the required boost or
L
orbital __onfiguration within the limits of ground testing. _-_
u !
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3/ Systems Tests - Kennedy Space Center (KSC) - The following
tests, as documented in Memo A41-81h-SWS-M-I, were performed
at the Kennedy Space Center.
a. OWS/Instrument Unit (IU)/Saturn II (S-II) Continuity
and Compatibility Checks (KO-1004) - This procedure
verified the compatibility of the OWS electrical inter-
face lines prior to the application of power and prior
to mating with the airloek module (AM), Instrument Unit
(IU), SII, and the Solar Array. This test is similar
to the A3-VCL Continuity Compatibility Test.
b. AM/Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA)/OWS Electrical
Interface Test (KS-0003) - Two (2) of the functions of
this test were to verify, after mating with the AM, the
power transfer capability across the AM/OWS interface
and to function the OWF Power Distribution Control
System. _is section of the test is similar to the
A3-VCL Power Distribution Test.
c. SWS Operations for S-V Overall Test (OAT) and SWS
Mission Simulated/Flight Readiness Test (SIM/FRT)
(KS-0009) - This test functionally verified the electro-
magnetic compatibility of the Power Distribution Sub-
system with all of the Skylab electrical subsystems.
It is similar to A3-VCL All System_ Test.
m
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d, AM/MDA/0WS End-to-End System Test and Experiment Test
(KS-OOh5) - qT_'.sCheckout Procedure functioned all of
the Skylab cluster electrical and mechanical systems
and again verified compatibility cf the Power Distri-
bution Subsystem with each/all electrical subsystems.
B. Major Problems/Solutions
l/ Qualification Test Problems/Solutions
a. Problems - During the Qualification test program, several
of three (3) different module configurations (meter,
r- circuit breakers, and switch assemblies) did not meet
the minim_n insulation resistance requirement. The
problem was determined to be associated with the bonding
or adherence of the encapsulant to the metal housing.
b. Solution - Basically, the repair of the completed
circuit breaker and switch assemblies consisted of
cleaning the Junction area of the encapsulant and
housing assembly, removing some of the encapsulant at
the Junction area, filling in the voided area with
adhesive compound, an_ _hen sealing with fiberg]ass
tape and epoxy. The display light assemblies were also
modified in the same manner even though no anomalies
were noted during their qualification testing ....
2.2.6-33
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In order to obtain a good bond for new production items,
a sand blast method was utilized on the bonding surface
of the housing assembly. This process created a rough
surface on the housing sufficient to facilitate a good
adherence of the encapsulant to the housing.
The fix for the meter assemblies was to remove the en-
r
capsulant and matrix block from this assembly and then
solder the spacecraft conductors (control and display
panel wiring) directly to the solder terminals on the
meter assembly. The environmental seal was then pro-
vided by a heat shrink tubing covering the soldered4
area.
2/ Huntington Beach - VCL Testing Problems/Solutions
a. Problems - During post-manufacturing checkout, the OWS
:i megger test indicated an out-of-tolerance insulation
resistance for several of the circuit breaker assemblies.
Also noted dm'ing the megger test of OWS was an anomaly
of one circuit breaker assembly bat handle to not remain
in the closed position.
i
b. Solution - As a result of the two (2) above problems, all [
of the meter, switch, circuit breakers, and light ,"
assemblies, on the completed and installed control and
display panels, were removed and replaced with the
reworked/new configurated assemblies.
!
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In addition to correcting the housing-to-encapsulant
bonding problem, the circuit breaker manufacturer pro-
vided an additional inspection point on the assembly of
the circuit breaker during/after the activation mechanism
manufacturing step was performed. This inspection
verified proper assembly of the actuation mechanism.
When incorrectly assembled, this mechanism cou}d cause
the mechanical anomaly.
(
3/ KSC Testing Problems/Solutions - There were no anomalies
associated with the checkout of the Power Distribution
System at KSC.
4/ Waivers/Deviations - There were no waivers or deviations
required for the Power Distribution Subsystem.
.2.6.4 Mission Results
The 0WS Electrical Power Distribution System performance d'_ing the
launch phase and on-orbit operations was satisfactory. All EPS
launch Mission Rule requirements were satisfied throughout the count- _
down. OWS bus loads at iiftoff were 500 watts (17.5 smperes at
28.6 vdc) on OWS Bus 1 and h86 watts (17.0 amperes at 28.6 vdc) on
OWS Bus 2. The only OWS bus loads active or enabled from launch on
Day of Year (DOY) 134 until SL-2 activation on DOY 146 were ten water
tank heaters (5 on each bus), the primary and secondary refrigeration
systems (disabled prior to liftoff and enabled immediately following
orbital insertion), and the ion pump in the MI71 Metabolic Analy.-er.
The bus 2oads at liftoff agreed with the nominal prediction for t,e
case of all water tank heaters operating and the other loads as __t,._d. , _'
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The loss of the Meteoroid Shield approximately 63 seconds after
launch and the resultant loss of the 0WS Solar Array System Wing 2
at approximately 593 seconds did not directly _mpact the Electrical
Power Distribution System. No electrical wiring or components,
other than those associated with the t_¢o affected systems, sustained
any damage and no transients or perturbations of any kind were
observed on the OWS buses at the time of the incidents. Activation
of the Airlock electrical power sg_tem was delsyed until full
deployment of workshop solar array Wing 1 on DOY 158, because the
partially deployed solar array could not supply a significant
amount of power to the spacecraft load buses.
Follcwing orbital insertion the OWS bus currents increased at
Refrigeration System activation to 20.8 amperes on OWS Bus 1 and
18.0 amperes on OWS Bus 2 which represents the maximum lead exper-
ienced in the unmanned phase. S_bsequently, the combined action of
the water tank heater element end the OWS thermal environment raised
the water temperature so that individual water tank heater elements
started to turn off at launch plus 2h minutes and all ten were off
by launch plus 4 hours h7 minutes. Subsequently, the loads remained
at approximately 3.0 amperes on OWS Bus 1 and 1.0 ampere on @WS Bus 2
at °8.5 vdc Lmtil SL-2 crew activation on DOY 146.
After all attempts to deploy the OWS SAS by on-board sequence and
ground uplinked commands proved unsuccessful, the Apollo Telescope
Mount (ATM)/AM transfer rel_'s were closed to allow the A_ Electrical
Power System (EPS) to supply all power to the cluster. This was
accomplished approximately 2 hours after launch. Subsequently, the
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qAM Power Conditioning Group (PCG's) were commanded off to prevent
further depletion of the AM batteries and the c!ust :r electrical _
systems remained in this configuration pending attemFts by the SL-2
crew to deploy OWS SAS Wing i.
Launch of SL-2, the first manned vehicle, was d-,la_ved until DOY i)_5,
ii days after the Skylab 1 launch. This added i0 days to the launch
to activation phase. Thermal problems which develc ",ed as a result
of the loss of the meteoroid shield required that the vehicle be
maneuvered out of the normal solar inertial pointing mode to reduce
internal tempera_,ures in the workshop and maintain the integrity of
the coolant loops, refrigeration system, food supplies, and film in i
the storage lockers. Each departure from the solar inertial point- o
ing mode resulted in a reduction in ATM power system capability;
therefore, the requirement to manage power for the required electrical
loads became critical.
Power management procedures were initiated to ensure that demands
on the ATM electrical power system would not exceed its capability.
Since OWS loads during this period were constant and minimal, th_
0WS electrical power distribution system w_ not a large factor in
cluster power management until after the start of OWS activation
t
on D0Y 146. Although rigorous cluster power ms_nagement techniques
t
were required for th_s time period, the ATM power capability was
sufficient to supply the minimum load requirements at the various
_ vehicle attit ades.
L
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The OWS bus voltage levels for this time period remained substanti-
ally above the 2h. 8 volts required to insur_ a minir,,_r,input vo] rage
of 24 vdc at each end item. The minimum voltage observed on the
0WS buses during the entire launch, boost and unmanned phuse was
27.4 vdc on both 0WS Bus i and Bus 2. This occured at approximately
launch plus 5 hours during maneuvers out of solar inertial attitude
to alleviate 0WS thermal problems. Subsequently, the OWS bus volt-
age remained above t _ nominal 28 volt level st approximately
J
28.5 vdc.
The 0WS meteoroid shield mishap res,!ted in delayed activation of i
0WS systems until DOY 146 and then the requirem,=nt for rigorous
power management prevented full activation. Capabilities of the 0WS
power distribution and control and display system," vere used exten-
sive_ly during this period t_ achieve near-normal operation. Full
activation of all QWS syst_m_ was not accomplisheu until DOY 159
[
wh<n successful deployment of OWS SA_ Win% I by the crew allowed
act_vat_nn of the AM/OWE F]eetrieal Power Rvstem. The additional
solar array capability of approximately 7,000 watts from 0WS SAS
Wing 1 allowed 1"ull activation of the ._M Powel' ConditioninF
Groups and activation of all SWS systems. Subseauent cluster power
margins relaxed the power management task until CSM fuel cell shutdown
i
when the CSM became _ additional load on the cluster power system. _t
Fuel cell shutdown _ue to depletion of the reactants occurred
on SL-2 Mission Day 22 (DOY 168)_ SL-3 Mission Du,v 20 (DOY 228) .... ,
and SL-h Mission Day 20 (DOY-339).
t
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Although required after fuel cell shutdown fcr low beta angle condi-
tions (minimum solar array Dower) and _=REF pass orbits, power manage-
ment at these times wm_ not nearly as rigorous as in the early part
of SL-2 mission prior to SAS Wing 1 deployment.
A. Circuit Protecticn - A]l of the circuit protection devices con-
tained within the OWS (i.e., isolation diodes, circuit breakers,
and fuses) performed as extected. Z%e szzing of tl,ese compcneLts
"allowed sufficiert power to be applied to s&l end-items operated
during the SL...... 3, and SL-4 missions while providing the
ne .e_ it vehicle wi_ing protection. There were no cases of
vehicle wiring/component damage attributable to inadequate and,'
or faulty circuit protection.
B. Power Transmission - Distribution of electrical power within
th _WS va_ _atisfacterily accompli bed ._a the following
respects :
i/ All of _he distribution control devices contained with the
9WS (i.e., switches and circuit Ireakers) performe_ properly
during the mission. Circuit Breaker/switch positions were
not altered by SL-I boost v'hration or by SL-[, SL-3, or
SL-h CSM docking loads.
2/ All power circuitry was successfully operated without
incurring any short cxrc'lits or discontintt_ties.
2.2.6-39
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m3/ No static discharges were encountered by the crew (i.e.,
the crew did not receive any electrical shocks during
operation of the electrical equipment).
t
4/ No _4I problems were evidenced with relation to the OWS
portion of the Power Distribution System. It was observed,
however, that the Van Allen Belt Dosimeter (VABD) installed
in the OWS was affected by transients on the AM bus when
the AM was supplying power to the Command Service Module
(CSM). It was subsequently determined that the VABD was
susceptible to conducted interference generated by a heater
circuit in the CSM. Although VABD data was degraded, it
was recoverable.
5
5/ Voltage drop in the power feeders from the AM Regulator (Reg)
buses to the OWS buses was well within the anticipated band
as ncted below:
o Actual Mission Data
SL-2 SL-3 SL-h
DOY 162 DOY 21h DOY 3h3
REG BUS i VOLTAGE 28.89 v 29.13 v 28.37 v
OWS BUS 1 VOLTAGE 28.50 v 28.64 v 27.9h v
Av = 0.39 v O.h9 v O.h3
(@ lh.l amps) (@ 19.75 emps)(P 27.6 amps) !
REG BUS 2 VOLTAGE 28.90 v 29.14 v 28.37 v
OWS BUS o VOLTAGE 28.50 v 28.77 v 27.9h v
Av = O.h0 v 0.37 v 0.43 v
(@ 13.1 amps) (@ 10.29 ups)(@ 23.2 amps)
o KSC Test Dat_
Av = 0.60 v % 15 amps (both Bus i & Bus 2)
?.2.6-40
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6/ Power was supplied to the OWS by the AM at levels sufficient
to maintain the voltad_e to each OWS end-item between the
required limits of 22 to 30 vdc. The observed range of
voltaRe on OWS Bus 1 and 2 was 29.36 vdc maximum and 26.08
vdc minimum from SL-I launch throuRh the end of SL-4 mission.
The 29.36 volt level occurred on SL-3 and the 26.05 volt level
occurred during the storage period between SL-3 and SL-b.
Since the wiring desi_ maximum voltage drop from the OWS bus
to an end-item is 0.8 vdc, the termina/ voltaRe at all end-
items remained well above the minimum 22.0 volts at this bus
voltsdKe setting. At the heginninR of the SL-2 mission, on DOY 321,
the AM Reg. bus voltages were readjusted to an Open Circuit
Voltage (OCV) setting of approximately 29.3 vde.
in addition to maintaining the proper voltage level at the
end-item, the bus current levels were always maintained below
the maximum limit of 94 sumps per bus (94 amps bein_ the maximum
allowable bus current which can be handled without trippin_ the
9 parallel 12 amp feeder circuit breakers, allowlnK for un-
balance of reslstence between the feeder lines). The maximum
currents ebserved on 0WS bus 1 and bus 2 were durln_ the SL-3
mission and were indicated as bein_ h3.3 amps and 3h.5 amps
respectively.
7/ The circuit breaker/switch guards provided adequate pro-
tection against insdvertent crew operation ol these devices.
8/ All controls and displays successfully withstood the launch
environment.
_.2.6-21
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9/ Legibility of control and display panel markings, under
lightin_ conditions encountered during the SL-2 and SL-3
missions, was adequate.
i0/ During SL-3 and SL-h missions, power was distributed from
high power accessorl outlets in the OWS forward compartment
to loeds in the Multiple Docking Adapter (M/)A) via two 15
foot utility cables connected in series.
C. Anomalies - The following OWS EPS anomalies were encountered during
the SL-1/SL-2 mission: (none encountered dm'ing the SL-3 and SL-_
missions),
1/ Loss of OWS Solar Array Wing 2 - The OWS Solar Array Wing 2 was
physically and electrically separated from the vehicle durin=
SL-1 orbital insertion. This resulted in loss of approximately
one-half of the OWS Solar Array System (SAS) power _eneration
capability which, at the start of the SL-2 mission, amounts to
approximately 7,000 watts. This reduction in power capability
caused some flight plan modific_tions to accommodate the power
management requirements associated with the overall cluster EPS
(e.g., allowable nl_l:r average battery depth of tischarge), under
low beta angle conditions, Earth Resource Experiment Package
(EREP) passes, etc.
2/ Delayed Deployment of SAS Wing 1 - Due to a portion of the
Meteoroid Shield being partially deformed over the SAS Wing !
Beam Falrin_ during the SL-I ascent phase, SAS Wing 1 did not
fully deploy when commanded at T + _0 minutes. This condition,
2.2.6-h2
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coupled with the complete loss of Wing resulted in the
cluster power generation capability being cut virtually in
half (i.e., the only source of power generation remainin_ was
the ATM solar-array). This condition remained until the crew
L
manually deployed Wing I via Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) !
l
on Mission Day 14 (2h days after SL-I launch). The delayed !
deployment of SAS Wing i did not degrade the per;ormance of
the solar cells, which immediately started to generate power
upon deplo_._ent.
3/ Below Nominal Solar Array Group (SAG) #h Current Indication -
Upon comparing SAG _ current reading to the other 7 SAG current
readings it was noted that it always indicatea 3 to 6 amperes
low. However, a check of SAG 4 performance has revealed that
its power generating capability is equivalent to any of the
other 7 SAG's. Therefore, th_ low current readin_ on SAG 4
has been attributed to a possible short to structure of the
SAG h return _ires, which would allow return current to bypass
the Airlock Module current shunt while not degradin_ the
performance in any way. The most likely area for this short
is the point at which the SAS Wing 2 wire harness was severed.
A short of this type does not impact the cluster electrical
system because the positive leads are protected by isolation
diodes in the SAS power modules.
h/ Internally - Mounted Components - Due to the loss of the
Meteoroid Shield d'urlng the SI-I boost phase, the predicted
temperature profiles for the internally-mounted electrical
components were no longer valid. The direct exposure of the
m
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vehicle skin to the sun's rays resulted in the internal
temperatures exceeding the anticipated levels by a signifi-
cant factor (internal component temperatures as high as +225°F,
which is I07°C). Although these high temperatures actually
exceeded the component qualification temperatures in many
cases, the components were not thermally overstressed since
their inherent design capability, based on temperature ratings
at the piece-part level, would permit continuous operation at
257°F (125°C). The only exception to this statement is the
thermal susceptibility evidenced by the anomalous operation
of one fire sensor (located on the "hot" side of the vehicle)
- and the Duct #I flow measurement (which is also located on the
"hot" side of the vehicle).
5/ Externally-Mo_nted Components - From the thermal standpoint,
loss of the Meteoroid Shield did not affect the temperature
of eou!pment located in the forward or aft skirt areas exceFt
for a slight temperature rise (i.e., i0 to 15 degrees) on one
aft skirt panel during vehicle attitude maneuvers which were
performed to lower the internal temperature. In general, all
skirt mounted components remained within their predicted
temperature profiles.
6/ Caution and Warning Low Voltage Alarms - On DOY 153, Caution
and Warning low voltage alarms were initiated simultaneously
for OWS Bus 1 and Bus 2. Examination of the OW£ bus voltaKe
displays did not indlcate that a low voltage condition
actually existed. Subsequent investigation by the crew
revealed that both of the Low Voltage Sense circuit breakers
2.2.6-hh
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mon Panel 614 were in the OPEN position. Further data evalu-
ation confirmed that there were no bus voltage anomalies or
Caution and Warning System anamalies that could account for
a low voltage caution alarm being initiated. The most
probable cause was attributed to the inadvertent opening of
the Low Voltage Sense circuit breakers by the crew while
intending to open the two immed'ately adjacent circuit
breakers (i.e., the Display Power/Recorder Control circuit
breakers). The crew subsequently reset both Low Voltage
Sense circuit b 'eakers, re-enabled the corresponding Caution
and Warning System monitor circuits, and the system functioned
normally. No l%//'theranomalies were noted during the re-
maining 20 days of manned operations.
2.6.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusion - Performance of the OWS Power Distribution System,
since the launch of Skylab l, has been adequate. The subsystem
has performed as designed and its operation during the miszion
has verified the data obtained in checkout/analysis to be very
close to actual mission conditions (I _erence 2.2.6.4 -Mission
Results ).
B. Recommendations - In review of the various subsystem problems
and crew cumments obtained during the mission, the following
modifications/improvements are presented for consideration ....
l/ One-for-one ground control capability for every voltage
sub-bus (enable/disable via Digital Command System).
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1974020216-187
2/ Voltage and current telemetry (T/M) parameters for
every sub-bus.
3/ High resolution for all T/M current/voltage parameters
(i.e., if range is 0-1b0a, provide a low and high range
measurement ).
_/ Provide multi-scale meter (range selection switch) for
on-board voltage and current measurements.
5/ Provide local power ON/OFF control at 8/1 utillty outlets.
This was the subject of an ECP reouested by the crew, but
was too late for incorporation.
6/ Provide more utility (LO/HI) power) outlets.
7/ Provide circuit breakers that are not easily (inadvertently)
activated/deactivated (improved toggle guards or different
type toggles).
2.2.6-h6
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2.2.6.6 Development History - The final confi_Aration of the Power Distri-
bution and Control System was the culmination of many "in-house"
and customer design review meetings.
The design concepts were presented at Electrical Subsystem design
review meetings which were chaired by MBFC and co-chaired by MDAC
representatives. After the design concepts and Amidelines were
firmly established, the design was finalized and _resented for
review at formal meetings for the NASA intercenters (MSFC and
Johnson Space Center). The intent of the meetings, which were
identified as Preliminary Crew System Reviews (PCSR's), was for
the Skylab crew members and/or their representatives to critique
the design. Many of the crew member's requested design modifica-
tions were implemented, and the system design from that point in
time was firmly established. The following synopsis identifies
several of the design trade-offs conducted during the conceptual
and requirement definition phase of the system design period.
A. T_o Wire Single Point Ground - _ "one wire" system utilizing
the vehicle structure as the current return hath was initially
considered. This concept routed all end-item returns (except
for instr_nentation) via the shortest route to the vehicle
structure or to _rounding plates which in turn were electri-
cally connected to vehicle structure.
The two wire single point Fround concept routed all end items
back to the power source return and then connected the _ower
source return to the vehicle structure at a single point.
dm
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Both concepts had been utilized on various spacecraft and
booster ztagcs. Features of both systems were identified
and presented to NASA with the two wire single point ground
being selected as the final design requirement.
B. Parallel Feeders (Stiff Bus) - The AM was baselined to provide
power to the OWS.
A sub-bus concept was considered as the means for distributing
this power. This design provided for the AM to supply the
OWS with nine (9) 12 ampere rated/protected sub-buses from each
of the A_ regulator buses. The OWS would then distribute the
sub-bus power to the OWS end-items. Each end-item would have
individual circuit protection as well as the capability to be
power (switched) from either regulator bus.
The parallel feeder concept connected all of the nine AM supplied
12 ampere protected feeders electrically together in the OWS to
provide a "stiff bus" or one main but for each of the AM regulator
buses. The power was then to be distributed and protected in the
seinemanner as the sub-bus concept.
Both concepts were presented and MSFC selected the "stiff bus
as the final design requirement.
C. Parallel Zonauc_ors for the AM/0WS Power Feeders - One of the
basic requirements imposed upon the OWS system was to limit the
voltage drop (line loss) from the AM/OWS interface to any O;.NS
end item to 1.5 (round trip).
2.2.6-t_8
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This requirement, in addition to the space environment deratin_
consideration, dictated the amount of copper required for any
given load.
Sufficient copper could be provided by paralleling small _au_e
wires or by utilizin_ one large conductor.
A basic constraint upon the initial design (wet Workshop) was
to use existing qualified hardware. The largest feedthru re-
ceptacle qualified for the "wet" Workshop environment was 12
gauge. Therefore, the parallel conductor concept was selected.
"Utilize existing qualified hardware" was still the theme when
the OWS was converted from 'wet" to a "dry" launch configuration.
In elder to comply with the basic 1.5 line loss limitation and
existing aalified hardware, three (3) number 12 _au_e _arallel
conductor was baselined for each feeder circuit (9 feeder circuits
per "stiff" bus) and 36 parallel number 12 _.au_e conductors for
the common return bus.
D. Power Distribution and Control Console - The Power Distribution
and Control console for the "wet" Workshop consisted of two
enclosed "drag-on" panels (one circuit breaker panel and one
control and display panel).
The panels were to be stowed in the AM for the launch and would
be installed on orbit, by the crew on the _'wall"of the OWS.
mm
]9740202]6-]9]
emm
The crew would then connect the pre-insta]led wire harness
connectors to the panels.
The conversion from a "wet" to "dry" Workshop resulted in a
complete redesi_ of the "wet" Power Distribution _nd Control
Console. All of the sy&_em components could now be hard
mounted within the 0WS prior to launch.
A console was developed within which the system electronic
modules, circuit breaker panels, and control and display panels
would be installed. However, the web to dry conversion also
resulted in more systems, and more sophistication. The final
number of console mounted panels were 5 circuit breaker panels
and 2 control and display panels. The circuit breakers, switches,
and display arrangement was finalized after the last PCSR meeting
(mid-year 1971).
In addition to the console mounte4, panels, four (4) "remote"
control and display van_is were baselined. One each for the
waste management compartment, _ardroom, forward compartment and
experiment compartment. The "remote" pm:els provide for local
crew control of functions which would be cycled many times during
the mission. By providing the controls in the area of usage,
traffic to and from the p_¢er distribution and control ccnsole
would be _.onsid_rably reduced.
I
i
I
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E. Cable Routing, Separation, Protcction - The original OWS
internal _ harness (W/H)installat_ ,ns concept was to !
".e. iroute wiring in as many "hidden" areas as possible, _ ,
I :
install wire harness inside structural members, behind cabinets
or experiments, or in any manner that would preclude the possibi- _"
lity of crew contact. Li_jntweight, Drotective covers were tz
be used in areas where it was impossible to "hide" the wiring.
These covers would util_ze the stonepickup points as the clamps
for attaching the wiring. The cable routing allowed for physical
separation required to maintain EMI control.
After MSFC-SPEC-IOIA (f!a_nability) was imposed as a CEI require-
ment, much effort was expended to determine materials and methods
to meet the IOIA requirements. The following highlights the
development hi sto,_.
i/ Investigation and evaluation of available materials and
methods to meet flammability requirements. This effort
included:
o Determining availability of new materials for connector
sealing grommet, wire insulation, _.d clamp cushions;
o Deter_mining the available materials for wrappin_ or
enclosing the W/H's and att,_ch clamps;
o Determining m,:thods of protecting the W/H's if suitable i
insulation materials were unavailable;
o Determining affects of the above approaches on engineerin_
deis_n, m_nufacturing onerations and schedule_.
m
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2/ Selection of a design arproach that coL1bined the be_ _ of
all elements. This resulted in an enclosea, compartmc_tized,
metal trough for main routinR paths and a new "state-of-the.
art," material (Raychem NBG) in the: form of convoluted tubings
for localized breakouts to end-items.
3/ Redesign of all wire routing paths. This effort included:
o Selectin_ routing paths that were more direct;
o Gathering of as many W/H's in o.,_.trough as possible to
minimize weight increase;
o Sizing trough and trough compartments in order to stcn-
dardize parts;
o Sizing of convoluted tubing to standard pa_'ts.
4/ 3edesign of the Electrical Power, Display, and Coutrol C,.nsole
tEPD&C) for the purpose of compartr_.ontizingthe wiring for
fla_ab_ lity considerations.
5/ Several key factors led to the fina3 selectiun of the _rcugh
and tubing design:
o Uz .-.vailabilityof a qualifi. ,le wire insulation and connector
sealing material that would meet the s_ringent require-
ments of 101A.
o Selection of the best alternate fla_abllity nrotection
method that minimized design effort while fa_,'.'rinF_:anu
facturing fabrication, in.qtallation, _,d maintenance
effort;
o Selection of a design that would fit within established
design and manufacturing schedules,
I
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The resultin_ fllwability end physical protection resulted
in a significant increase in design and manufacturing effort.
However, two major advantages were achieved. One was better
• _ff _ ontrol of the vtre harnesses through the use of the
contJ__uous metallic _arrter afforded by the ccmpartmentized
˜ _ro_h.Another, was the reduction in the number of routtn_
_ paths and attach points that would be required in the tank
wall insulation.
F. Utility Outlets - Extension Cables - The final number and lots-
of the utility outlets was baseltned as a f_mction of the PCSR
meetinws. In _eneral, they w_.re located by anticipated/planned
_ usaKe of the portable equipment (vacut_ cleaner, fans, lights,
cameras ) o
After the outlet locations were basellned, the length require-
ment of the extension cables was determined. The requirement to
:i provide for vacuum cleaning and liF_htin_ coverawe for the total
vol_e within the OI_ Sncludtn_ the plent_ area and st;ill provide
for ease of stowage resulted with the opttmm_ length for each
cable as being 15 feet.
O. Zero G Connectors - The _asic design concept for the wet OWS was
that all wire harnesses would be pre-installed and thet all elec-
tronic equtp_nt which could not withstand the liquid _-_ro_en
_ cryogenic temperature environment would be "dra_-$n" or ero_
_!** installed item. The "dra_in" concept coupled _lth a potential
_, hazardous at_orphere _tctated the use of a connector that p o_ldee_
#,
]9740202]6-]95
o Ease of operation:
Could be operated (c_nnected/disconnected) with one
gloved hand _de. _ zero,d3 conditions.
o Safe:
= Precluded hazardous condition due to arcing when connected/
disconnected _der load.
Th_se two basic considerations resulted in several desiF, n concepts
and proposals. Several companies submitted desi_ concepts.
One concept utilized a fixed pin on the receptacle to actuate a
microswitch within the connector which then energized a rel_v
which in turn completed the electrical circuits in the connector.
The design t_lat was flnall,v selected was submitted by Bendix and
the resulting connector was baselined for the wet workshop. A
basic ,_equirement for the conversion from '_et" to a "dry" OWE
• was to utilize _ applicable "wet" hardware. Therefore_ the
_, "dry" OWS retained the '_et" _ero-@ connector for those end-items
which would still require the crew to connect/disconnect.
/
,i
?
L_
i
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: 2.2.7 Illuminatinn System
L
_- 2.2.7.1 Design Requirements
5
'_ A. General Requirements - An illumination system was provided in
the Orbital WDrkshop (0WS) for use during habitation periods.
The interior lighting system shall be provided to allow for
normal and emergency crew activities, and experimental
operations.
7
<
_- o General llluminatlon Lighting: General illumination lights
_ were provided in the forward compartment and crew quarter !;j
._ compartments. _
o Initial Entry and Emergency Lighting: A low level lighting
• system was provided for use during initial entry_bperations
_ and for emergency egress.
o Auxiliary-Ixl_,l_ts: A supplemental illumination level of not ?
: ;less than 20 foot candles (215.3 lumens/square meter) at :"
_ work surfaces shall be provided for crew operations requir- _
\-_ ing reading, writing, and experimental tasks.
: 5. Detail Requirements ,
_ 1/ Common Electrical Requirements Requirements imposed on the
%-
_ lllmnination System such as flammability, contamination, i:
._ _:4
,'_' gro_mdlng, bon:llng, etc., which are imposed on all electri- ._
..; cal subsyste.m, are as stated in paragraph 2.2,6. _.
2.2.7-1
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2/ General lllmnination Lighting Requirements - An interior
illmnlnation system shall be provided in the OWS for use
during habitation periods. The lighting system shall be
provided to allow for normal, experimental operations and
emergency crew activities in the forward c_,partment and
c_'e_ quarter compartments.
a. Controls - The lights shall be capable of being con-
trolled from eith_ the light assembly or the power
control panel. Any light which has more than one con-
trol switch, excluding the switch on the light assembly,
shall be capable of ON-OFF control independent of the
• other switch positions. One light in the Waste Manage-
merit compartment and sleep compartment shall be capablei I
j of being turned on from the doorway. The lighta in the
: sleep compartment shall be located such that at least
: one light shall be capable of being turned on and off
from any sleep restraint. A switch shall be provided on
the light assembly to allow 0FF-LOW-HIGH control of the
light intensity. The LOW position shall simultaneously
lower the light power consmnption.
b. Illumination Levels - The lights shall provide the
following average illumination levels:
:- 2._.7-2
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Area Foot Candle (Minimum)
_L_ 1 - Sleep Cc_p_rtment I. 5 (48.4 lumens/sq, meter)
2 -Wardroom 5.0 (53.8 lumens/sq, meter)
i
3 - Waste Management
_ Compartment 9.0 (96.9 lumens/sq, meter)
4 - Work Experiment
Compartment 5.5 (59.2 imnens/sq, meter)
5 - Forward Compartment 1.0 (10.8 lumen_/sq, meter)
The foot candles specif'.ed for the forward compartment
shall be an average ill_ination level 3 feet (0.9 meter)
i
from the light source. In the crew quarters the ilium-
° ination level is measured 3 feet (0.9 meter) from the
_ ceiling with the experiments installed in the operating
mode •
Brightness ratios shall not exceed:
i i - i0:i between task areas and remote surfaces
: 2 - 20:1 between light source and immediately adjacent
surfaces.
• 3 - 3:1 between task areas and immediste surroundings
c. Replacement - Light assembly design shall meet the
/
_ following requirements for the purpose of replacing
lights:
1 - one hand replacement under zero-gravity (g)
_ conditions.
2 - utilize a pigtail type connection.
/
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Id. Life - The light assembly shall meet minimum life
¢ cycle requirements for one 28-ds_ and two 56-day
; habitation periods eve" an eight (8) month mission span.
The required levels for light assembly are 4,500 hours
service life and B00 start cycles.
r e. Operation - The light assembly shall provide standard
cool white light as defined by coordinates on the
chromaticity ,&t_ram in NIL-M-25050, and shall produce
_2 no noticeable flicker or undesirable audible noise
during startup or operational mode. The maxim_n start
} time shall be two seconds where start time is defined
_ from switch activation to lamp lighting.
!
f. T,_perature Deviations - The OWS inten_al surface tempera-
ture variation to the touch temperature requirements of
55°F (12.8°C) to 105°F (40.6°C) will be as follows:
.2
• Calculated Maximum
:" Equipment Temperature (OF)
_ Interior Light Housing 123 (50.6°C)
(assembly grid enclosing light)
3,1 Initial Entry and Emergency Lighting Requirements - Initial
:. entry and emergency lighting shall be provided in the OW8
for use during initial entry operations and for emergency
egress. The low level lighting system is required to aid
i the crewman in locating and recognizing controls, e.g.,
_ power distribution, panel handles, h_ndrails and hatches.
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a. Controls - These lights shall be electrically controlled
_ from the AM via a circuit which shall bypass the 0WS
circuit breakers, control switches, and the switch on
/
the light assenbly.
h. llumination Levels - The low level lighting system shall
provide an average illunination of 0.5 foot candles
(minimum) (5._ lumens/square meter) in the crew quarters
and forward compartment.
i 2.2.7.2 System Description
A. System Configuration - The OWS lllu_ination System configuration
is comprised of the components listed in Table 2.2.7.2-1. The
items not listed are the Power Distribution equipment such as
cable harnesses, matrix blocks, electrical panels, etc. which
have commonality in design with other system uses. The list
includes the portable auxiliary lights which are powered with
utility cables from outlets.
B. Functional Description
i/ General Illumination - The OWS contains 42 floodlights for
internal illumination (Figure 2.2.7.2-1)--eighteen in the
forward compartment with eight (8) lights on the forward
_ dome and ten (i0) lights around the upper walls, four (4)
in the wardroom, three (3) in the Waste Management compart- -'
ment (WMC), three (3) in the sl_ep compartment, and fourteen
_ (14) in the experiment compartment. To identify the light's
_ location for the dome and upper wall lights in the forward
L
_ 2.2.7-5 -
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Table 2.2.7.2-1
ILLL_4INATION SYST]_ COMPONENTS
-- ,,..
IT_ PART NUMBER QUANTITY
J
Housing Assembly, Interior Light IB75h86-1 42
! Housing Assembly, Portable Light IB77hhl-i 3
, Floodlight, General Illumination ]369364-501
Installed in Interior Light Housing Assembly 42
Installed in Portable Light Housing Assembly 3
Available as Spares (Stowed) 6
Portable High Intensity Photo Lsmp 95MI0750-I 2
compartment, the floodlight number is marked on the housing
hinged cover. For the crew quarters light installation.
the housing has marking numbers on the integral light switch
plate and on the opposite end plates. These floodlight
numbers correspond to the nomenclatures on the remote light
switch panels 616 and 630 (Figures 2.2.7.2-2 and 2.2.7.2-3)
< and on the circuit breaker panel 613 (Figure 2.2.7.2-4).
1
In addition, red stripe marking is used on the hinged cover
for floodlights used for initial entry _nd emergency purposes.
! ,
The OW8 gener_l illumination lights ere controlled from the
remote light switches on Panel 616 and 6?0. The dome lights, ...
_ upper wall lights, and experiment compartment lights map be
_ turned on by combinations for each area through the lighting
2.2.7-6
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dome switches, upper wall switches, and experiment compart-
ment switches on Panel 616. In addition, Panel 616 p'ovides
simultaneous remote switch control of all sleep compartment
_ • lights through a single lighting sleep c_mpartment mTitch.
: Panel 630, located on the experiment compartment partition
_ between the wardroom and the WMC, provides remote control
of the wardroom and WMC lights. The wardroom lights may be
'¢
t
turned ON in p_ir_ through the wardroom switches on Panel 630;
_- all WMC lights may be turned CN simultaneously by the single
J
WMC switch on Panel 630. The remote switches for the OWS
lights will control their respective floodlights providing
the appropriate circuit breaker is closed and the flood-
light's integral switch is set either on HI or LOW. Placing
the integral light switch to OFF disables that floodlight
from being controlled by any remote switch. The low posi-
tion on the integral light switch provides for a low-
intensity illumination of the OWS during power management
periods as required.
2/ Redumdancy - Lighting redundancy is pzovided in the OWS by
powering approximately half of a given area's lights from
OWS Bus #i e_d half from OWS B_s #2. The even-numbered
lights are powered from OWS Bus #J and odd-numbered lights
from OWS Bus #i.
4
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| 3/ Initial Eb..try/EmergencyLighting - During OWS manned acti-
! ration, or emergency, a light system is provided to control
; the following eight (8) floodlights: Dc_e i, Dome 4, Upper
Wall 3, Upper Wall 8, and Experiment Compartment 6, T, 13
and 15 floodlights. These floodlights will illt_inate,
regardless of the position of their remote or integral
" light switch. However, the light intensi_y varies with the
integral light switch positioning, i.e., low intensity at
OFF or LOW mode and highe-t intensity at HIGH mode.
. _. Initial Entry Lighting - Entry lighting is controlled by
._.
::. a _ingle OWS entry (on-off) switch on the AM aft cumpart-
• ment panel 390. This switch controls the eight (8) OWS '
v
floodlights designated for initial entry and emergency.
' The entry switch supplies Airlock Module (AM) Electrical
!
Power System (EPS) Buses #i and #2 power directly to
the entry lights where normal power source is disengaged.
_ _ rela_ interlock control prevents power sharing from
3
the normal bus source while the EPS control power is
present and powering the ¢loodlight. After activating
; general lighting, the entry switch is t_ned off which
removes the EPS power and restores the interlock for
'i norm_l operation of _he lights.
The crew u_es the 0WS entry lights during activation
upon opening the OWS hatch, and during _.eactivation for _""
;" the storage reconfiguration of the 0W8 internal lights, i
- I; 2.._,7.12
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b. Emergency Lighting - During normal operation, the lights
in the OWS are assigned to buses so that a loss of a
single distribution bus will not disable any more than
half the lights in a given area. lll_ination in this¢
"_ case is degr_le4, but adequate for crew operation to
_ continue satiefactoril_. If both buses that supply
power to the lights within the 0WS fail simultaneously,
an emergency lighting network will autcRatically activate
" end supply EPS power to the floodlights designated as
initial entry and emergency lighting.
The OWS buses I and 2 are continuously monitored for
proper voitage level by the AM low voltage sensors in
the emergeucy lighting network. If the voltage level
for both OW8 buses i and 2 dece_s below 23 vdc, the
voltage sensors will activate the network to provide
EPS buses 1 and 2 power to the designated emergency OWS
floodlights. EPS power is applied directly and simi-
larly as in the initial entry operation and ill_ninates
: the lights to either low or high intensity, depending
'_ _ on the integr_ switch position. The normal bus power
source is autumatically isolated by an interlock relay
whenever EPS power is present and powering the emergency
_ lights. When either failed bus increases above 23 vdc,
-: the low voltage sensor deactivates the network and removes
_\ EPS power from all emergency lights, enabling the auto
marie isolation interlock to return the floodlight power
source back. to the noraal bus.
_r' 2.2.7.13
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_ Eight (8) OWS floodlights are used as the emergency
: _. (or entry) light6 with half on each bus system for
redundkncy. The emergency lights in the OWS dome and
on the upper wall provide illmnlnation of the OWS for-
'- ward area and illuminate the translation route between
the crew quarters and the AM aft cempart_ent. The
_ emergency lights in the experiment compartment proviae
i general contingency illumination of crew quarters and
_" illuminate the egress opening at the experiment compart-
ment ceiling and "the electrical control console.:?
J
: 4/ High Intensity Light - Two portable high-intensity lights
-,_
,_-, are provided for tasks requiring high illmnination. Each
high-intensity light contains four (4) permanently installed
fluorescent lamps. The four (_) fluorescent lamps are
; separated for dual system nontrol, with two (2) lamps
assigned to system i and the remaining two (2) lamps
_ assigned to system 2. Each system may be operated in one
_ of two (2) illt_nination modes, high or low, through system
:' switch controls mounted on the high intensity light. Either2_
_i mode uses both lamps but each syste_n's circuit is designed
such thkt the low mode emits a two-lamp ill_ination with
/
40 watts power consumption while the high mode will emit a
-._
r two-lamp illmmlnation of 75 watts. A single power switch,
L
-- mounted adjacent to the system control switches, provides
:i power to operate systam 1, Dystem 2, or both. Over-
_ temperature protection is provided in the event extravehicular
_: activities require high-intenslt_ li6hting. If an
?
- 2.2.7-1_
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]overtemperature condition occurs, a thermostat will close
and interrupt the power supply _o the system 2 lamps,
ii_ extinguishing the leaps. After the thermostat is allowed
_ to cool to its open setting, the crewman may reapply power
(" to the system 2 lamps by momentarily positioning the thermal
"i protect switch to reset.
_: Each high intensity light contains a 12-inch (0.3 me-_.r)
_ pigtail for use at any high power accessory outlet. HighC
_, power accessory utility cables provide additional extension
capabilities.
: 5/ Construction
/
a. Floodlight - The floodlight housing has a protective
_ hinged cover that permits access for bulb replacement
_ (Figure 2.2.7.2-5). The replaceable bulb includes an
integral hi-low-off switch and a pigtail with a zero-g
connector. The bulb (Figure ff.2.7.2-6) is comprised of
a fluoreBcent lamp and an electronic package. The lamp
! (Figure 2.2.7.2-7) As enclosed in a Lexan tube filled
_ with S¥1gardsilicon resin. A chemically tempered glass
_: tube s_rounds the Lexan tube and is coated with trans-
_:- lucent teflc_ to prevent fra_nentation and migratic_ of
_-. the glus in the event of breakqe. The electronic
_' _e_kage is enclosed end encapsulated in the al_in_
_,: tubular sectio_ of the bulb.
-i:!
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mb. Portable Lights (Figure 2.2.7.2-8) - The portable light
is a housing with a carrying handle and includes a
floodlight bulb. The housing is hinged and secured
with dial-latches to permit access to the floodlight
bulb. The housing is also fitted with a ttniversal
mount bracket to permit utilizing the universal mount
on a cc_venient structure.
c. High Intensity Lights (Figure 2.2.7.2-8) - The high
_ intensity portable light contains four (_) permanently
installed fluorescent lamps, protected by a grid housing.
The grid ho_ing is fitted with a collapsible carrying
handle and a universal mount bracket to permit installa-
tion on a convenient structure.
6/ Utilization of Portable Lights - The portable lights (flood-
lights and high intensity) can be connected to any convenient
utility outlet in the Saturn Workshop (SWS) for floodlight
power. The 15-foot (_.5 meters) utility cables can be used
as extensions to allow the portable lights to be used in
remote locations of the 8WS or for _xtra Vehicular Activity
' f
o
,\
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2.2.7.S Testing
A. Test Programs
i/ Qualification Testing
i
a. Purpose - Qualification testing was performed on pro-
;
duction light assemblies to demonstrate that design and
:_ production methods result in a product which fulfills
the design requirement established for use.
b. The qualification testing of the general illumination
light was done in two separate line items, IS-1 and
IS-7. The second test, IS-7, was performed after a
redesign/reconfigurationof the high-low switch cir-
cuitry of the lamp electronics. The line item  -sts
validated the design requirements with regard to the
following type stress or environment; vibration,
acoustical noise, life cycles, high and low temperatures,
humidity, and Radio Frequency Interference/Electromagnetic
Interference (RFI/EMI)o In addition, electrical chara-
teristics and ill_nination levels (component) were
_ verified by IS-I.
2/ Vehicle Checkout Laboratory/KennedySpace Center (VCL/KSC)
Integrated Testing
.i
a. Purpose - The purpose of thes_ tests were to assure that
the distribution of light within the spacecraft is (i)
a_equate (illumination in terms of foot - candles) to _.-
% meet the requirements defined in Contract End Item
' Specifications; (2) contrast r_tlos are correct andL
; compatible with vLrlous assembly end items; and
_ 2,2.7-21
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_ (3) properly controlled switches and circuit breakers
correctly apply/interrupt power from the designated
I
;] power bus. The Test and Checkout Procedures served to
_ correlate actual subsystem pe_neter measurements
(illumination levels and contrast ratios and subsystem
_ output) as they related to spacecraft display/controls
_ under ambient and emergency/initial entry conditions.
b. Summary of Completion - The tests were performed per the
_ requirements of Acceptance Test Procedure ]383586 "A"
_ Revision, Illumination Subsystem, 0NS and KS-0045 AM
_' Multiple Docking Adapter (MD_)/OWS end-to-end system
_ test and experiment test. Completion of the tests '
verified the adequacy of the OWS Ill_ination Subsystem
i
? design to effectively control and provide illumination
within the various areas of the spacecraft.
J
B. Test Anomalies and Solutions
i/ Qualification Testing
_ a. Line Item iS-i - Five (5) general illumination lights
_., were subjected to the environments as specified:
i"
2
?,
_r
(:
Y
] 974020216-2] 8
|_ Failure Failure Specimen #! Specimen #2
Analysis Analysis (Hardmount) (Shockmount)
: s/_o05 s/No02 S/N057 S/_O59 S/NOO4
Pre-Functional X X X
Low Temperature ,
(Non-Operational) X X X
_ High Temperature
i (Non-Operational) X X X
_ Vibration
(Non-Operatlonal) Failure# Failure* Failure* X X
Acoustics _
(Non-Operational) X X
E_ X X _- •
Htm_idlty, Temperature, :_
Life (Operational) X
Pos t-Fun ctional X X
_ Vibration (Delta)
(Non-Operational) X
Shock (MDA)
-- (Non-Operati onal) X
j;
_ #[These failures (see paragraph 3. and h, below) and analysis :
resulted in the need for two additional specimens (S/N 059
ands/_oo_)]
,f,
_- i. The illumination level_ in the high position were
below the specified tol_,ranc_ throughout the
._ qualification tests for S/N 004, 005, and 059.
This anomaly was traced to an error 'in the manu-
_ facture's production acceptance test equipment
setup and procedure. ._i
_' 2. Low insulation resistance was observed .,.thS/N 059. "_
! This failure was caused by electrical leakage _
,_ through a moisture laden opening in the splice ...._
:_: insulation sleeve to the switch and container case. _
1974020216-219
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/
: | This opening resulted from repeated impact of the
splice with the interior surface of the container.
Investigation of the problem proved that this light
' was one of the exceptions and most lights (including
i all lights to be used in flight) were manufactured
(
with epoxy bonding the splice anchored to the end
_ of the container.
3. Floodlights S/N 002 and S/N 005 failed during the
: first few seconds of random vibration. The failure :
J
was caused by an tmexpected amplification of the
t'
housing in the range _f the resonant frequency of
the lamp subassembly. The only installations of
the floodlights in Jeopardy from the housing amplifi-
', cation are those installed on the forward dome.
These installations will be safely protected by the
_ addition of a vibration i_olator to each assembly.
_ 4. The S/N 057 floodlight was broken in vibration during
sine evaluation. The floodlight was installed in
the housing which in turn was attached to the iso-
_ lator system and bolted to the shaker head. At
_. approximately 25 Hertz, the floodlight, housing and
isolator assembly were thrown off the shaker head. :_
, The floodlight was broken by the severe reaction due
:_ to a vibration input at least double that specified.
The loss of the assembly was due to the mounting bolts i
'. bein_ too short and was holding by only a couple of
_,, threads. _!
=' 2.2.7.2 b,
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: 5. Floodlights S/N 059 and S/N 004 failed to meet the •
_ requlrenent_ for broad band conducted interference
_ and broad band radiated interference tests, These
out-of-toLrauce conditions have been deferred until
All Systems Test on the Orbltal Workshop to deter-
mine if the levels interfere with other subsystems.
.The conducted interference was out-of-tolera_cc as
_ much as 29 db at 18 MHz when the letupwas switched
from off to low. The radiated interference was out-
of-tolerance as much as 50 db at lO0 MtIz when the
: lamp was switched from off to low. (Referel
_h
_ Paragraph B.1/b. 3 below).
) 6. Pre and Post Tests - The Pre and Post tests per-
_ ;
:!: formed on S/N 059 and 00_ test specimens verified
_ they had no_ degraded as a result of the applied
environments. _le test specimens were required -_
; to operate in the same mode during each environ- _
; mental test as they are expected to function during
the Skylab mission.
: b. Line Item IS-7 - The test was started with test part "
_°
IB69%_-_01, S/N 070,but due to an incorrectinstalla- _"
tion of the light to the vibration test fixture, a i
_ structural failure occurred. The test was hence re-
:_ starte_ with a new test specimen, IB69364-_01, 8/N 03_ ..... _
o; ;
; 5
, /5
................ _ ..... g
] 9740202] 6-22]
_ne specimen was subjected to the following en:_ror_ents t
? to verify that the part would function within required I
specificatic_ limits, i
t
Vibration (Hardmount end 8oftmount Configurations) I
, Life Cycles I
!'_ Humidity
_. Pre and post tests were performed to verify that the
• unit had not degraded as a result of environmental I
, i
_: exposure. I
Sylvania _lI test data has been _tilized in lieu of i1
4_ T
conducting _I testing as origin=_ly defined by 18-7. !.
"- !
i. During the post C-axis (hardmount) power consmnption
test, a step increase was noticed in the light
intensity after approximately one second. It was
" determined that the ananalies would not affect the
operational characteristics of the light. The step
-: increase in light intensity at turn-on corresponded
! to a degradation in start time but the time was
still within the maximum requirement of two seconds.
" 2. Power consumption was measured once every 2_ hours
: during life cycle testing and sliKhtly exceeded the
required limit of 12.5 watts at 28.0 vdc in High
Mode operation--the first day. After 109 cycles ""
were completed with the power cons_nptio_ remaining
¢
out-of-tolerance, Failure Report F08511 was written.
i 2.2.T-26 i
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The life cycling was continued in an effort to
: verify the validity of the high power consumption
readings. Measurements were made immediately after l
- turn-on and again 15 minutes later of which results
_: indicated that consumption was in tolerance shortly
after turn-on but out-of-tolerance after the 15
, minute warm-up period.
j After 460 cycles the specimen would not turn on
_ cumpletel_ with 2k.O _dc input and llfe cycling
"i'i
"f was terminated. A post test was performed in both
.,
_" the high and low modes during which turn-on time vs.
_: input voltage data was taken, starting with 32.0 vale
_! and decreasing in increments of 0.2 volts until the
light failed to turn on. From this data it was
_ noted that a significant increase in start time
_ occurs with input voltages below 29 vdc and long
start times are damaging to the lamp filaments.
: A fluorescope examination was also performed which
i indicated that all heating elements were intact.
, Continuation of testing at this point was conducted
-' under the direction of Failure Report F08511 to
_, satisfy humidity environment requirements and newly
i define'd mission life requirements, and to obtain
start time vs, anticipated life data.
1 It was also determined Chat the caus._ of theg
excessive power consumption was due to heating
effects of thel_. The Imp was not in its
;. proper usage configuration and hence had Inadequate
heat sinking.
_: It was also determined that the failure of S/N 03k
/
_- to turn on after }160 cycles was caused by cycling
) with low (2k vdc) input voltage. The 2k vdc input
_ used in life cycling was not representative of
flight profile and thus new mission requirements
were defined.
7
The humidity and life test were successfully com-
pleted thus satisfying missic_ requirements.
/
: 3. Conducted and radiated interference specifications
were exceeded during _ testing of the floodlight
{ in Line Item IS-l, however, since no interference
5"- with other subsystems was experienced during All
SystI Test on the Orbital Workshop, this condi-
, tton his _een considered acceptable.
C
2/ VCL/_SC integrated Testing - No ma_or discrepancies were
"," noted during intelr&ted/all i]rsteml, light tests performed
{?
_' in the VCL and at KSC.
._:..._-,:_-.., C. WaAveru/DeviatlonQ - None.
2.2,T-28
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2.2.7._ Mission Results
The OWS Illumination System performance during the launch phase and
on-orbit operations was satisfactory. All general illumination
: lights, portable lights, and high intensity portable lights
survived the launch environment, the high temperature environment
of the first twelve dens of the SL-I mission and the SL-2, SL-3,
_ and SL-_ do-._tng loads.
_ Rigorous power msnagement techniques during the first thirteen days
of the SL-2 mission prior to Solar Array (SAS) deplo_ent required
_ a greatly increased number of on/off switching cycles on the general
_ illumination lights. Following SAS deployment, the system was
operated normal_ and has exhibited no degradation or failures due
to the additional start cycles. Each crew indicated that, with the
exception of the early SL-2 period, the 0WS general illumination
; lights were all turned on in the high mode and operated continuously
_ during awake periods and all turned off during sleep periods. All
0WS lights were turned off during Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) to
! reduce 0WS waste heat loads. There were no failures of general
illumination lights in the OWS _or in the MDA which utilizes the
sme bulb/ele ctroni cs.
_ The portable light performance was satisfactory. These lights were
utilized per the crew checklists as required to supplement the
general lighting for maintenance and repair operations. One l_ght --
?_ _ wu installed on the floor of the SL-3 Co_manders (CDR's) sleep
compartment after the sleep restraint was inverted to achieve
_ improved ventllatio_. There were no failures of OWSportable lights.
" '" 2.2.T-29
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The high intensity portable lights were utilized only when
specifically called for in the crew checklists. Performance of
these lights was satisf_t_'_', and there were no failures.
." Table 2.2.7.k-I shows the actual and predicted light usage based on
the following _ata:
A. Accumulated Running Time
r
i/ Time period to flight: Total acc_ulated time through KSC
testing as recorded on the Quality Control recordsi °
/
2/ SL-2, SL-3, SL-_ Estimated: Hours were computed on the
basis of an average 16 hour work d_, all lights on, and
total occupancy of 172 days.
3/ End of Mission Margin: Design requir_nent (predicted life)
of 4500 hours less total time accumulated through end of
the SL-4 mission.
B. Accumulated Cycles
i/ Cycles prior to flight: Total .accumulated cycles through
KSC testing as recorded on the Quality Control records.
2/ SL-2, SL-3, SL-4 Estimated: Cycles were computed b_ed on
: Astronaut usage information (i.e., lights wet _.@Ii turned
on in the morning and off at _ight. This is equivalent to
%.
' _ne cycle per day for 172 d_Ts average use)
i .
_' _ 2 7 30J_ @ • I
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_ 3/ End of Mission Margin: Design requirement (predicted life)
i of 800 less total cycles accunulated through end of the SL-4
mission.
Actual usage of portable lights is based on experiment and/
or housekeeping tasks and is insignificant. Flight spares
would on]_vbe used in the event of a light failure.
2.2.7.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
A. Conclusions- The results of all three Skylab missions have
_. shown that the 0WS lighting syst_ms are adequate and have met
j all desi_ requir_nents specified in the 0_'SContract End Item
(CEI) Specification CP2080JIC.
l
B. Comments (Crew) and Recommendations
i/ Light Intensity (High vs. Low)
,_ Comments - All General Purpose lights were use_ in the HIGH
_, mode only. The difference betveen high and low modes was
slight.
Recommendations - Future general lighting fixtures be
limited to a single light level for simplification and cost
reduction.
_ Special low level lights should be installed for emergency, -.
t
: night lights, etc.
2.2.7-3k
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_ 2/ Detailed Work Illt_nination
Comments - Supplemental lighting was required for close
work, i.e., item repair, shaving, reading, etc.
_, Recommendations
._ a. Specific area(s) should be designated as a repair/
maintenance facility and pro'_J.ded with sufficient
illumination for close detail work.
t
b. Provide additional lighting for personal hygiene such
; as a "make-up" type mirror with side lighting as
opposed to overhead lights.
c. Provide higher illumination levels (higher intensity
_ and/or additional lighting) in areas where reading and/
or record keeping is performed, i.e., Wardroom, Sleep
Compartments, and Experiment Area.
d. When bo_y or.ent&tion tends to block lighting, such as
the c_se when the waste management system was in use_
added lighting should be provided.
",_;' 2.2.T-$5
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]!_ 2.2.7.6 Development History - The genera] illumination light originally
, planned for use on the OWS was a 15 inch (38.1 cm) floodlight
with an F8T5 [8 watt, i0 inch (25.4 cm) length, 5/8 inch (1.6 cm)
diameter] Sylvania lamp covered with a lexan inner tube and a
5
_ lexan outer lens (180° diffused - 180° clear). (Reference Figure
2.2.7.6-1). This preliminary design concept was in force until
' December 12, 1969.
On December 12, 1969, a meeting was held with Sylvania to review
i, the preliminary design of the floodlight. Sylvania presented the
( light output data for various combinations of input power, bulb
size, and physical configuration. With the existing design concept,
; the lamp _ould only produce 62% of the required illumination output.
_ Increasing the input power from i0 watts to 13 watts (maximum usable
_;: power for this lamp) would still only bring the light output to 69%
• of the required level. Therefore, it was proposed to (i) change the
]
_ lamp from an F8T5 to an FI4T8 [14 watt, i inch(2.54 cm) dlameter
_ 13 inch (33 cm) long] which would result in increased efficiency due
• to the larger capacity of the lamp, and (2) chan_e the EMI screening
4
to the housing, rather than on the floodlight, which would increase
the light output an additional 4 to 10% (Reference Figure 2._.7.6-2).i
Ji
1
I
After performing a full assessment of the total cluster impact ass--
elated with the design changes proposed on December 12, 1969, it was
established that additional detailed development testing was necessary
at the system level. Therefore, an ill_ination patt,ern and intensity
¢
_ level test was conducted with a mock-up light. Utilising the d_ta
_ derived fro_ this testing, an analytical evaluation of the total interior
light was performed.
!,, Z.2.7-36
.................................................. l
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ZERO.G RECEPTACLE
', /
_ FLOOOLIGHT A8 ORIGINALLY PROPO3ED - IN FORCE UNTIL DECEMBER 12, 19_9
Figure 2_.7.6-1. Flooo!ighta OriginallyProposed- In Force Until December12,1969
;_ - l i i i i llll
_ 2.2.7-3?
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iLEXAN OUTER LENS (180 ° DIFFUSED - 180° CLEAR)
_ LEXAN INNER TUBE
F14"1"8LAMP
7
FLOODLIGHT DESIGN IN FORCE FROM DECEMBER 12, 1969 UNTIL JANUARY 18, 1970
{:
Figure2.2.7.8-2. Pi(.torialHistory of 1B§93(14FloodlightDellgn
,_ i i i ii i
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'_ It was determined that CEI Specification levels of illumization
.... could be met with a floodlight producing 85% or more of the original
intensity as specified in Source Control Drawin_ (SCD) i_69364. Con-
currently, Sylvania was oroceeding vith the inve_ ,_ation or'flood-
light design alternatives based on the follc_in_ ground rules:
i/ The input power to the lamp would be 12.5 watts.
2/ EMI screenin_ would not be uJed on the floodlight housing.
_: EMI suppression will take place within the floodll_ht.
3/ Low operational temperat_Are is +30°F (272°Kelvin)
i 4/ Removal of the clear half of the outer lens of the floodlJ _,ht
= was acceptable, although no_ desirable.
5/ A m_Itiple lamp floodligh_ would not be considered due to the
increased mercury content.
A meeting was held on January 15, i,_70to present the results of the
above two efforts and to reach an e_reement on a firm set of require-
ments for the design of the floodlight. During the meeting, Sylvania
presented the results of recent investigations with an inner diffUsed
floodlight. The inner diffused light has a half-circle fill of the
inner Lex_ tube with Sylgard 182 encapsulant resin. Yttrium oxiSe
is mixed with the Sylgard, for light diffUsion (see Fi_nare 2.2,7.6-3).
This configuration provided the followin_ advantages:
i/ Light diffusion takes place within the inner Lexan tube rather
than at the outer lens, producing a pattern almost identical to
_ that defined in 8CD 1B69364
2/ Heat conduction through the Sylgard allowed cooler operation,
• and therefore increased efficiency.
_ _.2.7"39
i
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LEXAN OUTER LENS (380 ° - CLEAR)
SYLGARO 182.YTTRIUM OXIDE FILL
I'LO(,_.LIGHT DESIGN IN FORCE FROM JANUARY 15, 1970 UNTIL FEBRUARY 13, 1970
Fiouro2.2.7.6-3.
_ 2.2.7-_o
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3/ The Sylgard fill decreased the boundary l_ver losses in light
transmission.
It was then qrreed that the floodlight design presented by Sylvania
offered the best solution to the problem. Revistoo -G of SCD
: 1B_936k was fors_S_V released on January 26, 1970, incorporating
i the agreed upon design and the additi_ of electrical b_ding re-
/-
/ quirement s.
The current configuration (Ref. Figure 2.2.7.6-4) was finalized with
release of SCD IB6936k-H cn February 13, 1970.
/
Minor modifications to the light control clectrontcs have been made
• since the February 1_, 1970 date; however, they did not affect the
current basic floodlight.
J
f
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o
" ALUMINUM END PIECE
CHEMICALI Y TEMPERED GLASS
_ WITH 0.020-INCH TEFLON OVERCOAT
LEXAN INNER TUBE
F8T5 LAMP
: SYLGARD 182-YTTRIUM OXIDE FILL
E
FLOODLIGHT DESIGN IN FORCE SINCE FEBRUARY 13, 19?0
i
-¢
, Fi0ure2.2.7.64. FloodlightDesignin Force$1nooFebruary13,1970)
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'.2.8 Communication and Data Acquisition Systems
:.2.8._ Communication System
...... A
A. Design Requirements
1/ General Requirements
.- a. The Orbital Workshop (0WS) audio system shall be a hardware
_ system consisting of ten (i0) Speaker Intercom Assemblies
.,, (SIA's), P/N 61A850003, which shall be provided as OovL n-
?
_ ment Furnished Property (OFF) for the O_S. The SIA's shall
_ __ be eo,mmunication stations distributed within the OWS as
follows:
LOCATION QUANTITY
._ Experiment Compartment 2
Waste Management Compartment (WMC) I
Wardroom Compartment I
Sleep Compartment 3
, Forward Compartment 3
t
b. The OWS audio system shall operate as an integral part of
the Skylab (SL) Orbital Assembly (OA) system defined in
::_, NASA Interface Control Document (ICD) 50M13136, Skylab
_' Orbital Assembly Audio System Requirements, - --
i 2/ Detail Requirements
_ a, Power
i. The Airlock Module (AM) power buses provide dc power,
: through 5.4 amp circuit breakers, at the AM/OWS inter-
_ face to provide intercom and voice recorder control
,__. power to each channel of the audio system SIA's. The
_ AM power buses provide dc power, through 3.9 amp circuit
_1 breakers at the AM/OWS interface to provide Crew
¢
_ " 2.2.8-1 "J
tI' •
-, ,_-_ ........._:-:.. ..-:-_ . . •...............................................
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_ Communication Umbilical (CCU) power to each channel of
_ the audio system SIA's.
2. No subsystem loading will cause these limits to be
exc eeded.
_- 3. The electrical power bus characteristics are defined in
the electric=i po_er distribution system paragraph
_ 2.2.6.1.
'• b. Voice Requiremen4ts
4
1. The audio system shall be a two channel operating ser-
vice, Channels A and B to each of the ten (10) OWS
cammunicat ion stations.
•- 2. Each co._unication station in the OWS shal] be _'ovided
%
with the capability *.o accommodate headset voice func-
tions for duplex (simultaneous talk and listen) voice
communications between crew members within the modules
.: of the OA or between crew members in _he OA and the
._ Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN) on both
-_ Channels A and B.
S. Microphone voice functions shall be provided from the
_,_L .... OWS communication stations "to the AM/OWS interface for
ii simplex (talk or listen) voice communication between
;- craw members within the modulas of the OA, or between
_ crew members in the OA and the I_FC on both Channels A
i and B.
?' k. The OWS audio system shall provide for voice recording
; functions from each of the communication stations to the
.._ AM/0WS interface to control the voice tape recorders in
the AM on both Channei_ A and B.
•: 2.2.8-2
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C. Caution and Warning (C&W) I
c li. The OWS audio system shall receive tones and indicator
' signals from the C&W system and route them to the
communication stations and crewmen as required on
Channels A and B.
; 2. Detailed requirements for the C&W and crew alert func-
> tions are contained in the ICD, 50M13148, Speaker
-?
Intercom Assembly to Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) and
OWS Interface.
d. Operational Biomedical Data
The OWS audio system shall route operational biomedical
data from the CCU of the communication stations to the
:_ AM/OWS for insertion into the AM Pulse Code Modulation
_ (PCM) data system, from up to two crewmen, on Channels A
or B. Detailed requirements for the biomedical data func-
tions are contained in the ICD.
e. Interfaces
The OWS audio system interfaces shall be defined by the
following ICD's:
_ o 40M35594 - Orbital Workshop to Airlock Module Electrical
Interface.
v
o h0M13148 Speaker Intercom Assembly to MDA and OWS
< Interface.
_, o 50M131_8 - Ancillary Equipment to L_urn Workshop
;_ Instrumentation and Communication Interface.
o 50M13136 - Skylab Orbital Assembly Audio System
f
_ Requirements.
_.. 2.Z.8-3
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: B. System Description
_L. _/ General Description - The OWS cnmmunication system is designed
as a functional part of the OA audio system and provides the
following: (i) direct voice link between the OWS and the STDN
via the Command Module (CM) S-Band; (2) biomedical data to the
_ STDN through the AM PCM telemetry system; (3) int_rcommunica-
tior, link between astronauts within the OWS; (4) audio and
; visual displays of warning tones generated by the C&W systp_;
- and (5) control for the operation of the voice and data record-
ing system in the AM.
_ 2/ System Details
" a. Power
_" i. The utilization of SIA's having a potential of ten (i0)
stations active at the same time, created voltage drop
difficulties with lines providing power to the SIA's,
_ Therefore, parallel "ring" bus circuits with busing
redundancy within the busing "ring" were designed, using
heavier 12 gauge wires, to car3:ythe heavier load cur-
rents. The circuits requiring the additional busing
_' redundancy are the intercom power circuits, and the call
:, command circuits of both communication channels.
•, 2. See Figure 2.2.8.1-1 for the "ring" bus circuit concept.
_:_; b. Voice
i. The Channel A and Channel B functions are routed across
the AM/OWS interface through feedthrough connectors into
the habitation area and connected to each of the commu-
_ nication stations in a parallel "ringed" bus circuit
, (see Figure 2.2.8.1-1 for the "rin_" bus circuit concept).
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!- "I_ING" BUS CIRCUIT CONCEPT
_. _ . COMM CHAN "A"
' ,_ SUPPLY-INTE RCOM PWR _.]1 SPEAKER INTERCOM ASSY "A" CCU]• RET'JRN-COMM PWR (SIAl436A3 (PNL40!)FWD COMPARTMENT "'8" CCU: SUPPLY_CU PWR
"--_ 0 MIKE SIGNAL j SIA I
: _ 436A2 (PNL-520)
,,, MIKE S',GNAL RET • _ FWD COMPARTMENT
,,4: SPEAKER/EARPHONE SIG •
-_ _ SPEAKER/EARPHONE SIG RET j _ SIA
•" 440A6 (PNL-600)
::- - I PTT COMMAND J i EXPERIMENT AREA
": CALL COMMAND
i 0 441A1 (PNL-9031
., O
CAUTION/WARNING TONE • _ _ SLEEP COMP.
CAUTION/WARNING TONE RET j .j
, • ,,J
, <
" 441A2 (PNL-902}
_= HL CAUTION/WARNING TONE RET _j _ W SLEEP COMP.
MASTER ALARM STATUS LIGHT
441A3 (PNL-901)
SLEEP COMP.
, :{,: VOICE RECORD ENABLE _j
•: i S1A
: BIO.MED CREW IDENT SIG ,. _._ 442A1 (PNL,.801)
• "" WMC]:
BIO-MEO HEART RATE SIG
, , m -,,,,,q
:! BIO.MED ZPN SIG •
" S1A
- 436A1 (PNL.540)
_ BIO-MED BODY TEMP SIG __ FWD COMPARTMENT
_r I I
,_ BIO.MED ECG SIG •
_-, BI0-MED SIG RET ,,, _ _ S1A
_ " _ 443A 1 (PNL702
,j WARDROOM
,.J
;_ COMM CHAN "B" HAS THE "B' SIA
440A6 (PNL-6271
SAME S1A INTERFACE, BUT EXPERIMENT AREA
,:. DOE8 NOT HAVE THE 81GNALS
MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK .... "'"
i FIGURE 2.2.8.1-i
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2. The capability is provided to cperate the speaker/micro-
_ ' phone of the SIA by selecting intercom (ICOM) listen, or
• transmit (XMIT) mode of operation. ICOM allows micro-
phone outputs to the OA audio network and also enables
_L
the voice transmission to the Manned Space Flight Network
(MSFN). The listen mode enables the SIA speaker. ICOM
and XMIT control positions are momentary (see Figure
?
2.2.8.1-2).
_ 3. A CCU power and mode selection switch provides for each I
communication channel CCU receptacle. The switch J
provides the capability of positively selecting OFF, I
" ICOM/PTT, PTT, or SLEEP modes of operation for the CCU
fUnctions.
h. The voice RECORD switch enables or irhibits voice tape
recording. Controls are momentary-contact; the enable
(RECORD) switch activates the tape recorders in the AM,
as required. The inhibit (OFF) position deactivates the
tape recorders without interferring with AM PCM data
storage when it has been enabled.
'_ 5. The green advisory light confirms successful voice
_ recorder enable or inhibit selection by the voice RECORD
switch as described in the previous paragraph. It
indicates tape motion on the data (subframe i) recorder,
provided the voice recording has been enabled and a
playback has not been enabled
! 6. The SIA provides for a momentary "call" which performs
t
the following functions: Connects together the micro-
i phone lines of both Channels A and B, overrides SLEEP
ti z;z.8-6
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mmode on all except ca_ling stations, overrides SLEEP
mode on all CCU except earphone and C&W circuits, enables
ICOM for the speaker/microphone, and establishes ICOM/P_T
for the CCU receptacles on the calling station.
• c. Caution and Warning (C&W)
The AM provides C&W signals and ground commanded crew
alerts to the OWS SIA's. The Master Alarm Status Light
; is activated and the C&W tones are generated at each of
the SIA's.
d. Biomedical Data
The system transfers biomedical data from up to two
crewmen on separate channels through the CCU's of the
SIA.
C. Testing
! i/ Testing Program
? a. There were no OWS Test Plan, DAC-56697A, line items pre-
pared by MDAC-W for develoDment testing of components used
in the communication system.
b. The SIA was provided as GFP for installation as part of the
OWS communication system; consequently the SIA qualification
_ tests were in accordance with MDAC-E document 061-063.22,
_ Test Request for Qualification of Speaker Intercom Assembly,
c. The OWS communication system consisted of the SIA's and
interconnecting cable harnesses; therefore, production
testing involved verification of the cable harnesses. The
: SIA's were production tested by MDAC-E at the St Louis ....j
_ facility.
>
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;d. Port manufacturing tests were performed at Huntington Beach
_ which included subsystem and integrated system testing.
These tests involved the utilization of equipment simulating
the AM portion of the audio system. The 0WS communication
i_'
?
system was verified to be compatible with the audio system
in the airlock. Tests contributing to the verification are
_ listed in Table 2.2.8.1-1.
e. Testing at KSC consisted of post manufacturing subsystem%
j retesting of any delta changes affecting Huntington Beach
test results and integrated system testing at the module and
cluster levels. Major testing related to the verification
of the communication system i_ listed in Table 2,2.8.1-2.
2/ Major Problems and Solutions
, a. There were no significant 0WS communication system problems
_ encountered during checkout of the system at MDAC-W
(Huntington Beach).
b. _unctional verification of the OWS communication system at
KSC disclosed two (2) significant problems. Both problems
required the removal of the SIA's from the spacecraft for
design modifications. The first removal was to reduce the
S output level of the call potentiometer to minimize the
possibility of acoustic feedback in the CALL mode. The
second removal was due to the misalignment of the channel
select knob on the SIA's which caused channel function
L_ indexing problems. The SIA's were reworked; reinstalled,
and successfully retested according to Test KS-0OhS.
2._.8-9
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/TABLE 2.2.8.1-1
• HUNTINGTON BEACH POST-MANUFACTURING TESTS AFFECTING
0WS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
/
Procedure Nomenclature Tests
1B66984 Continuity compatibility Assures confidence in bWS stage
; wiring
IB83587 InteJ'com subsystem Verified the performance of the
_ audio communication system by
methods of dialogue and cali-
_ brated signals into the earphone
and microphone lines. All fu_ic-
i tions associated with each of
the l0 communication stations
(SIA's); which included the
warning tones, tape recorder con-
trols, voice communication for
each audio channel, as well as
the CCU functions including
bicmed functions to telemetry;
were verified.
]283590 EMC setup and systems Demonstrated t.hat the communic_-
reverification tion system met transient and
margin of safety requirements of
the EMC criteria.
_ 1B93589 All system test - prep and Preparation and securing of the
securing 0WS for all _ystem test
1B93591 All system test - activation, Simulated OWS test of syst._ms
orbital operations and after the insertion phase mud
deactivation during orbital operations.
,_ 1B93588 All system te_t - prelaunch, Simulated OWS test of systems
boost, and preactivation during prelaunch, boost and
: preactivation periods of the OWS.
>
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TABLE 2.2.8.1-2
KSC TESTING OF THE OWS INTERCOM SUBSYSTEM
Procedure Nomenclature Tests
! KS-OOh5 AM/NDA/OWH end-to-end system Verified the perfolmance of the
! test and experiment test. cluster audio system utilizing
simulated CSM audio center.
_ Verified that the OWS communi-
cation system operated com-
patibly with other module com-
ponents of the system.
KS-O009 SWS Operations for SV CAT Integrated cluster level testing
and SWS mission SIM/FRT which functionally verified the
compatibility of the OWS elec-
trical power system, including
, the OWS communication system
: and ensure electromagnetic
compatibility of these systems.
?
_L
%
,,, 2.2.8-11
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3/ WeAvers and Deviations - There vere no vatvers or _eviated-to-
design specifications of the O_ ccemunlcation system.
D. Misaion Results - The OWS comaunication system, an extension of
the OA audio system, has successful_ supported the SL-1/SL-2,
SL-3 and SL-_ atssions. The O_ hardvare has performed veil and
has enabled the astronauts to cc_untcate among themselves and
i vith the _ team throughout the atsstons. The hio_edicaA data,
t routed through the SIA's vere of good quality and enabled the
aedAcal te.m to perform their functions.
' Mission problems vere limited to a malfunctioning SZA located at
Position _0, and an acoustical feedback problem that is similar
to tha +. experienced during the Huntington Beach checkout. The
ancmaAous SIA had a mtlfunctioning ICOM/X_T svitch vhich
resulted in continuous '*hot" _.t.crophone condition. This unit
vas replaced.
The acoustical feedback problem vas attributed to the placement
_ of the .glA's vithin the OWS to support the different experiments
and crev tasks. The feedback problem was operationally controlled
during SL-2 and SL-3 by either keeping the 5XA speaker volume
_ contro3.s turned dovn or by _ctivating the SlA's only vhen they
vere req,Ltred.
This technique vas unacceptable to the trey and for SL-_ JSC devel-
oped an external load that vss used to load the microphone llne
an_ thus reduce ira sensitivity. This, in turn, reduced the
feed oack problem. The ustronauts stated that in the 5 psia
I
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(3h.5 k_/m 2) environaent, they vere able to maintain norn_
/
conversation vithout the aid of audio equil_ent, up to a
distance of 5 to 8 feet.
B. Conclunlons and Reca_endattons
j
1/ Conclusions - The ultimate criteria for success for the 0WS
_ ccMauntcatton systa _as to meet the objectives of the Skylab
: mission in support of the Saturn Workshop (Sk_) cluster audio
system operation. Therefore, it can be 8tared from the mission
results that the overall performance of the Ob_ portion of
the total cau_mLcation ,yetem has been acceptable.
All audio equil_ent of the OWS c_unicatton system performed
e_ expected during the mission with no failures except for
the SIA located at Panel 5h0 vhlch sustained a broken ICOM/
z, ]04ZT svttch. The 8lA unit m replaced.
Based on crev debrleftngs, the 0_ co_unicatlon system
provided adequate voluae level and quality during mission
operation; however, some audio feedback probleas vere
encountered. _e problem manifested itself e_ a nuisance
: to the trey and it is attributed priBarll_ to the interaction
betveen SXA's dae to trey usage u re.L1, u the total gain
: characterim:tcs of the cluster audio syutem. Both channels
of the O_S c_untc&tton system provided adequate inter-
conunication for activities within the 0_ aa veil u upltnk
_ and dovnllnk _untca_lons.
/
.+
: 2,2,8-.I.3
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: 2/ Recomendations - Inasmuch as the Ok_ com_nication system
perfor]_l s&tisfactorily throughout the SkTlab mission, there
are still areas vher_ reccemendations can be made to improve
on system shortccLtngs or program deficiencies. They are
delineated belov.
a. The feedback problem encountered during the _tssion can
be e_tmin_ted or minimized by reduci_ the number of
_ SIA's in an acoust$cal_y reverberant enclosure such as
: the O_ to a reinsure, and provide a battery operated
personal transceiver-type intercom for each crevman for
: voice use vhich voul_ be tied together vith the cluster
•_ audio syste_a.
b. The n_ber of function8 of the SIA should be reduced to
primarily acccmodate personal comun!c&tion requirements
_. (i.e., C&W).
c. Present SIA design contains a voltme control in the Slk
speaker circttit; a volume control in the microphone line
vould give the SIA greater attenuation selectivity _nd
could be useful in reducing the feedback problem.
/
i
_" 2.2.8-11_
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F. Development History - The '_et" Og_ Cammunication System was initially
defined as an extension of the Apollo Audio System, The design orig-
ginallS alloyed for 10 "drag-_/' caamnmication panels which would
provide for t_o independent complication channels and connection
_ of a "drag-in" portable microphone/speaker _it.
i: During the cc_version from '_et" to a "dry" Workshop, the dry design
concept combined the intercom microphone/speaker unit and the cceu_uni-
cation unit into on,_ permenentl_ installed module. Ten of the units
(8IA's) was baselined for the OWS portion o_ the total orbital assembly
(OA) cceRunication system, and were to be designed/supplied by MDAC-E.
Two basic requirements of the wet workshop was to minimize weight and
utilize existing hard,are. Teo wire harness designs were considered
for the SIA system. Reference Figure 2.2.8,1-3.
One concept provided for a central distribution center. After routing
the system ftmctlon frc_ the Command Service Module (CSM) through the
AM to a central distribution area within the interior of the 0_, the
ccmntmication functions vere then to be independently routed to each
SIA. This concept required development and qualification of a distri-
bution center in addition to requiring an excessive amour of copper.
A second concept provided a "rin_ bus" f_nction routing to th* SIA's.
:. A bused connector (three bused pins per _mctton) would replace the
central distributi_ and the functions would be "daisy chained" to
the SIA's via the ring bus.
1
2,2,8-1.5
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A connector fr_ an existlnK "t_tlT" ot connectors could be utilized
_._ and the veight of the rink bus vire haa-neese8 v_ less than the
central distribution concept. The ring bus would not be as reliable
an the central dlstr/button system. _--ver, tvo failures vould be
.?
L
The trade-oft indicated the rink bum v_ the most cost effective of
the concepts° The final ring bum configuration t8 shown in
_ Figure 2.2.8.1-I. _"
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2.2.8.2 Data Acquisition System (DAS)
• A. Design Requirements
I/ General Requirements
• a. Design Trade-Offs - During the changeover in design from
"wet" to "dry," the criterion was to minimize system re-
design. This fact, together with the "designed-in"
limitations of the existing Gemini multiplexers (i.e.,
restrictions to flammability, outgassin6 and odor), prohi-
bited installations within the OWS internal cavity and
influenced the present design. The multiplexers and asso-
._ ciated components were mounted on panels within the for- :
J
ward skirt. Thermal studies were performed to optimize
instrumentation component installation for maintaining the
required thermal environment while in the solar inertial
mode. Skirt paint patterns and the various cluster atti-
tudes were contributing factors. Component heaters and
thermostatic switches were added to the mounting of the
components whenever it was concluded that the components
would be below their respective thermal requirements,
while the cluster was operating outside the solar inertial
mode.
Wire harness installations and transducer/signal cond_ti_h-
ing multiplexer versus proximity con_iS_rations dictated !
!
the location of two multiplexers in the aft skirt area of '_
_he Orbital Workshop (OWS), However, due to the _Iming .o._
_ signals being affected by the increased long line oapaci-
, tance, the multiplexers had to be located in the forward
_' skirt,
2.2.8-18
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Individual timing signal lines to each multiplexer, as
initially considered, increased the number of wires signi-
ficantly. The "ringed" bus circuits were then conceived
and implemented. Signal redundancy was provided across
the Airlock Module (AM)/OWS interface, through two separate
} connectors for each "ringed" bus circuit, to improve
reliability.
f
b. Requirements
i. The Saturn Workshop (SWS) Pulse Code Mcdulation (PCM)
Telemetry (TM) system consists of the programmers,
J
interface box (I/B), tape recorders, and low-level and
high-level multiplexers. The OWS porticn of the PCM
TM system shall consist of the low-level and high-level
multiplexers. Detailed requirements for both the
low-level and high-level multiplexers are defined in
MDAC-E Drawing 52-85713, Appendix CI and Appendix C2,
Specification Control Drawing, MAC Model 133P, 195B,i
and 1003 D_ta Transmission System [including Change
[
Notice Request (CNR) 68].
2. The OWS measuremen& program shall be defined in MDAC
/
Drawing IB68h67,
3. Displu# pal,els shall be provided which shall allow the
crew membezs to monitor the 0WS environment and the
status of ¢,gB e_uipment. These display parameters
shall be defined in MDAC Drawing iB68h67 .....
" 2/ Detail Requirements
a. Power
i. Two separate power buses in the AM shaY, _rovi_e
2.2.8-19
[
1974020216-257
: direct current (dc) power, through 9.3 ampere (amp)
o
: .:ircuit breakers, at the AM/OWS interface to two (2)
separate instrumentation system power buses in the OWS
to excite transducers, signal conditioners, and 3 vdc
excitation modules.
2, Two separate power buses in the AM shall provide dc
power, through 9.3 amp circuit breakers, at the AM/OWS
interface to two separate instrumentation heater buses
in the OWS to provide power to the telemetry system
component thermal elements.
3. Power characteristics shall be as defined in electmical
Power Distribution System (PDS) paragraphs 2.2,6.1,
2.2.6.2, 2.2.6.3, and 2.2.6.5.
4. Grounding requirements shallbe as defined in electrical
PDS paragraphs 2,2.6.1, 2.2.6.2, 2.2.6.B, and 2.2.6.5.
b. Telemetry System
1. Seven (7) low-level multiplexers, designated B, D, H,
J, L, M, and Q are assigned to _he OWS and are to
operate electrically and logically as an integral part
of the SWS PCM TM system.
2. Five (5) high-level multiplexers designated D, E, J,
K, and T are assigned to the 0WS stage and are to
operate electrically and logically as an integral part
i
of the SWS PCM TM system,
3. The maximum measurement capability of the OWS TM system
multiplexers shall be as follows:
o 152 0-Sv channels at 1,25 samples per second,
o 56 0-20my channels at 1,25 samples per second.
,. 2.2.8-20
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o 168 O-20mv channels at 0.416 samples per second.
o 72 bi-level channels at i0 samples per second.
:;; o 64 bi-level pulsr channels at i0 samples per second.
$
h. Biomedical and experiment measurements shall be routed
to the programmer/interface box or multiplexers ir the
{
AM across the AM/OWS interface from the Speaker Inter-
cornAssemb]y (SIA) of the audio system, and from the
Experiment Support System (ESS).
5. Measurement capability of OWS inputs directly to the
programmer/interface box shall be as follows:
o 50-5v channels at 320 samples per second.r
o 3 0-5v channels at 80 samples per second.
o 1 0-5v channel at 40 samples per second.
o 1 0-Sv channel at 20 samples per second.
_ o h 0-5v channels at i0 samples per second.
o h O-5v channels at 1 25 samples per second.
6. The OWB shall provide eight (8) command signal lines
for AM tape recorder control functions from the
_ experiment and 1orward compartments to the AM/OWS
interface.
7. Time reference system signals from the AM shall be
provided to hhe M509/T013 experiments in the OWS.
_ 8. Hardline cabling from the AM/0WS interface to the
! OWS/Electrical Support Equipment (ESE) umbilical on
the forward interface of the OWS shall be provided for
ground checkout monitoring of the PCMdata.
•_ c. Measurement System
1. The telemetry measurement system shall consist of signal
_ 2.2.8-21
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_ conditioners and/or transducers necessary to convert
physical and electrical parameters into electrical
N
signals which meet the input requirements of the high-
level and low-level multiplexers. Measurement para-
meters are defined by the Instrumentation Program and
0_ Components List (IP&CL), Orbital Workshop i and 2,
IB68467. The following parameters shall be monitored:
o
_ Temperatures
o Pressures
o Vibrations
o Flows
!
o Positions
/
_ o Events
o Liquid Levels
_ o Volts, currents
o Radiation
Experiments Parameters
2. The 5 vdc excitation modules shall be designed to meet
the accuracy and regulation requirements of signal
conditioners and potentiometer types of transducers of
the telemetry measurement system. The output of the
module is 5.000 +_0.010 vdc over the operating input
voltage range of 24 to 30 vdc with load currents of
0 to 200 milliamps.
3. OWS on-board display measurements shall be operationally .._
independent of the OWS PCM data system. The OWS on-board
display measurements shall be powered from either of the
two OWS bus powers, OWS Bus i and OWS Bus 2, through
i
$' 2.2.8-22
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circuit breaker protected sub-buses (Sensor Power
Buses i and 2). Measurement parameters are defined
by iB68h67, IP&CL, Orbital Workshop i and 2.
h. The AM shall provide time reference signals to the
digital clock for display in the OWS. The digital
clock displays elapsed time in days, hours, minutes
and seconds.
5. The OWS shall provide a low range habitation area
pressure measurement to the AM and a Thruster Attitude
Control System (TACS_ supply pressure measurement to
the Multip2e Docking Adapter (MDA), across the AM/OWS,
for displays.
6. The 0WS measurement systems shall be provided with a
: Remote Automatic Calibration System (RACS) for ground
• checkout.
7. The Ground Support Equipment (GSE) measurements shall
be opera_onally independent of the OWS PCM data system.
; The measurements shall be powered from the prelaunch
instrumentation bus, hDll9 bus, and OWS Buses i and 2.
These measurements are required for ground checkout and
prelaunch countdown. Measurement parameters shall be
defined by IB68467, IP&CL, Orbital Workshop i and 2.
d. Telemetry Component Thermal Conditioning - The temperature
environment of the OWS TM system components shall be main-
tained within their thermal qualification limits,
I. The Gemini multiplexer thermal environment shall be
controlled with thermostatically controlled resistance-
type heaters with set points at 35 _5°F (i,7 +2,8°C _
[
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ffor ON and 50 +_5°F (i0 +_2.8°C) for OFF.
2. The instrumentation fuse modules shall be controlled
K
_ with thermostatically controlled resistance-type
heaters with set points at -20 +__5_F(-29 +_2.8°C) for
! ON and 0 !5°F (-17.8 +..2.8°C)for OFF.
_ e. Data Acquisition System Accuracy - The OWS DAS accuracy
is determined by the root-sum-square method of combining
the independent 3 sigma errors of the various components
: and sources that comprise the subsystem and contribute to
_ meastuement errors. The OWS DAS identified by this document
is designed or specified such that its combined root-sum-
square accuracy, together with the total measurement
! system (including transducers, signal conditioning componer :,
dat_ system components in the AM, GSE data reduction
J
hardwares and other factors), does not degrade the measurement
performance beyond the requirements specified in the
; respectiveMeasurement Requirement Drawings (MRL's) identi-
! fied in accordance with Design Memorandum OWS-39A.
_ f. InLerfac_s - Requirements for the OWS DAS interfaces are
defined in th_ following documents:
i. 40M35668 - Interface Control Drawing (ICD), Definition
of OWS/ESE Electrical Interface Forward Umbilical Plate.
'l
,: 2. 40M3559h - ICD, OWS to AM Elect_ical Interface.
J
3. 40M30597 - ICD, S-IVB/Instrument Unit (IU) Electrical
Interface .....
_. 40M35651 - ICD, ESS/OWS Electrical Interface.
g. Radiation Monitoring
1. Van Allen Belt Donimet_r (VABD) - The OWS shall
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i be designed to support operation of a VABD GFP. The VABD
shall provide direct measurement via telemetry of skin and
I depth dose rates in rads/hr of radiation that penetrates
i the OWS. The VABD shall be provided power from the OWS
instrumentation bus. The _ABD mo" "ting assembly shall
incorporate a protective guard for the skin sensor ion
chamber.
2. Personal Radiation DosimeLer (PRD) - Six (6) stowage
restraints shall be installed in the OWS to mount the
PRD's (GFP). Tilree (3) restraints shall be located in ,
the sleep compartment, two (2) restraints in the forward
compartment, and the other in the experiment compar,.ment.
3. Radiati_ Survey Meter (RSM) - A bracket (GFP) shall be
provided to physically mount an RSM (GFP).
h. Common Electrical Requirements - Common requirements imposed
on the 0WS DAS such as flammability, cort_mination, bonding,
etc., which are imposed on all electrical subsTstems, are
defined in paragraphs 2.2.6.
B. System Description
l/ General Descriotion - The OWS DAS consists of the OWS portion
of the SWS PCM TM system, OWS on-board displays, and ground
checkout support measurements.
_ The SWS PCM TM system is a PCM/Frequency Modulation (FM) system
which consists of a Radio Frequency (RF) transmitting system,
• a PCM system (including programmers, an interface box, high- and
low._evel multiplexers), a data recording _ystem, a time reference
system, amd assorted measurement monitoring instrumentations,
The PCM system is designed for a maximum capability of 18
" 2.2.8.25
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high-level and 19 low-level multiplexers in addition to the
measurement signals that are directly inserted into the programmer
or Interface Box (I/B). The data from the PCM system is
categorized as analog, bi-lc':e!, or b'-level pulse. They are
formatted by the programmer in the AM, and transmitted throuth
the RF data link at 51.2 Kilcbits Per SecenS (KBPS) or recorded
on t_pe recorders in the AM at 5.12 KBPS and transmitted delayed
time at 112.64 K_PS (22 times r-corded speed), j
- As part of the overall SWS PC_ TM system, the OWS PCM TM system
_ provides for the transmission of real time and/o delayed time
monitc_-ed data of OWS subsystem flight measurement parameters,
crew biomedical data, and scientific experiment data to ground
tracking stations of the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
(STD ).
The OWS u: board display parameters provide for crew participation
in monitoring selected OWS subsystem parameters on a real time
, bas _s.
Selected parameters are hardw!red through the OWS umbilical
connector_ for GSE monitoring during ground checkout. These
• measurements are inacti-" _or flight.
2/ System Details
_ a. Pow _-r
i. The two :_parate instrumentationsy._tempower buses
provid itation to transducers, sign_l conditioners,
and 5 vac excitation modules (see Figar. 2.2.8.2-1).
2. The two separate instrumentation heater buses provide
_ power to the %_4 system component thermal elements (see
Figure 2.2.8.2-2).
" 2.2.8-26 _,3
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b. Telemetry System - The telemetry system multiplexers and the
_ signal flow from transducers and signal conditioning are
: shown in Fi&nlre 2.2.8.2-3.
C. Testing
i/ Testing Program
a. The integrity of the OWS DAS hardwares and equipment was
tested to assure operational success during the SkTlab
mission by the test programs defined in the OWS Test Plan,
DAC-56697A.C
_k b. The primary objectives of testing was to ensure that the
T
hardware and equipment furnished by MDAC-W fulfilled the
objectives delineated in the NASA Mission Requirements
Document I-MBD-001A and the requirements of OWS Contract
End Item (CEI) Specification CP208OJIC.
: c. Development testing was performed to optimize system or
_ component configurations and identify potential areas of
[.
marginal design or performance. Hardware utilized during
the test program was either prototype or pr_Droduction
configurations.
d. Qualification testing was performed to demonstra%e that the
design and production methods util_zed in system manufacture
_r_.ided a product that fulfilled the design requiremem s.
Qualificatior tests performed on 0WS DAS components are
delineated in OWS Test Plan, DAC-56697A.
e. Production testing of MDAC-W fabricated or assembled items
and supplier i'_emswere tested to product test requirements "'_
L Y-
; at either MDAC-W's Santa Monica or Huntington Beach facility,
or the supplier's facility.
2.2.8-29 !%
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f. Post-manufacturing tests were performed at Huntington Beach.
They included subsystem and integrated system testing which
assured the operation of the PCM system as well as its
7
compatibility with other OWS systems. Huntington Beach
testing which verified the 0WS DAS subsystem are listed in
Table 2.2.8.2-i.
g. Testing at KSC consisted of post-manufacturing subsystem
_ retesting of any changes affecting Huntington Beach checkout
test results, and integrated system testing at the module
and cluster levels. All testings of the OWS were performed
: using the DAS. Major tests at KSC are listed in Table
t
2.2.8.2-2.
2/ Major Problems and Solutions - The OWS DAS underwent extensive
testing, design qualification as well as operational, to ensure
successful attainment of mission objectives. There were problems
encountered and resolved at the various levels of testing (com-
ponent to cluster). Significant test problems encountered and
resolved are delineated in the following tables:
a. Table 2.2.8.2-3 identifies major qualification test problems
: and solutions.
b. Table 2.2.8.2-4 lists problems encountered during Huntington
Beach post-manufacturing tests.
_ c. Table 2.2.8.2-5 identifies major KSC test problems and their
_ resolutions.
3/ Waivers and Deviations - There were no waivers or deviations to
design specifications of the 0WS DAS. However, a waiver to the
L
Test and Checkout Requirements, Specification and Criteria
(TCRSC) Document, IB83429, deleted the requirement to verify full
/
2,2.8-31
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scale readings (i00 +2.4%) of the wate_ level transducers aftezL
the completion of filling operations of the water system.
This request was made in Devaitlon/Wavier Request No. MDAC-OWS-
WR-33 and was attributed to a marginal operating condition of
the transducer which did not warrant any redesign or rework.
(Ref OWS DCR RID IC-5).
Several transducers experienced electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) out-of-tolerance conditions during vendor testing. They
were IB78503, Transducer, Flowmeter, Air Duct; IB78870, Transducer,
Pressure Absolute; IB79315, Transducer Pressure; and iB86638,
Transducer Pressure. Although waivers were considered, the dis-
positions were deferred unt_l after completion of the Huntington
Be_ch EMC system test. Upon the completion of the Huntington
Beach EMC testing the transducers were found to be acceptable
< under system performance and no waivers were generated.
D. Mission Results
l/ Performance During Launch and Flights - The OWS DAS has success-
fully supported the SL-1/SL-2, -3, and -4 missions. The telemetered
data has enabled the ground recipients (ground controllers,
experimenters, design groups, etc.), to perform their work as
: planned, whereas the on-board displays helped the crew to perform
system monitoring while exercising the various equipment. A
daily verification of the OWS DAS has demonstrated that the
telemetered Instrumentation and Communication (l&C) measurements
wereperforming well within the design limits (+1.5% for nigh-level
and +2.0% for low-level multiplexers) This is based primarily
i
on the performance of low-level multiplexer reference measurements
i M7031 through MT0_, hi@h-level multiplexer reference measurements
M70_5, M7057, M7051, M7053, and M705_ and substantiation
°_ 2.2.8-37
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/. by the design technologies who continue to be satisfied with the
performance of their telemetered measurements.
The 5 vdc excitation modules continue to function satisfactoril5
and provide proper excitation to signal conditioning modules and
transducers as verified daily by the multiplexer reference
channel measurements and by technologies evaluating measurements
excited by the 5 vdc modules. The instrumentation thermal
conditioning system, heater blankets, and thermostats, have
provided the multiplexers _nd fuse modules with proper thermal
environments as it can be verified irdirectly by successful
multiplexer operation and an uneventful power distribution
history.
The on-board displaymeasurements have successfully supported :
crew activities and aided the ground controllers in evaluating
|_ TM dicerepancies. Ground personnel with the aid of the astronauts,
, have periodically verified the performance of the on-board dis- '
: plays and correlated the information with telemetry data whenever
display data was made available.
Review of flight crew comments did not disclose any complaints 1
in the area of adequacy of the on-board display measurements to _
• monitor the OWS environment and the status of OWS equipment in i
; flight. However, the crew of 8L-3 did state that 0WS Buc 1 and _;
Bus 2 current measurements had too broad a range.
During crew debriefir_s, the astronauts stated that the 0WS }
tape recorder control provisions were adequate and enabl,_d them i-
i to control the AM tape recorders remotely while performing i
i_ }
experiments in the OWS. 1
2.2.8-38
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2/ System Anomalies - There have been several problem_ that have
affected the system since liftoff. These problems include _
anomalous low-level multiplexer, a reference levF! shift on a high
level multiplexer, a number of measurements that were lost as a .
result of Meteoroid Shield (MS)/SAS wing structural failures, a set
_ of measurements that were affected by the high temperatures :_nthe
OWS early in the missions _d a set of measurements that havef
exhibited noise intezference. _
a. DAS - L -level "B" multiplexer anomaly. Day of Year (DOY)
215:04:57:50 all of the measurement parameters processed by
i
lo_-level "B" multiplexer w_re lost. Since that da_e all
of the parameters have simultaneou_,ly randomly cycled
on/off, _enever t._eparameters are oresent the data is
valid.
In investigating the observed anomaly the following analyses
were performed: (a) a thermal analysis of the multiplexer
including additional thermal testing at MDAC-E, (b) a detail
analysis of the telemetere'_ data, (c) a design analysis of
the hardware involved, and (d) a correlation of multiplexer
cycling vs. (1) crew activity, (2) position of the spacecraft, i
! (3) and (4) time of day. /
The MDAC-E tests and analysis concluded that the ,,_c_tprobable
cause of a multiplexer failure would be the non-redund_
pulse steering diodes rsed on the counter module inputs, i
However, the concurren._ analyses _nd data rev'_ws concluded
that the problem was not necessarily associated with the
multiplexer but it could be an anomaly within the I/B. In order
I to isolate the malfunctioni:g components, MDAC-W recommended
to have the flight controllers transfer the _i PCM system to
' _.2.8-39 '
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The secondary electronics. This would have isolated the
{_ anomaly to either the multiplexer or the AM I/B.
This was not accomplished during the SL-2 and SL-3
mission periods sinc_ the lost measurements had backups or
related measurements that could be utilized in assessing
flight system performsmce. However, during the SL-h, the
,: AM PCM was switched to the secondary electronics and the
multiplexer reined-_d off indicating that the operational
anomaly was in t__ Ch'S.
The m_. plexer data continued to randomly cycle on/off
and the source of the problem was not conclusively defined
_ although the most probable cause of the problem is suspected
T
. to be the multiplexer. :
c
J. Mete..'oid Shield (MS) - Approximately 63 s,'-onds into SL-I
21ignt the MS was ]ost which severedthe i.,strumentation wire
narnessez required by 9 a,.%log and 3 bi-level MS measurements.
! However, loss of these measurements had no mission impac*
since these sensors were used to monitor the status of the
lost shield.
o. Solar Array System (SAS) - Appro.d_ately 593 seconds into the {
SL-I fllght_ the SAS Wing No. 2 structural failure occurrea
which se,'_red the instrumentation h_-nesses req_\red by 13
> analog, anu 2 bi-level measurements. Loss of these measure- ,
ments had no mis ion impact mince these sensors were used to
i _,_nitor th_ status of the lost wing.d. Thermal Control System (TCS)
! i. F7000-436; Flow, Ventilation Control System (VCS), Duct i,' 2.2.8._0
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me
(TM) - On DOY 147, between 0322 and 03hh Gree**wich Mean
Time (GMT) the measurement failed to provide any flou
data. Consequently, _,[DAC-EEngineering performed a
• number of studies that included (a) a design analysis of
the hardware, I.b)a failure history of the part, and (c)
a thermal analysis relating to the high temperatures
experienced during the first two days of SL-i.
Studies (a) and (b) did not provide an explanation for
; the failure; however, a thermal analysis of the first
ten days of the SL-I mission revealed that the flow-
meters were exposed to hiEher than designed thermal
environments. This, plus the observed behavior of the
measurement during the six (6) hours prior to the
failure, indicated that the most probable cause of the
malfunction we3 a random failure of the converter,
initiated by the adverse thermal environments during
the initial phase of SI,-I.
Loss of this measurement had a minimal impact on the
mission since there are on-bo_-d displays that can be
used by the crew to verify flow status on Duct No. i.
2. FT00I-h36; Flow, VCS Duct 2 - On DOY 228:15_8 GMT the
telemetry measurement for VCS Duct 2 flow showed a
d_sradation while the on-board display measurement
£
showed readings consistent with normal sys_.;m
operation.
Data reviewed since for SL-2 and EL-3 indicate n desra-
• dation of approximately A5% compared to the Duct 2
• on-board displ_y equivalent.
_ 2.2.8-41
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FDuring SL-4, the meas_rement showed increased
erraticity after turn-on and turn-off of duct fans. On
I DOY 29, the measurement level dropped sharply to zero
: level and remained zero through the end of the mi'.sion.
During these periods, the on-board display indicated
Duct 2 flow to be normal.
During qualification testing, the transducer encountered
flow degradation due to bearing contamination. Although
L
the transducer was finally qualified using bearing
lubricant in its life test, it is believed that this
anomaly was caused b)- some type of bearing contamination.
< A comparison of this data to qualification test data
disclosed that during qualification testing there was
< a similar flow degradation as a function of time due
to bearing contamination. It is believed that this
anomaly was caused by some type of bearing contamination.
3. M7058-440, Current, TCS Duct Heater, indicates current
to the heater elements when the heaters are off.
Review of the mission data. indicates that measurement
M7058 increases/decre_-.es at M7005 increases/decreases.
This tracking phenomenon began on DOY 156, between
/
J
: I0:50 and ii:20 GMT.
A detailed analysis of the curl'ent sensor, thermal
control assembly, the multiplexer m_d system harnesses
was performed. The analysis was inconclusive since it
was impossible to isolate the anomalous device without
additional information. If the crew were to perf ...., an
/
|
i
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"OWE TCS Check" procedure (ref. SWS System ._::ecklist),
:- additional fault isolation information could be obtained
by ccmparing the results with available data. However,
• this anomaly has no mission impact.
e. Pressure Control System (PCS)
i. D7125-_22; Press Waste Management Compartment (WMC)
H20 Dump Line - On DOY 210, a_ approximately I_:45 G_,
the crew reported that the display measurement .as off
scale high. This measurement system consists of a sen-
sor and a deflection type display meter.
A fsalure mode analysis was performed on the meter and
• the sensor. The analysis revealed that the most
< probable cause of the failure was within the sensor.
The failure was either a conta_nation of the parti-
culate filter to the pressure sensing cavity or an
electronic component degradation or failu, e affecting
the circuit gain or zero level. Loss of this display
measurem=nt _ _d a minimal impact on tilemission.
2. DTl12-h36; pCS _'_,ation Area (HA) Low Range _ensor 2
o_ (TM) - On DOY's 164, 173, and 187, the subject measure-
ment exhibited level changes which differed when
eompmred with OWS Measurement D7111 and AM/MDA Measure-
ments D0218 and DO002. Investigation revealed that the
; observed shifts may have been due to a performance
degradation of the transducar.
_egradation of the measurement had a minimal impact on
the mission, sil_ce the redundant measurement (DTlll)
was used to monitor the pressure of the HA.
l
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FI f. Van Allen Belt Dosimeter (VABD) - P70Ol-hh0_ VABD Skin Dose
Rate - On DOY 165, at approximately 1750 GMT, the measure-
ment exhibited cyclic excursions of approximately i0 seconds
in duration and about 0 to 12 percent of full scale at a
repetition rate of 20 seconds. The same anomaly was
observed for Measurement P7002; VABD Depth Dose Rate. On
_ DOY 165 the VABD was replaced by a spare unit. The spare
: also _.xhibited the same anomaly.
._ne anomalies appeared for the first time when the Command
: Service Module (CSM) was powered from the AM buses and
returned to normal when the CSM was transferred from AM bus
a
power to its own power again. The CSM Inertial Mes%uring
Unit (IMU) heater cycles -orrespond exactly in time with the
VABD data excursions. Tbesp anomalies were concluded to he
caused by the Skylab and CSH generated electromagnetic
interference (F_.II).
Although the measurements were degrcded, the dosimeters
were responding to radiation and the data was considered
_ usable.
g. High-level "J" Multiplexer Reference Channel - Starting with
DOY 011 during the SL-4 mission, the high-lev_l "J" multi-
plexer reference channel, MT053-hll, was observed to go
i
_ out-of-tolerance. The measurement level expected was h.763
%
, vdc to h.90] vdc with h.8_2 vdc as nominal and the
" out-of-tolerance observed was as high as h.960 vdc.
<
Investigation and analysis was performed which indicate the
most probable cause to be a signal return reference level
shift of the measurement as a result of common mode volta6e
2.2.8-1_ i
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level changes at the low-level signal returns,bus. Extensive
re%,iew of data has not re...._ the contributing c_u_o _,
!
the anomaly to a specific fault. However, the data indi_tes
the following:
_ i. Other multiplexers, both high and io'_, and their data
have not been affected by the anomaly.
l
' 2. There is no correlation between GWS and AM bus load
changes versus measurement level changes %:hich i_.dicates
the problem is not associated with major power components.
3. There is no correlation between DCS commaJ1d or crew
activity and the reference measurement level changes
which indicates the same as Item 2 above as well as no
RF interference.
h. Only two measurements on high-level "J" multiplexer,
MT053-H/L "J" reference, and DTI37-ESS ambient pressure,
are affected by the ground reference shift. Other
measurements on high-level "J" are not affected because
the measurements do not receive transducer excitation
fr_ the 5 vdc excitation module or utilize the low-
level signal return bus as does the affected measurements.
: Level shifts on D7137 are of the same magnitude as
M7053 and, therefore, c&n be scaled utilizing correction
equal to the percent change of the reference voltage.
5. The anomaly i¢ not detrimental to the operation of the
in_,trumentatlon components.
2.2.8-45
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1 E. Conclusions and Recommendations
i/ Conclasions - The overall performance of the 0WS DAS
throughout the Skylab mission was acceptable. The OWS TM
multiplexers and their assigned measurement parameters pro-
vided information to ground control and responsible system
technologies for continued monitoring and evaluation of
system performances. Display measurements which provided the
astronauts with on-board real time monitoring of critical
. functions were adequate. The astronauts were able to assess
systFm performance to a higher degree of confidence.
Despite the failure encountered by the low-level "B" multi-
/
plexer data, optimization of reliability through distribution
of a system measurement to separate multiplexers avoided the
total loss of data from any one particular system.
Components of the 0WS DAS had acceptable perfozmance o',er
zhe Skylab mission periods.
2/ Recommendations - Although perfol .Ic_of the 0WS DAS ",_as
acceptable throughout the Skylab mission, there are still
areas whe_'e recommendations can be made to improved on system
shortcomings or program deficiencies. They are delineated
_,, below.
a. The OWS DAS instrumentation panels located in the OWS for-
%;ard skirt area should be provided with temperature measure-
ments which measure the panel thermal environment. The
failure aasociated with the low-level "B" _ultiplexer made
it necessary to base thermal environment predictions for the
2.2.8-I_6
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Jmultiplexers on analytical values rather than direct
measured values. Since these instrumentation panels
contain the major portion of the components of the data
" system, the actual measured temperature environment would
provide a fundamental assessment of the actual thermal
h
environments of the system's major components.
%
b. The OWS instrumentation and heate_ power buses should be
instrumented for current monitoring. Many of the system
analyses performed during the mission required such
measurements. Load current changes are very significant
analytical data in evaluating system performance or
anomalies.
c. The design of the OWS DAS was basically the Gemini design
'_ which required that all multiplexers to be operating
during the entire mission. Consequently, a large quantity
of unnecessary data was produced. Future space missions
t
similar to Skylab should incorporate a data mana&ement
:_ system so that measurements required only for boost,
; deployment and initial activation (i,e., Exploding Bridge-
wire (EBW), position, events, etc.) would be deactivated
after their usefulness. On-board data compression would
be s_other method _f implementing better data management.
These approaches would reduce the quantity of data, speed
u_,the dat L processing, enable better quality control of
the data and allow for the data to be disseminated _n a
more timely manner.
2.2.8-47
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d. One of the limitations of the DAS was the lack of con-
tinuous ground station coverage in order to provide con-
: tinuous real time crew/ground communications and para-
meter monitoring. Several times during the mission,
_: including manned periods, there was only one short
L
/ station pass during an entire orbit (approximately 90
\
_" _inutes). Although cre_ activities, such as EVA, etc.,
_ can be constrained and scheduled for orbits providing a
greater ground station time; anomalies cannot. It is,
therefore, recommended that any future Skylab type
missions consider the possibility of continuous ground
: : station coverage (e.g., via satellite relay, etc.).
e. The OWS DAS could increase its data acquisition ,rsa-
!
tility, especially witLin the OWS HA, by having remote
interface panels with patching-type connections or
connectors for accessing the unused multiplexer channels.
The usefulness of this concept was made obvious, by the
addition of new equipments work-azound, and _ucm_lies
• which made it necessary to accommodate additional data
during the Skylab missions.
F. Develo?ment History - The OWS Data Acquisition System evolved
[
from the r,_quirement to provide real time and delayed time monitor-
ing of subsystem flight paramete._s as well as biomedical and
scie_tific experiment data to grcund tracking stations of the
• Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (STDN). Crew monitoring
of basic subsystem functions with on-board displays was also de-
finad as requirements, i
2.2.8-48 i
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Initial design of the Data Acquisition System was begun with the
i
"wet" Saturn I Workshop (SiW). Early Workshop proposals were
made to utillze the telemetry system (consisting of an RF zystem,
Model 301 PCM Assembly, Model 270 multiplexers, and remote analog
and digital submultiplexers) that existed on the Saturn IV-B
booster. However, during trade-off studies it was decided that
the telemetry system used on the Gemini program and proposed lot"
_ the Airlock Module would also be used for the workshop. The
telemetry system on the workshop was to be designed as an exten-
; sion of the Airlock Module Gemini-used system with Gemini high
: level and low level multiplexers located remotely on Workshop for
inflight dat,-processing. The trade-off studies indicated that
the Gemdni used telemetry system had the advantages of much less
J
power consumption, proven icng duration use in Gemini missions,
and was smaller and more versatile in sampling rates.
0nly those components which ca_:withstand the LH2 cryogenic
environment, such as cablings, connectors, distribution Junctions,
: and temperature transducers were to be installed within the
habitation area for lift-off.
; Other electronic components were to be installed in the muZ'iple
docking adapter for crew "carry-ln" into the habitation area
! after LH_ t_.nkpassivation.
: 2.2.8-|_9
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_: Subsequently, design changeover from a "wet" workshop to a "dry"
: workshop was made. One transition criterion was to minimize
system redesign. This fact, together with the "deslgned-in""
, limitations (i.e., restrictions due to flammability, outga_sing
and odor) of the existing Gemini multiplexers, prohibited their
installatio_ within the OWS internal cavity. However, the design
2
of other OWS instrumentation hardware (such as on-board displays,
_, vibration transducers, nabit ational pressure transducers, and
water level sensors), permitted their usage within the habitation
area.
_ Individual timing signal lines ._o _=achGemini multiplexer located
on the OWS were initially considered but this would have signifi-
!, cantly increased the num_ _r of wires crossing the Airlock Module/
_ OWS interface. Hence, the "ringed" bus circuits were conceived
-p
and implomented. To increase the system reliability, signal ,
, redundancy is provided across the Airlock Module/OWS interface,
through two separate connectors, for each "ringed" circuit. 4
, Early design concepts were based on locating two multiplexers in
the at_ skirt area of the OWS. However, due to timing signals
being affected by increased long line capacitance to the aft
skirt area, all multiplexers were located in the forward skirt
al_ea.
1
They were not located in the habitation area for the same basic
reason, in addition to not being qualified for flammability, !
_, outgasslng and odor.
I
2.2.8-50
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Thermal com_tionlng is provided for the 0WS multiplexers and the
fuse modules, Thermal _onditioning consists of heating pads
under the modules wv.'tbpower to the heaters being controlled by
thermostats. In this manner, the component low temperature
operating limits are not exceeded. Active therm _l conditioning
for panels (cold plates) were considered. However, the cost
was considered prohibitive with respect to benefits derived.
Temperature bridge module excitation voltage source used on the
S-IVB "mainline" program was considered in an effort to u_e
proven hardware of other programs. However, the use of Gemini-
type multiplexers restricted its use. Since the "mainline" S-IVB
used temperature brldges, an excitation voltage of +20 vdc caused
J
the bridge output signal to e..ceed the Gemini type low level
mu_ tlplexer requirement of a maximum unbalanced common mode
_ voltage limit of six volts. Therefore, th_ 5 vdc excitation
, n_dule for temperature bridge excitation (used for other 5 vdc
excitation me_qurements also) was designed and developed.
To minimize the to+_l locs of telemetry data from a subsystem,
the telemetry channelizatlon _f the subsystem is optimized for
4
reliability. Measurements for each subsystem are distributed
i among the various multiplexers and related measurement parameters
$
_, are assigned to separate multiplexers whenever possible. Also,
_ for d_ta reliability optimization, excitation voltages for measure-
i merits of each subsystem come from two separate power sources.
2.2.8-51
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2.2.8.3 Command System I
A. Design Requirements
'/
i/ General Requirements - The Orbital Workshop (OWS) Command
System shall provide for relaying Instrtment Unit (IU)
initiated ccmmands to various Saturn Workshop (SWS) sub-
systems during the unmanned activation phase of the SWS
mission profile. Backup control for these commands via the
Airlock Module (AM) Digital Command System (DCS) shall also
be provided.
2/ Detail Requirements - In addition to the common Electrical
Power System (EPS) design requirements (Paragraph 2.2.6),
the OWS Cemmand System (which is comprised of the switch
selector (sw/sel), the AM DCS, and the relays that control
subsystems) shall comply with the followin8 requirements:
a. Switch 8elector Requirements
i. Commands for operation of the OWS switch _elector
i shall be provide'd by th_ IU across the IU/OWS inter-
i face, and the verification of receipt of cnmmand by
the OWS switch selector shall be returned to the IU
at the IU/OWS interface.
2. The cc_mand requirements defined at the switch
selector input _erminals are presented in the follow-
ing subparagraphs.
• L 2.2.8-52
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(a) The s_itch selector shall o%erace with zt_ge
select, reglster address, reset, and read
command pulses of 18.3 to 32.0 vdc amplitude.
(b) The command pulse shall have the following
durations :
CO_ND PULSE WIDTH
i
; [ ge select 14.5 _.5 milliseconds
-0
Register address 14.5 + '" _l!iseconds
+2.5 milli_ ,_-onds
Reset 12.5 -0
+3.0
Read 25.0 -0 milliseconds
(c) The switch selector dc inpat impedance shall
be as follows:
SWITCH SELECTOR
COMMAND I_PUT IMPEDANCE
: Stage select °-42+ 5% oi__ at 25°C
Register address 725 + 5% ohms at 25°C
Reset 630 + 5% chins _.t25°C
Read 210 + 5% ohms _t hScC
The impedance values specified shall _ncreac_
by a maxlmtQn l0 percent for each 25°C in-
";teasein ambient temperature.
2.2.8-5,B
41
1974020216-291
i 3. The switch selector shall provide a maxim_n of 112
output channels. The selection of a particular
channel shall be automatically determined from the
8 bit input register address, or its complement.
The selected channel shall provide a pulse output
within 7.0 milliseconds s__terreceipt of a read , ;
ccmnand.
k. The voltage output "shall not be less than 3.0 volts
1,el(_r the switch selector input power voltage of
2k.O to 30.0 vdc.
c
+0.5 i
5. The pulse duration shall be 27.5 -2.5 milliseconds.
2
6. The switch selector shall provide elgh_ (8) outputs _ :
for address verification. These lines shall convey
the complement status of the address register within
20 milliseconds after receipt of a stage select
command.
7. The switch selector shall provide a register test ,i
output. The output shall occ_,'whenever the input
register address contains all "ones", and shall be _
5
preeent within 7.0 milliseconds after, and for the
?
duration of a read command.
)
8. The switch selector shall provide a zero-indicate -'_..._
. test output. The output shall occur whenever the
' input register a_dress contains all "zez _s". A read _
co.and shall not be required for a zero indicate :
output. ?
2._.8-5_ t
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!9. The switch selector shall provide an output pulse
proportional to the number of output channels
• switched on at any given time. The output pulse
i
voltage shall be in accordance with the following
tabulation:
NO. CHANNELS SWITCH SELECTOR MONITOR ;;
SIMULTANEOUSLY INPUT POWER OUTPUT :
ON VOLTAGE VOLTAGE
+0
; None 2k-30 vdc 0.2 vdc
-0.2
One 24-30 vdc 2.0 +0.4 v pulse
Two or more 2h-26 vdc 2.8 +0.2 v pulse
-0 _
+0.2
• Two or more 26-30 vdc 3.0 -0 v pulse
c
NOTE: Two or more channels switched on simultaneously
represents an abnormal or malfunction condition. ::
: i0. With the e:_ception of a stage select command, the _:
switch selector shall internally reroute all power :_
and co.ends received from the IU.
i
ii. The eight (8) address verification lines shall be :,_"
_ routed to the IU/OWS interface. The maximum voltage _
drop and loading shall not exceed 0.2 volts at :
120 milliamps. !
[ 12. The switch selector output signals shall be monitored ,--
j
by the AM PCM Data Acquisition System. :.
i ¢
;. J
%
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I13. The following list identifies the measurements that
shall be used to evaluate the performance of the
OWS switch selector.
K0005-602 Event-_,_WSel Stage Select
K0006-603 Event-SW Sel Read Co.nand
K0008-603 Event-SW Sel Register Verify
M7014-411 Volt-SW Sel Output Telemetry (T/M)
14. The switch selector Register Test shall be routed
through the OWS forward umbilical for GSE monitoring.
b. Digital Command System Command and Control Requirements
i. Backup control of 0WS Command System relays shall be
provided by circuits in the OWS which are an exten-
sion of the AM DCS. AM DCS channel assignments shall
be controlled by Interface Control Drawing (ICD)
50M16141, AM Digital Ccmmand System Radio Frequency
Command List.
2. The command volt_e levels at the AM/0WS interface
shall be 25.5 to 30.0 vdc.
+48
3. Ti_ecomnand signal shall be a 200 -46 msec pulse
_-om the AM DC controlled relays.
4. The AM DCS Radio Frequency (RF) signal shall be
routed to Ground Support Equipment (GSE) through the
0WS forward umbilical by means of a 50 ohm coaxial
cable.
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!5. Cabling shall be provided between the AM.lOWS and the
OWS forward umbilical for control of the DCS RF
path to either RF or hardline.
6. Cabling shall be provided between the AM/OWS and _
the forward umbilical to inhibit the application of
power to the AM DCS.
c. Command System Load Characteristics -,
i. Maglatch and general purpose relays shall be pro-
vided to transfer the OWS Command System outputs to
the subsystems being controlled.
2. The characteristics of the OWS Command System pulse
outputs shall be as follows:
AMPLITUDE DURATION
SWITCH SELECTOR 21 to 30 vdc 25 to 28 milliseconds
AM DCS 21 to 30 vdc 15_ to 2_8 milliseconds :
V
1.
3. The general purpose relay normally-open contacts
shall be fully closed for a minimum of 20 milli- ._
seconds for a switch selector output and i_9 milli- ,.
seconds for an AM DCS.ccmnand. _
_. ATM and MDA command and control signals, switched :.
and returned to the AM for control of Apollo Telescope
Mount (ATM) and Multiple Docking Adapter (MDA) ._
functions, shall have line resistance less than
250 milliohms.
2.2.8-57
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B. System Description
i. General Description - The 0WS Command System was designed
to provide commands to various OWS subsystems and to control
certain AM, ATM, and MDA functions. The design utilizes the
Saturn - IVB (S-IVB) Switch Selector and, as in the S-IVB
, operation, receives commend input logic across the IU/OWS
interface from the Launch Vehicle Digital Adapter (LVDA) in
the Instrument Unit (IU). General purpose and m_netic
latching relays are utilized to load the command drives of
[
the Switch Selector. The Airlock Module Digital Comm_id
System (DSC) is used to provide backup commands to the sys-
tems controlled by the OWS Switch Selector during the Unmanned
Activation Phase and control other subsystems during other
mission phases. The latter DCS capability, which is essen-
tially the ground control of OWS systems, is discussed in
more detail in the system description where it applies. "
2/ Detail Description - The OWS Command System was designed as
a functional part of the IU and AM Digital Command Systems
and consists of one switc_ selector, maglatch and general
purpose relays, diode modules, and interconnecting he2nesses.
The part numbers of the major components are aP follows:
%
'- PART NO. TITLE ,_
• IB65319 Switch Selector Assembly
IB77691 R_.lay Module, General Purpose
: IB78535 Diode Module
: 1379710 Relay Module, Magnetic Latch
_ IB79769 Relay Module, General Purpose
;J
i
, 2.2.8-58
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a. Switch Selector I
f
i. The Switch Selector Government Furnished Property
i
(GFP) consists of electromechanical components which
decode digital flight sequence commands from the
LVDA/LVDC and activate the proper stage circuits to i
execute the commands. It is provided redundant dc _
power via two separate buses from the AM through
3.9 ampere circuit breakers and diode isolation
circuits. _
i
2. The Switch Selector is designed to execute flight
sequence commands selected by the 8-bit code or by
its complement. The flight sequence commands are _
stored in the Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (LVDC)
2,
memory and are issued according to the flight pro-
gram. The switch selector decodes the commands and
actlvates, one at a time, ll2 different pulse cir- !
cult outputs (27.5 msec nominal) which control mag- i
latch or general purpose relays in various subsystems. _:,
3. During the Unmannded Activation Phase, the switch ;
selector provided commands for the following
operations :
o Refrigeration System (RS) Radiator Protective
Shield Jettison ""-_
" o Habitation Area Venting _
_ o Waste Tank Venting
o Meteoroid Shield Deployment
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o Solar Array System (SAS) Deployment
o Thruster Additude Control System (TACS) Control
Transfer (IU to AM) :_
o Payload Shroud Jettison
o MDA Ventin_
o ATM Activation
4. To maintain power isolation between vehicle stages,
the Switch Selector. is divided into two (2) sections:
The input section (relay circuits) of the Switch
Selector receives its power from the IU; the output
section (decoding circuitry and drivers) of the
Switch Selector receives its power from the AM. .
The input and output are coupled together through a
- diode matrix. This matrix decodes the 8-blt input
(:ode and activates a Positive Negative Positive 'i
(PNP) output driver, thus producing a Switch Selector _
output.
5. The Switch Selector is connected to the IU through _i
22 lines :
!
_ Stage Select Lines - 2 _
Read Command Lines ..2
Reset (forced.)Lines - 2 _.
J
Bit Register Output Lines - 8
Verification Lines • - 8
In addition, there are 22 lines for IU + 28 vdc and
2 lines for signal return between the IU and the i
_, Switch Selector.
z.z.8-6o | -_
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6. The wire pairs for stage select, read command,
forced reset, IU + 28 vdc, and signal return are
L
,; redundant. Only one of each pair is required for
_ normal operation.
. 7. The output signals of the LVDA switch selector
register, with the exception of the 8-bit command,
_ are sampled at the Control Distributor in the IU
and sent to IU Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) telemetry
(T/M). The Switch Selector also provides outpu+s
to telemetry.
i
8. The following list identifies the measurements that :
will be used to evaluate the performance of the OWS
Switch Selector:
MEASUREMENT NO. TLME
K0005-603 Event - Sw. Sel. Stage Select i
K0006-603 Event -Sw. Sel. Read Command
i K0008-603 Event -Sw. Sel. Register :
Verify _:
M7014-411 Voltage - Sw. Sel. Output T/M o
The above noted measurements convey the following
T
information: _
(a) K0005-603: This measurement uses telemetry "
channels DPIAO-13G00-01 thrcugh -0_ to identify
,. whiclt of the four (h) Skylab Switch Selectors
,i
-_ 2.2.8-61 :
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have been addressed (i.e., the SIC Sw. Sel.,
- the SII Sw. Sel., the IU Sw. Sel., or the OWS
,_ , Sw. Sel).
(b) K0006-603: This measurement uses telemetry
channels DPIAO-13G00-06 to identify when a read :
command has been sent to the Switch Selector.
A Switch Selector pulse output is provided
within 7.0 milllseconds after receipt of a .
read command. _
i
(c) K0008-603; This measurement uses telemetry
channeJ_o DPIAO-14GO0-OI through-08 to identify
: which of the ll2 Switch Selector channels has _
been selected.
(d) M7011_-411: This measurement provides an output
voltage which i_ proportional to the number of , _
output channels switched on at any given time
in accordance with the following tabulation:
NO. CHANNELS SWITCH SELECTOR MONITOR _-
SIMULTANEOUSLY INPUT POWER OUTPUT i
ON VOLTAGE . _ :
+0 _
_ None 24-30 vdc 0.2 vdc °
-0.2
One 2h-30 vdc 2.0 + 0.4 v pulse _,
Two or more 24-26 vdc 2.8 +0.2 v pulse "
-0 -.--_;L
:_ Two or more 26-30 vdc 3.0 +0.2
-0 v pulse "i
• NOTE: Two or more channels switched on simultan- J
eously represents an abnormal or malfunction
condition. .,
:: 2.2.8-62 _
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b. Diode Modules - The Switch Selector is provided redundant
power frc_ AM buses #i and #2 via two (2) separate diode
modules to satisfy the physical isolation requirement
between buses. The diodes used in the module (Part No.
SINI204A) will conduct an average current of 12 amperes
and can stand a reverse voltage of 400 vdc, thus assuring
electrical isolation of the 28 vdc buses.
c. Relay Nodules - The relay modules used in the ccamand
system output circuitry were the IB79710-I i0 ampere
maglatch relay module and the IB79769-I i0 ampere
general purpose relay module. Test data on these
modules verified that the relays will operate satis-
factorily over the range of 21 to 33 zdc. Since the
contact-releasetime of the general purpose relays was
equal to/or greater than the pull-in time in all cases,
the requirements (2.2.8.3A.2c) of being fully closed for
20 msec with a 25 msec duration switch selector command
and 149 msec with a 152 msec duration command from the
AM DCS were achieved.
C. Testing - The objectives of the test program were to (i) perform
all tests necessary to verify flight readiness of the Command
System hardware, and (2) demonstrate that the Command System
design and components fulfill the requirements of the Contrr_ct
End Item (CEI) Specification CP2080JIC.
9.2.8-63
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I._ i/ Qualification Tests - The qualification test line items
(DAC-56697) associated with the Command System were CS-3,
Structural Mounted Console Components, and ES-11, OWS RL.:_'
Modules.
Line item CS-3 tested the Junction Module Assembly,
1B79020-1 and -501. The module was subjected to high and
i low temperature testing, functional testing, and vibration
testing. The module was qualified to the humidity require-
ments by line item ES-7. The qualification test units were
b
identical to the flight modules; no cc_mand system hardware
malfunctions or anomalies occurred. A detailed test
definition is provided in Test Control Document 1T16838.
The test results were published in technical memorandum
TM-DSV-7-EE-R7028, dated 11-1_-72.
Line Item ES-II tested the following OWS relay modules which
were used in the Command System:
PART NO. PART NAME
1B79710-1 10-er.p Maglatch Relay Module (bused)
1B77691-i lO-amp General Purpose Relay Module
IB79769-I lO-smp Gene-al Purpose Relay Module (bused)
_ Testing verified that all of the above relay modules, which
were identical to the flight hardware, would satisfactorily
_, survive high and low temperature cycles, vibration, and
shock. A de_ailed test definition is provided in Test
_ Control Do,_vment IT16839. The test results were published
in technical memorandum TM-DSV-7-EE-69_3 dated _-ii-72.
2.2.8-6_, t
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The switch selector was provided to the 0WS as GFP.
Detailed qualification of this component for use on the
OWS is provided by the following documents:
IBM Report 66-373-001
TM-DSV-4B-(SSL)-EE-R-554-3
_ MSFC h6MSlh88
IBM Report 66-544-068
IBM Report 373-6664h-15
T_-DSV-4B-ENV-R-5574-2
2/ Vehicle Checkout Laboratory (VCL) Tests - Postmanufacturing
tests performed in the VCL assured performance of the
Command System prior to shipment of the OWS to Kennedy Space
Center (KSC). System wiring and interfaces, switch selector
• operation, and the command capability via the DCS or umbil-
ical were validated by the following tests.
a. IB66984 Continuity - Compatibility
RESULTS: The majority of the problems were procedural.
No command system problems identified.
: b. 1B8357k Power Setup, IC Scan, Power Turnoff
_- RESULTS: Three hardware problems; none were Command
System related. ':
i
> ':;
: e.2.a-65 ,
u
1974020216-SOS
Ic. 1B83580 Meteoroid Shield and SAS Exploding Bridge
Wire (EBW) Subsystem
1B84786 Refrigeration System Activation, Operation and
J
Securing
i_8358_ Thermal Control and Ventilation
1B83582 TACS Checkout
1B86961 Refrigeration System Elect Freps
iB90960 Leak and Functional Checks - _neumatic Control,
Habitation Area and Waste Tank, OWS i
2
, !
RESULTS: Command System functions were required to
, exercise the above systems during _he tests.
i
No Cortland System problems were identified. ;
d. iB83590 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Setup and _
Systems Verifi cation
RESULTS: No Command System malfunctions occurred. In
t
addition, the test indicated that the "ommand i
System did not generate EMI and was not sus-
ceptible to EMI. i
?
, Y
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e. IB93589 All System Test _rep and Securing
IB93591 All System Test - Activation, Orbital
Operations and Deactivation
]393588 All System Test - Prelaunch, Boost and
Pre activation
.<
RESULTS: No Command System problems were identified
during All System testing.
Detailed descr otions of all of the above tests and
test results are documented in MDAC Report G3C:_9, Report,
Orbital Workshop Checkout, Vehicle Checkout Laboratory
(VCL), dated November 1972.
3/ KSC Tests - During the subsystem and all-system testing at
2
KSC the Command System was used extensively to exercise the _
OWS subrjstems. The tests which were primarily associated
with the OWS Command System opera*ion were as follows:
KS-00h Saturn Workshop (SWS) to IU Tnterface Test - This
test verified switch selector interfaces and operation '.
of all channels except 108 and i09, radiator shield
Jettison, which were verified by deviation to KS-O008. _.
KS-0009 SWS Operations and Space Vehicle Overall Test Mission
Simulation/Flight Readine,Js Test (Sim/l_lT) - This
test (a) verified IU/SWS interface ccmpatibillty in
,\
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a simulated flight mode; (b) exercised Skyl_b-i
(SL-I) Countdown and countup functions, and (c)
demonstrated electromagnetic compatibility between
the individual SWS systems.
KS-O0h5 SWS End-to-End Systems Test and Experiment Test -
i This test -,erified OWS control circuits, ordnance
circuits, and other Command System interfaces.
No major problems or anomalies were identified during these
%
tests and no waivers or deviations to either the hardware
d.esi_ or test requirements were required. ._
=
D. Mission Results - The OWS Command System successfully supported
the boos_ and deployment phases of the SL-I mission. The OWS
installed hardware performed well as assessed by the performanc6
of the OWS Switch Selector and the response of the subsystems
commanded by it.
Z
The predicted event times compared nominally with the actual
event times as assessed by the response of the Switch Selector _
measurements. The only anumaly associated with the cammand z_
system relates to the Switch Selector data reduced from the _;
Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft (ARIA) which was approxi-
mately 60 seconds ahead of the predicted times. A subsystem i
response data review verified that the actual commands got to
the end-items at predicted times. Further evaluations and data
reviews indicated that the most probable source of the timing
error is either in the code generator of the ARIA or in the data _"
'_
area.reduction ,
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The OWS Switch Selector was inhibited at approximately l0 hours
and 30 minutes into the flight of SD-1.
E. Conclusions and Reccmnendations - Indications are that the
Co,and System provided acceptable performance throughout
: checkout, launch, boost and the unmanned activation portion
of the Skylab mission. This conclusion is based on telemetry "
data and the fact" that no subsystems controlled by the Command ;"
"_ System experienced any malfunctions which could be attributed _.:
to the Co,and System.
- The Cau_nd System design was not unique to the Skylab program.
As mentioned previously, the design is the same as that used _
on the Saturn stages for several years and has exhibited high
._eliability. In addition, the ATM command and control system :-
includes four (k) switch selectors which are required to operate
the entire mission duration; no malfunctions or anomalies have
: been identified at this time. •
Therefore, on future space programs where there is ._ requirement :
z for progr_ed control it is recommended that this same design
concept, switch selector control with DCS backup, be incorporated.
The DCS ccamand capability has been used effectively for control _'
of 8k_l&b subsystems during both manned and unmanned portions
Y /"
of the _l_l&b mission. A rec_enda%ion for future space vehicle i
"_ designs would be the incorporation of remote panels with ""
?-
j _
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patching-type cormector capability which could provide an
interface between the DCS and some subsystem requiring a capa-
bility which resulted from an anomaly or a re-evaluation of the
requirements. This capabllity vovld increase the DCS co_.nand
versatility and might have eliminated much of the new equipment
and work-arounds which were required during the Skylab missions.
J
F. Develotment History - The initial concept for the Electrical
_d b_stem, durinK the chsnge-over from a "wet" to a "dry"
Workshop, was to have the IU Switch Selector issue commands
directly to the OWS for the functions required for the first
7.5 hours of the mission (launch and orbit phase). The AM DCS
would be utilized to provide backup or redundant ccumands for
the IU DCS.
As more of the Ob_3 co.and requirement, wet _ identified, it
became evident that the existinK IU Switch Selector did not have
sufficient spare channels to acc_smodate the 0WS functions.
/
Therefore, the existing concept o_ the S-IVB booster control _
system, which utilized a GFP switch selector controlled/co_anded
by the IU Launch Vehicle Digital C_puter, was retained for the
"dry" 0WS Electrical Co.and Syst_a. The AM DCS would still
provide backup or redundant control.
The IU/S-IVB eystes had an extremely relis ole fllsht history. The
only modification incorpor&ted for the 0WS system was to provide
redundant isolated AM power (power froa AM I and AM 2 buses) to
the |witch |elector in lieu of • single power source.
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2.2.8.4 Television System (TV)
A. Design Requirements
i/ General Requirements
a. The Orbital Workshop (OWS) TVSystem shall be an integral
part of the overall Skylab TV System. It shall include
three (3) TVInput Stations and interconnection system
cablings. The TV Input Stations shall be located as
follows:
NO. of
Location (General) Stations View Requirements
Forward Compartment i View _°pe .ormance of
experiments M509,
TO13, and TO20.
Three feet forward i View performance of
of sleep c_npartment experiments M509,
ceiling on forward T013, and T020
compartment wall
Ceiling of experiment View subject of bio-
_ompartment medical expe?iments
b. The TV Input Station_, shall provide means of connecting
the portable TV camera, defined in Interface Control
Drawing (ICD) 50M16154, to the OWS video bus.
!
2/ Detail Requirements
a. Power _
i. Power for the TV System shall be from 0WS Buses i ""_
or 2 to each of the three (3) TV Input Stations. }
2.2.8-71 i*L
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2. Characteristic details of the power source for the
_" Input Stations shall be defined in the Electrical
Power Distribution System paragraphs 2.2.6.1, 2.2.6 o
2.2.6.3, and 2.2.6.5. ]
b. System Provisions
i. The TV Input Stations, Part Number (P/N) 82000003800, ;_
shall be provided as Government Furnished Property L
(GFP) for installation in the OWS.
?
2. Each station shall have an 0N/0FF power switch.
i
f
3. The video bus from the Airlock Module (AM)/OWS ;,
L
interface to the TV input stations shall be 93 ohms
coaxial cables.
h. The OWS TV Input Stations shall be connected such ,_
/,
that the activation of a TV Input Station shall
connect the video signal bus line of the TV System _,
to the activated station and disconnect the video
signal bus line to TV Input Stations further
removed from the AM/0WS interface.
c. Interfaces - The OWS TV System interfaces are defined
by the folloiwng interface Control Documents: 'i'
i.
,j
o hOM3559k - Orbital Workshop to Airlock Module
Electrical Interface
4
2.2.8-72 i"
t
1974020216-310
! ]
m
o 50413149 -TV Input Station to Airlock Module and
_: Orbital Workshop Interface
o 50M1615_ - Portable Television Camera Assembly to
Saturn Workshop
o 50M16132 - Skylab Orbital Assembly Television System ?
Requirements
: d. Common Electrical Requirements - Requirements imposed
on TV System such as flammability, contamination,
: grounding, bonding, etc. which are imposed on all
_ electrical subsystems are defined in paragraph 2.2.6.
B. System Description _
i/ General Description
a. The OWS TV System is an extension of the Skylab TV _
System. It provides accommodations for the transmission
of real time television data from the 0A to the manned z
Spaceflight Network (MSFN) when the Ccmmand Service :.
Module (CSM) is docked to the Saturn Workshop (SWS)
All TV transmissions are made through the CSM Unified
" Sideband (USB) data transmission link.
b. The OWS TV System consists of three (3) TV Input Stations ,_
and associated interconnecting cabling which accommodates "''_'
the connection of the portable color TV camera equip- ::
ment to a video bus to provide video coverage of crew :,
? activities, equipment operation, and experiments in the OWS. i:
2.2.8-73 _!
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2/ System Details
L
J
a. Power
I. The TV Input Stations in the forward dome and the
S
experiment compartment are powered from OWS Bus 2
through 6 amp circuit breakers. "
!
2. The TV Input Station in the forward compartment
"_ wall is powered from OWS Bus i through a 6 amp cir-
cuit breaker.
o Refer to Figure 2.2.8.k for circuit details. _
b. Systcm Provisions
t
_: i. 0nly one TV Input Station can be operating with a
:_ portable TV camera at any one time. The TV camera
is an Apollo color camera with a 30 foot (9.1_k
meter) cable.
2. TV coverage will be provided for Workshop tour,
• system housekeeping _nd experiment operations.
3. Refer to Figure 2.2.8.)4-1 for circuit details. :_}
/
g
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C. Testing
i/ Testing Program
J
a. There were no Orbital Workshop Test Plan, DAC-56697A,
line items prepared by MDAC-W for development testing
of components used in the TV System.
J,
/ b. The TV Input Station is provided as GFP for installation :
_ as part of the 0WS TV System. The TV Input Station was
qualification tested by Martin-Mariett_ (MMC) - Denver
t
: and the results documented in MMC Environmental Labora-
tory Test Report No. 3278. •
c. As the 0WS TV System consists of the TV Input Stations
and interconnecting cable harnesses, production testing
involved verification of the cable harnesses. The TV
/ Input Stations weze production tested by MMC at Denver.
<
d. Post-manufacturing tests of the 0WS subsystem were per-
formed at Huntington Beach. They included subsystem as
"_ well as integrated System testing. These tests utilized
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) portable TV camera
and monitor to accommodate video testing. The testing
ensured that the 0WS installed TV s_stem would adequately
support the operation of the total video system. Tests
contributing to the verification are listed in .._
_ Table 2.2.8._-i.
&
/
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e. Testing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) consisted of a
_ post-manufacturing subsystem retesting of any delta
changes affecting Huntingto_ Beach test results and
, integrated system testing at the module and clus_;er }
; ?
levels. Major testing accomplishing verification of _"
the TV System are listed in Table 2.2.8.4-2.
, 2/ Major Pr6blems and Solutions
a. There were no operational problems having any impact on
; test performance with the TV System hardwares ins_alled
in the OWS during checkout of the system at MDAC-W
/ (Huntington Beach).
b. Functional verification of the OWS TV System was very
successful, at KSC. There were two problems related to
0WS TV System hardware that were considered significant.
One problem dealt with a DC bias difficulty on the TV ?
_ Input station at P_0_ on the 0WS doze. After the problem
was isolated to a malfunctioning component, it was
removed, replaced, and retested in accord with KS-00k5.
i_ The other problem was the difficulty encountered when
: the 30 ft. (9.1_ meters) TV camera cable would not
lock on the P6_2 TV Input Station (TVIS) connector. The
problem was attributed to a dimensional out-of-tolerance
1 condition on the connector and it was corrected by
placing a washer under the connector airlock housing. ;
With the correction, the cable was mated to the TV Input
Station and testing was completed by KS-OOZe.
_.2.8-78 "_
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D. M_clon Results - The OWS Television System, an extension of
T
the Orbital Assembly Video System, has successfully supported
• the SI..I/2, SL-3 and SL-_ missions. _e OWS installed
hardware has performed well and enables the astron=uts to pro-
vide the ground controllers, experimenters, design technologies,
and the public viewers good video data of the crew activities
_: and orbital assembly hardware status. The television input
_" stations were strategically located in the OWSto support view- ;
ing of the different experiments and the "'_tronauts were pleased
with the loc_tions. The local control of eac_ TVIS gave the :'
;_ crew the mobility required while working in the OW8. The kine-
scope films that were viewed in assessing the picture quality
verified that the lighting provisions were good throughout the
OWS, but the picture quality did vary as a function of location/
light level.
There were no mission problems usociate'_ with the O_ installed
hard*n_e and thus, it was not necessary for the crew to per¢orm
the TVIS replacement procedures.
: E. Conclusions and Rec_endations
1/ Conclusions - The OWS TV System acc_odatlons consisting
of the Television Input Stations (TVIS)_ and its associated
wire harnesses, provided satisfactory _erf_ce in support
:. of the Sk_lab Television System in transmitting video
_ inx_rlaation during the manned Sk_lab missions as well ae
during the gr_.ad checkout &ctiW.ties. There were no _
/
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major accommodation proble_e encountered by the OWS TV
_ System during the mission and during checkout.
2/ Recommendations - Future design or redesign of the OWS TV
System accommodations should take into consideration pro-
visions tc permit %_e astronauts to control the operation
of the Video Tape Re_order (VTR) from each TVIS or the TV
camera. During the Skylab missions the astronauts were _
./
required to activate the VTR in the MDA which was a n_or
inconvenience when TV activities were being performed
within the 0WS.
F. Development History - The original 0WS TV System design concept
_rovided for only two TV outlets within the 0_S. In addition, i:
the TV Coaxial signal cable was to be routed by the crew
through the _J_/OWS _tch in lieu of being pre-tnstalled with _
per_ent feed-thru connectors.
In July of 1970, the TV sym_,e: requirements were finalized and _
resulted in the present desit_n. The final design provided for a '_
: permanent installation of a 93 ohm coaxial si _ cable and
three TVlS units. These design requirements were defined by
MSFC upon their consideration of the total clueter system
design and operation constraints.
_..2.8-81
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2.2.9 Caution and Warning System
2.2.9.1 Design Requirements
A. General Requirements
i/ Caution and Warning (C&W) system for the Skylab (SL) shall
• monitor the performance of itself (voltage only) and other
/
systems, including the Orbital _orkshop (OWS) portion, and
. alert the crew to hazards or out-of-limit conditions. Para-
meter limits monitored shall be those which constitute crew
hazards or could result in Jeopardizing the crew, compromise
primar-j mission objectives, or if not responded to in time,
could result in loss of a system. These parameters shall be °
categorized as either EMERGENCY, WARNING, or CAUTION. Criti-
cality and required crew response shall be used to determine
the category of a parameter. Emergency, Warning, and Caution
categories aze defined as follows:
• EMERGENCY - Any condition which can result in crew
injury or threat to life and requires _n_ediate correc-
tive action, including predetermined crew response.
• WARNING - Any existing or impending condition or ms/-
function of a cluster system that would adversely affect
crew safety or compromise primary mission objectives. ,:
4
Requires immediate crew a_tion. -:.
• CAUTION - Any out of limit condition or malfunction of a
/
cluster system that affects primary mission objectives -.---->
or could result in loss of a cluster system if not ._
responded to in time. Requires crew action (although
not immediately).
\
!
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_ 2/ _he number of monitored parameters must be consistent with
_ effective monitoring. When any of the monitored parameters
' reach the predetermined out-of-tolerance level appropriate
visual and acoustical signals will be activated. ::
B. Detail Requirements
i/ Common Electrical Requirements - Requirements imposed on the
• Caution and Warning System such a_ flammability, contamina-
: tion, grounding, bonding,, etc., which are imposed on all :
electrical subsystems are as stated in paragraph 2.2.6. .
2/ Redundancy - The OWS portion of the cluster Caution and
Warning System (C&W) shall be fully redundant and consist
of a displ_v panel, an emergency alarm and the wiring
required to transmit the C&W information to/from the AM/OWS
interface.
: B/ DisplaTs - The following C&W displays shall be provided in io
7
the OWS: :
Title Category ::
Cluster Low Pressure Warning -:,
OWS Bus i Low Caution
OWS Bus 2 Low Caution _:
f
: Crew Alert Warning -_
_- MDA/STS Fire Emergency
AM Fire Emergency ,'
OWS Forward Fire Emergency
OWS Crew Quarters Fire Emergency _.
i
OWS Experiment Fire Emergency
J
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. Title Category
_- - Rapid AP Emergency
One Displsy Spare Eme'_gency
Two Displ_7 Spares Caution _nd Warning
: 'Thedisplays shall be powered from the AM/OWS interface. The ;
displs_ lights shall be color-coded as follows:
a. Emezgency - Aviation Red \
b. Warning - Aviation Red i
T
• c. Caution - Aviation Yellow :_
_/ Bus Voltage The OWS Bus voltage signals shall be provided :'_
by sense lines to the AM/OWN interface. The parameters
sensed shall be 0WS Bus I and 0WS Bus 2. Redundant sense
lines shall not be provided.
5/ Fire Detection Sensor Subsystem
a. Twelve (12) ultraviolet sensorsGovernment Furnished Property
(GFP) shall be installed in the 0WS in the following areas:
?
• Sleep compartment 3
. • - Wardroom 2
• • Waste Management i _!
compartment
:.' • Experiment compartment 3 -_
• Forward compartment 3 i-
b. The sensors shall be powered from the AM/OWS interface.
The signals resulting from contact closures in the three
: sensors in the Forward compartment shall be "or"ed and '
routed redundantly to the AM/OWS interface as the para- ',.
meter "OWS Forward Fire." The outputs from the three r'
sensors in the Experiment compartment will be "or"ed and
;
; 2.2.9-3
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_: routed redundantly to a'he AM/OWS interface as the para-
meter "OWS Experiment Fire." The outputs from the
remaining six (6) sensors in the Wardroom, Sleep compart-
i merit and Was±_ Management compartment will be "or"ed and
1_uted redundantly to the AM/OWS interface as the para-
meter "OWS Crew Quarters Fire."
c. Seven (7) sensor control panels (GFP) shall be installed.
Each panel shall include test and inhibit switches and
an annuncisCor for its associated sensor(s).
6/ Master Alarm Light - A master alarm light shall be provided
on the OWS displ_7 panel. This red light (switch/indicator)
shall be powered from the AM/OWS interface. When depressed, :
: this light shall provide a contact closure returning AM power
to the AM/OWS interface.
7/ Emergency Alarm °
l
a. The emergency subsystem au_Lible alarm shall be generated
: by an acoustical trs_sducer (such as Klaxon horn, bell
U ;"
or similar device). One Klaxon assembly will be GFP _
and shall be controlled from the AM. ;"
b. The acoustical alarm shall output a distinctive audible
tone through redundant speakers. Each speaker shall
; produce a minimum output of 89 db measured one foot
axially from the speaker cone with rate_ power.
8/ Verification - The verification requlrements for the C&W
system are as follows:
a. The C&W system shall have a capability to permit end-to- i_
end checkout during ground testing.
i
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I• b. The C&W system within the OWS shall be designed to
remain in the on-orbit confi_n&ration from acceptance ,
( testing through launch; i.e., system integrity will be :
_ maintained. _:
c. The C&'4system shall be capable of integrated checkout
prior to launch.
d. The C_W _ystem shall be designed to permit system testing
by a crew member in flight. In the emergency subsystem, ;i
J
capability shall be provided to permit checkout from
: each transducer input through the electronics, to :_
illuminate -_heapplicable lights and trigger the
acoustical devices.
9/ Isolation - The Caution and Warning system design shall
satisfy the following iscl_tion requirements:
a. The C&W subsystem and the emergency subsystem shall be '
" separate and independent. An exception of this require- :.
; ment will be at the AM/OWS interface where the two
subsystems will use the same connectors, and the fire ,
detection _ystem wiring m_y be routed with other sub- :,
._ system wiring. Failures in other systems shall not
t cause a malfunction in the C&W or emergency subsystems. ,_
b. Isolation shall be included for all C&W systems sensors
having multipurpose usage, i.e., also used by the ;_
J .)
instr_nentation system. Use dual sensors (independent i
C&W sensors) for all parameters wherever practical. -,--:
_j
y
rl ,;_
::
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c. There shall be no single-point failures in the C&W
system. The redundancy within the C&W system shall be
capable of inflight verification.
I0/ Reliability - the design goal of the C&W system shall be as
follows :
a. Components shall be selected such that the maximum
allowable failure rate for the C&W system shall not
exceed 1.145 failures per million hours of operation.
b. Failures which will trigger false alarms shall not _
exceed 2.289 failures per million hours of operation.
Analytical verification will be required to assess the design _
against the above failure rate goals. :4
)
i
I
9
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2.2.9.2 System Description
: A. General Description
i/ The Caution and Warning (C&W) system installed in Skylab
_ provldes the crew with visual displays and audible tones when
selected parameters reach out-of-tolerance conditions. The
parameters selected are those which could result in
_ Jeopardizing the crew, compromising primary mission objec-
tives or if not responded to in time could result in the
loss of a system. The monitored parameters are categorized
: as either Caution, Warning or Emergency parameters.
2/ The monitor electronics of the Caution and Warning S_stem for
the Skylab cluster is in the AM. The OWS contains selected
redundant displays for crew observance while in the experi--
: merit compartment. A block diagram of the system is shown in
Figure 2.2.9.2-1.
: 3/ Two independent subsystems are used; Caution und "arning
subsystem for monitoring various system parameters, and an
Emergency subsystem for detecting Fire or rapid loss of
pressure.
4/ Each workshop Caution and Warning Subsystem is redundant
within itself, with respect to d_splays, sig_nals and sensors.
Each switch has a redundant set of contacts, each display
has redundant indicators - input and return, and each signal
has a dual special C&W power source.
5/ The OWS Caution and Warning Subsystem panel is primarily a
repeater station displaying the condition of selected cluster
2.2.9-7
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Iparameters. Six (6) emergency parameters, two (2) Caution
i
: parameters, and two (2) warning parameters are displayed.
These are listed in Table 2.2.9.2-1.
" B. System Details
l/ Common Electrical Design - Complisace to requirements imposed
: on all electrical subsystems such as contamination, flamma-
bility, bonding, grounding, etc., is as indicated in
_ paragraph 2.2.6. _
J
_ 2/ AM Control The control logic and a display panel for the
,V
C&W system are located in the AM. _
• 3/ 0WS Repeater Panel - A repeater panel, P616 shown in
t
'_ Figure 2.2.9.2-2 located in the OWS, contains dlsplays of
selected malfunctions, and a Master Alarm reset switch light. ;:
4/ SIA's - Ten (10) Speaker Intercom Assemblies (SIA) in the
0WS each contain a repeater MASTER ALARM light and reproduce
an acoustical tone for Cautions and a different tone for
Warnings. ';
5/ Emergency Alarm
a. There are two (2) Klaxon assemblies, one in the AM and
the other in the 0WS. Each Klaxon assembly contains !
: redundant speakers that reproduce an acoustical tone
for rapid loss of pressure and a different tone for
fire. The Klaxon annunciates a siren for a fire and an
interrupted buzzer for a rapid P.
b. Each Klaxon assembly speaker produces a minimum output .,_j,
of 89 db measured one ft. (.30_8m) axially from the speaker cone
with rated power. Audio output varies as the square of
2.2.9-9 ,_
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_able 2.2.9.2-1
CAUTION AND WARNING SUBSYSTEM PANEL DISPLAYS
Parameter Category* Indic .tor Color
Rapid AP Emergency Red
MDA/STS Fire Emergency Red
AM AFT Fire Emergency Red
0WS FWD Fire Emergency Red i
0WS EXP Fire Emergency Red
OWS Crew Qtrs Fire Emergency Red
Crew Alert Warning Red
Cluster Press Low Warning Red
0WS Bus 1 Caution Yellow
OWS Bus 2 Caution Yellow
)
t
¢
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!the distance from the source. Therefore, a decrease of
6 ao _s noticed each time the distance doubles. Addi-
tionally, a loss of approximately 5 db is incurred in
going from 14.7 psia (10].3 kN/m 2) to 5 psia (34.5 kN/m2).
6/ Fire Dete_icn
a. Twelve fire sensors are located within the OWS, distri-
buted per the previously stated requirements. The purpose
of the fire sensor is to detect the presence of fire in
the form of Ultra Violet (UV) rays in excess of pre-
determined level. A gain adjustment on each sensor allows
for in-flight setting of the activation level. An internal
UV source is activated when the common Fire Sensor Control
Ps_.els (FSCP) switch is positioned to test to establish
proper operation of the sensors.
b. Theze are seven Fire Sensor Control Panels (FSCP) located
within the OWS. Each FSCP can control one cr two fire
sensors as determined by the number of sensors used to
provide coverage in an area. The panel has a switch for
each sensor that can turn off the sensor or provide power
from Bus 1 or Bus 2. Fire detector test and master alarm
reset capability also exists at each fire sensor control
panel.
c. The fire sensor circuits are designed to send redundant
signals to AM C&W logic and illuminate fire locator lamps
an the fire sensor control panel. The capability to switch
\
any given sensor from one bus to the other is incorporated.
i 2.2.9-19.
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Jd. The 12 fire sensor and 7 fir_ sensor control panels are
distributed as follows:
Forward Compartment Sensor j Measurement
J Control Panel CUS OWSForward Compartment Sensor Forward Compartmel_.t
Fir_ i _
Forward Compartment Sensor) Contro± Panel •
Experiment Compartment Sensor} } Measurement
Control Panel CWS OWS
Experiment Compartment Sensor Experiment Compartment
Fire i
Experiment Compartment Sensor I Control Panel
Sleep Compartment Sensor _ _
Control Panel ,
Sleep Ccapartment Sensor
Measurement ;_
Sleep Compartment Sensor CWS OWS ._
Control Panel Crew Quarters
Waste Management Fife i
Wardroom Sensor
I Control PanelWardroom Sensor i
7/ Voltage Sense Cizcuit Breakers - A circuit breaker for each
OWS Bus labeled LOW VOLTAGE SENSE 1 and LOW VOLTAGE SENSE 2
e
is located in the C/W portion of Panel 613. The puzpose of [
_he circuit breakerz is to allow isolatlcn of the DWS 1 or 2
bus from the OWS bus low voltage sensor located in the AM.
/
8/ Master Alarm - The master alarm redundant circuit presents a ,',
conte_t closure to the AM when the master alarm reset switch
is depressed (momentary). This command/signal is utilized to :,
reset the alarm logic of the cluster C&W system.
9/ Verification - Tests of the Caution and Warning subsystem at
the component, subsystem, and integrated vehicle level on the _
ground, and in-flight C&W subsystem tests, have established
its compliance with the verification requirements. !
2.2.9-!3 _
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2.2.9.3 Testing
A. Test Program
i/ The Caution and Warnin_ subsy.'tem did not have a development
test program.
2/ Parts were qualified through test data taken f_-om system
c_mponents mounted in Qualification tests ES-6 and E_-7.
3/ Accepte'ce tests and an Ali Systems Test were performed at
MDAC-W Huntington Beach to verify proper workshop C&W system
functional operation.
4/ At KSC the Caution and Warning system was tested in detail
as par_ of the integrated vehicle tests KS-O009 and KS-OOh5.
z
B. Major Problems and Solutions
i/ During tests at Huntington Beach, a calfax fastener roll pin
fell out of a Fire Sensor Assembly S/N 037, while retorquing _
to flight requlrements. The probi_m was attributed to a
marginaSly high torque value. The torque value was reduced,
'- All units were checked and reworked at Huntington Beach by ._
the supplier.
2/ During KS-00h5 testing of f .ight spare Fire Sensor Control
Panel (FSCP), S/N 041, Sensor i and 2 lights did no_ _llumin- _'
ate during self test. Failure analysis revealed that the
FSCP lamp assembly potting boost were improperly instaJled
and were impeding the proper seating of the lamp assembly.
\
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As a result sll FSCP's were removed and sent to St. Lou's
for further testing and rework.
Upon completion of the rework, the FSCP's were returned and
installed in their original locations. A successful retest
wa=qperformed.
C. Waivers and Deviations - There are no waivers or deviations that
exist against the OWS Caution and Warning System.
2.2.9.4 Mission Results - The OWS C&W System, an extension of the Orbital
Assembly C&W System, has successfully supported the SL-I/2, SL-3 and SL-b
missions. The OWS ir_stalled hardwtre has performed satisfactorily
and provided the _stronauts continuou.q monitor and status of the
emergency, warning, and caution parameters. The repeater C&W 616
panel in the 0WS provided the crew with continuous remote C&W para-
meter status monitor and master alarm reset coverage. The twel_'e
(12) f_re sensors and the seven (7) fire sensor control panels,
strategically located throughcut the OWS, gav_ the crew confidence
of safety and great mobility.
There were no hardware failures during the SL-I/2 and SL-3 flights.
Mission problems were limited to the following: (a) a low voltage
caution indication was experienced on Day of Year (DOY) 153 for OWS
Buses i and 2. Results of an investigation into the problem revealed
th.. the most probable cause of the anomaly was an inadvertent open-
ing of the circuit breakers by a crewman, who at that time was cycling
adjacent circuit breakers; and (b) the fire sensor i_ the OWS Sleep
C_p_ment 2, initiated three (3) false alarms on D0Y i_6. Results
2.2.9-15
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of an investigation revealed the cause of the anomaly was the high
temperature within the OWH. This was substantiated by special tests
performed by MDAC-E which confirmed that the fire sensor sensitivity
increased at high temperatures. The crew was appraised of the find-
ings and were asked to _rn the affected fire sensor off until the
OWS internal temp.__ratures decreased to acceptable levels. When
temperatures w._re again normal, the sensor was activated and performed
satisfactoril'_ during the remainder of the mission.
t
!
• 1 2.2.9.5 Conclusions and Recommendations - The 0WS Caution and Warning System
t
design and insta21ation has satisfactorily supported the Skylab
i missions. All design goals of the subsystem have been met.
i
The Caution and Warning hardware performed without failure during
J
flight. False alarms which occurred during the mission were not
caused by any C&W system hardware failure but were the result of
other mission operations (e.g., inadvertent exposure of a fire i
sensor to ultraviolet light).
The OWS repeater panel and SIA portion of the Caution stud Warning
_ System gave the crew the desired mobility while providing the
necessary monitoring function.
_ The Cautica and Warning ground test program satisfactorily proved _
the adequacy of the Caution and Warning hardware. The hardware per-
formed as expected. High temperatures early in the mission caused .-j
only temporary undesired operation from one fire sensor.
I
Crew comments during debriefings indicated satisfaction with the
; Caution and Warning System. ,
: 2.2.9-16 !
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F
_ In-flight tests proved to be satisfactory. These tests were designed
!
to test the system during activation of the OWS.
There are no recommendations or suggestions made to alter the Caution
• and Warning System or do anything differently should the opportunity
present itself for redesign.
2.2.9.6 Development History - Initial design of the I.Mtergency and Warnin 6
System called for a completely independent system located wholly
,_ within, and controlled from, the habitation area of the OWS.
In early 1970, by Change Order direction, the system was redesigned
!
(Caution-Warning) into a redundant, repeater-type system. The OWS
portion of the C&W would now input signals to, and receive co.mmand
signals from, the AM C&W logic unit.
Subsequent to the change from an independent OWS system to the
repeater-type system, the only changes to the system design have :
been to alter the criteria associated with the monitored parameters.
_ 2..2.9-17
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: i 2.2. i0 Experiment Accommodations S[stem
2.2.10.1 Experiment Installation and Operation Provisions
A. Design Requirements
l/ The list of OWS experiments is shown in Teble 2.2.10.1-1. The
• design requirements for the integration of this experiment
hardware into the OWS were stated in electrical and mechani-
cal.Interface Control Drawings (ICD's). These ICD's covered
design areas such as vibration criteria, acoustic criteria,
thermal surface properties, electrical bonding, structuraS
interface loads, scientific airlock (SAL) and experiment
leakage, vacuum provisions, desiccated and filtered gas for
SAL experiments, launch mounting dimensions, OWS airflow,
nitrogen supply provisions, thermal environment, and electri-
cal interface criteria• A list of these ICD's has been
tabulated in Table 2.2.10.1-2. In those cases of experiment
• hardware where ICD's were not required by NASA, the related
design requirements stated in the Cluster Requirements
Specification were followed as the experiment interface
t
?
/.
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Table 2.2.lO.1-1
; OWS E._/_EHIME_S
i Exp. No. Experiment Title
ESS Experiment Support System
MO71 Mineral Balance
• M073 Bioassy of Body Fluids ;
M07_ Specimen Mass Measurement
J
M092 Lower BodyNegative Pressure
?
_ M093 Vectorcardiogram ;
: %
MI31 Human Vestibular Function i
M133 Sleep Monitoring i
(
MISI Time and Motion Study :'
i ?
4
MI71 Metabolic Activity _"
M172 Body Mass Measurement
M_87 Habitability/Crew Quarters _i
- t
M509 Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment
!_ M516 Crew Activities/Maintenance )
S019 UV Stellar Astronomy
t i
• S020 X-Ray/UV Solar Photography :.
S063 UV Airglow Horizon Photography i
S073 Gegenschein/Zodiacal Ligh "_
• !
Slh9 Particle Collection ,r
_k
S183 UV Panorama .,
SIg0B Earth Terrain Camera _
Y
$228 Trans-Uranic Cosmic Rays ¼
T002 Manual Navigation Sightings :_
4
' 22102ee _
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Table 2.2.10.1-1
_ OWS EXPERIMENTS (Continued)
Exp. No. Experiment Title
TO03 Inflight Aerosol Analysis
TOI3 Crew/Vehicle Disturbances
_; TO20 Foot Controlled Maneuvering Unit
_" T025 Coronagraph Contamination Measurement
T027 Contamination Measurement
ED31 Eacteria and Spores
ED32 in-Vitro Immunology
ED_I Motor Sensory Performance
: ED52 Web Formation
ED61/62 Plant Growth/Plant Phototropism
ED63 Cytoplasmic Streaming
ED72 Capillary Studies
EDTh Mass Measurement
ED76 Neutron Analysis
ED78 Liquid Motion
2.2.10-3
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Table 2.2.i0.1-2
EXPERIMF_NT-RELATED ICD'S
!ICD NUMB_ Title
13M07393 Slh9/T027, Mechanical Requirements
ll3M120hl M171, Metabolic Activity, Mechanical
" 13M12051 M092, Inflight LBNP, Mechanical
13M12071 MI31, Human Vestibular Functions, Mechanical
* 13M12091 M074, Specimen Mass Measurements, Mechanical
I13M12101 M172, Body Mass Measurements, Mechanical
13M12181 M509, Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment, Mechanical
iiM12183 M509, Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment, I&C
t
13M12231 T003, Inflight Aerosol Analysis, Mechanical
13M12261 T020, Foot Control Maneuvering Unit, Mechanical
13M12301 T025, Coronagraph Contamination Measurement, Mechanical
13M12311 T027, ATM Contamination Measurement, Mechanical
13M12321 T013, Crew/Vehicle Disturbance, Mechanical
_ i13M123hl ESS, Experiment Support System, Mechanical
13M12351 Slh9, Particle Collection, Mech_lical
13M12353 T027/S073, ATM ContamMeasurement and Gagenschein/Zodiacal
Light/OWS I&C
13M12381 S019, UV Stellar Astronomy, Mechanical
13M12391 S020, UV/X-Ray Solar Photography, Mechanical
13MI2hOI S063, Airglow Horizon Photography, Mechanical i
_ 13M13512 M071/M073, Return Fayload to CM, Mechanical
13M1351_ M071/M073, Freezer to CM, Mechanical
13M13515 Camera and Fhotolight LOC/0WS Experiments, Mechanical
' 13M13516 Bio-Med Stowage Container/OWS, Mechanical
., ,, .... =
¢
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Table 2.2.i0.1-2
EXPERIMENT-RELATED ICD'S (Continued)
ICD Number Title
13M13519 •Experiment 3rodOperation Film/SWS Film Vault, Mechanical
13M13521 S183, UV Panorama/SWS, Mechanical
13M13532 M133, Sleep Monitoring Equipment/OWS _ Mechanical
13M13535 TO02, Manual Navigation Sightings, Mechanical
13M135h0 Earth Terrain Camera to OWS, Mechanical
: 40M35606 T027/OWS, Electrical
40M3562_ TOI3, Crew Vehicle Disturbsmce/OWS, Electrical
40M356_0 MI71, Metabolic Activity/OW S, Electrical
_0M356_I M092, LBNP/OWS, Electrical
40M356_2 MI31, Human Vestibular Functions/OWS, Electrical
h0M356_3 M07_, Specimen Mass Measurement/OWS_ Electrical
40M356h4 M172, Body Mass Measurement/OWS, Electrical
h0M35645 M509, Astronaut Maneuvering Equipment/OWS, Electrical
40M35650 S063, Airglow Horizon/OWS, Electrical .•
'_ 40M35651 ESS/OWS, Electrical
i 40M35656 S149/T027, Particle Collection/ATM Contamination,
Electrical
40M35684 S183, UV Panorama/OWS, Electrical
h0M35686 M133, Sleep Monitoring/0WS, Electrical
h0M35731 Earth Terrain Camera to OWS, Electrical
_ 50M13132 ESS/SWS, I&C
50M16135 T013, Crew Vehicle D_sturb/0WS, l&C "'-
50M161h2 Slhg/T027, Particle Collection/ATM Contain, I&C
50M161_6 S183, UV Panorama/0WS, I&C
50M16151 M133, Sleep Monitoring/OWS, I&C _:_
z.2.10.5
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Idesign criteria. The contamination and flammability design
,I requirements were stated in the OWS End Item Specification
(CP2080JIC).
2/ An 0WS Experiments Accommodations Requirements Summary has %
been compiled in Table 2.2.10.1-3. This lists the experiment i
; equipment, method of attachment, gas and vacuum requirements,
<
and electrical requirements.
B. System Description
L
i/ The experiments subsystem consisted of the hardware accom- _
%
modations needed to integrate the GFP experiment equipment
I
!.
into the OWS. These accommodations included structural
A attachments, electrical cabling, pressurization and plumbing
provisions, and stowage restraints The location of the
"
experiment accommodations in the OWS have been shown in
Figures 2.2.10.i-i and 2.2.10.1-2.
2/ The structural attachments for experiment hardware included '!
floor, wall and ceiling attachment hardware for the experi-
ment stowage containers and other equipment, floor-to-
ceiling shear panels for the ESS and MI71 Metabolic Analyzer, _,
wall brackets for the T013 Force Measurement Units, the SAL
tripod support and the S183 Spectrograph restraint assembly.
i
A typical stowage container attachment has been shown on
Figure 2.2.10.I-S. The SAL tripod was designed to prevent
static and dynamic loads imparted to the T027 Photometer .,-_
• canister to induce excessive moment loads at the SAL/OWS
wall interface. The SAL tripod design and OWS location has
been described in Figure 2.2.10.i-_. A floor-mounted
\
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S183 Spectrograph restraint assembly resembling a bumper I
pad was also installed for tile same purpose.
5 3/ The electrical experiment a ......... _.,_ ........ '_* _
: telemetry and miscellaneous electrical provisions. The power
distribution system was a two-wire, single point ground sys-
temwhich supplied experiment power from two ecmpletely _
' separate supply buses. All power wiring supplying experi- _
ment equipment was protected with circuit breakers. U_ility :
J
,_ outlets with common receptacles were supplied for experiment
L
use. The experiment telemetry data system used the OWS date
- acquisition system, supplied signals directly to the AM PC_
interface box and utilized the OWS Communications System.
OWS Multiplexers J and K were reserved for experiment data
but for some experiments (M509, TO13, M093, MI31, T027/S073),
high sample rate data was routed directly to the _4 PCM
interface box. There were also some miscellaneous electrical
<
accommodations supplied for the OWS, including RF cables for
M509 and T013, DCS commands for 8159 and provisions for
synchronizing the camera for S063.
h/ A nitrogen gas pressurization system was provided for the
ESS and MlT1 Metabolic Analyzer, utilizing 1/h-ln. (0.6b cm)
OD stainless steel plumbing _nd a series of control p_lels
%
to provide the required gas supply at the experiment inter- ":
faces. The plumbing was routed from the AM to OWS Fanel 500
3 j,
at the water bottle ring to Panel 620 in crew cuarters
:-
&
/ 2.2.10-13
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tc_mpartment, as shown in Figures 2.2.10.1-5, 2.2.10.1-6, :
"-. 2.2.10.1-7, and 2.2.10.1-6. All the plumbing had brazed connec-
tions except at the connectors to the ESS, Metabolic
Analyzer, Panel 500 and Panel 620, where B-nut fittings were
• used.
5/ Vacuum provisions were supplied for the MI71 Metabolic
Analyzer (MA) and M092 Lower Body Negative Pressure Device
(LNBPD). The system for the MA consisted of two vacuum
lines, a one in. (2.Shcm) line 8.5 ft. (2.55m) long between the
MA and ocerboard penetration in OWS wall, and a i/_ in. (O.0hcn,) %
llae approximately 7 ft. (2.1m) long between the _t% and LBNPD vacuum
outlet line. The one in. (2.Shcm) llne was used primarily to null
%
the gas sample through the MA and vent it overboard while
the other line was a relief vent line to vent MA methane
overboard upon inadvertent failure of the MA calibration
pressure regulator. The LBNPD vacuum system consisted of a
: 19 ft. (5.7m) length of one in. (_.5_cm) line extending from the
LBNPD to the OWS wall, with a hand valve included, in this vacu_n,
• line to serve as an emergency shutoff should it be required.
This vacuum system was used to depressurize the experiment
and to provide the necessary pressure level for maintaining
_ a constant negative pressure on the crewman during the
J
, experiment operation. These vacuum provisions have been
pictured in Figure 2.2.10.1-9. o
6/ The vacuum system described above was used in miss n
SL-I/SL-2 and SL-3. However, because M092 venting
2.2.10-14 _ _
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necessitated spacecraft vehicle attitude corrections, a !
j redesigned system was developed for SL-4 and an adapter kit ;
was flown on SL-k for on-orbit installation. The new design ,
_ approach was to vent the LBNFD into the OWS waste tank by
closing the LBNPD vent valve at the OWS wall and connecting
hoses between a port on the tee _n the LBNPD vent line and
: the common bulkhead penetration which previously had the wardroom :_
"_ water dump probe installed in it. The two ports were ,
, interconnected by using _hree on-board hoses and two new
: adapters. A sketch of the new vacuum system was shown on
Figure 2.2.10.1-10. i
7/ The ctowage provisions for experiment equipment was covered 7
in Section 2.2.13 of this report.
C. Testing
1/ The experiment/OWS interface accommodations were verified
through a series of subsystem tests and all-system tests at
the Contractor facility and at KSC. Additional _ /machine
interface verifications were accomplished during Crew
Compartment Fit and Function (CCFF) testing. No significant
problems regarding OWS experiment accommcdatlons were
encountered during OWS testing but malfunctions occurred }:
?
internal to the GFP experiment he_dware. When these mal-
functions occurred, the hardware was either repaired by
Experiment Developer personnel at t,._ test site or returned
to the Experiment Developer's plant for rework. Retestlng :
was then successfully accomplished.
L _
,, 2.2.10-20 ,
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2/ Receiving inspection of all GFP experiment hardware was .i
performed at MDAC for visual damage, parts inventory, and
<
adherence to OWS cleanliness requirements. The procedures
used to perform these operations were listed in Table
2.2.10.i-4. One requirement for equipment in the OWS was that
all breathing systems and pressurized systems must be certi- •
fied to be free of mercury contamination per MDAC Mercury
Contamination Control Plan 20 dated, October, 1971. All
applicable hardware was either previously certified or a
mercury contamination verification test performed at NDAC
as part of the receiving inspection operations. Only minor
discrepancies were noted during receiving inspection.
3/ Only four problems of any significance occurred during the
installation of the OWS experiment accommodations hardware.
They are as follows:
a. The support structure for the M171 NM. did not meet the
minimum ICD tolerance width dimension. After appro-
priate rework, the installation of the l_was success-
,i
fully completed. (
b. The mounting holes in the OWS structural bracket to
support the T013 Force Measurement Unit No. 2 did not ,,_.
match up with matching mounting holes in the FMU. The
holes in the FMU were reamed for proper alignment and
the installation was successfUlly completed.
c. The M171 Ergometer forward moanting plate was out of
flatness. After leveling shims were riveted to the
mounting plate, a successful installation was complet_!.
2.2.10-22 _,'
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4/
Table 2.2.10.1-4
_ RECEIVING INSPECTION S_Y _
Experiment MDAC Procedul e
T025 iC841bi
M509 IC833970 :
_u
_, M092 iC83993
M172 IC84006 i
MoTk Ic8koo8
: S020 IC84053
V
S183 iC83999
_ T003 lC8k0ok ,_
; T013 IC83971
: T020 iC8_031
• T027 iC84078 :
BIOMED STOWAGE CONTAINERS IC84062
M093 iC84080 ._
%
_" MI31 IC8_073
M133 1C84081
_' M171 IC_4098
: ESS iC84082 -
S019 iC8h063
',_
S063 IC84O65
t
S149 IC8_06k
S190B lC8_196 _
T002 IC_4222 ;
)
t
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d. During a mechanical fit check of the TO?5 stowage
container, it was determined that one of the mounting
holes in the container did not match up with the stud
location of the OWS w_ll. After the flange hole was
reamed out, a successful fit check was completed.
4/ VCL testing at MDAC consisted of experi_ ent subsystem tests,
CCFF tests, and all-systems test. In _n_ experiment area,
the purpose of these tests was to verify the experiment/0WS _,
?_ interface compatibility. No significant problems in 0WS
experiment accommodations were encounter(i during this ?
'i
testing. The procedures used in the VCL testing are listed ;
in Table 2.2.1C.1-5. A final report, )_AC Report G30t_, 0WS
Checkout-%_, was prepared to provide detailed information
relative to test description, measurements, data evaluation _
and all experiment problems/anomalies, including crew
commen_s Each section of Report G3069 pertaining to a _
t
particular experiment was also listed in Tabl_ __.2.10 .1-5. !
5/ Receiving inspection, subsystem and all-systems test _or
experiment/0WS interface compatibility were also performed
at KSC. No significant problems regarding OWS experiment :
q
accommodations _,ere encountered during this testing. KqC
: test procedures applicable to experiment accommodations are
listed in Table 2.2.10.1-6.
"_ 6/ _o waivers and deviations wer_ required for any experiment
accommodations, except for material flammability for M'87 -_
off-the-_helf experiment instruments procured under NAS_ ":
_ direction.
" 2.2.10-24
1974020216-360
Tahle 2.2.10.1-5
': VCL EXPERIMENT TEST SUMMARY
i
IExperiment Checkout Procedure Section of 03069T003 IB86h3B 3.6.1013 IB84569 3.6.7
M07h IB84567 ' 3.6.12 :
Ml?2 IB84567 3.6.12
T027/S073 IB86h32 3.6.6 -:
S149 IB86432 3.6.6
" S019 iB86h28 3.6.3 :"
:_ SO20 iB86h30 3.6.2
M509 iB8h565 3.6.
TO20 IB84565 3.6.b "
S063 iB_6h42 3.6.13
M092 IB8_568 3.6.5
M093 IB8_568 3.6.5
MI31 iB8h568 3.6.5
: M]7Z iB84568 3.6.5
ESS IB84568 3.5.5
MI51 iB86h46 3.6.8
S183 l_6_hh 3.6.3
M_33 IB84566 3.6.11
T002 i]391060 3.6.9
SI90B IB91058 3.6.I0
T025 IB86h39 N/A (Off-Module)
M487 IB86h24 h.0
CCFF IBBg' "), 4.0
All Systems Test iB8b_J5 5.0
<
f
,%
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Table 2.2.i0.1-6
t
! ESC TEST PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO EXPERIMENT ACCOMMODATIONS
o.
: ! Test Procedure
Number Title
b
K0-19003 RECEIVING INSPECTION
i
•_ KO-7000 LEAK TEST
KO-7001 INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL
K0-7002 MECHANICAL TEST :
i
KO-700_ ON-MODULE P_IODIC
KE-7005 MEDICAL EXPERIML_ITS OFF-MODULE "
c
KE-7006 EXPERIMENTS OFF-MODULE PREPS
KE-7007 S019/S183 OFF-MODULE FUNCTIONAL
: KE-7008 OFF-MODULE PERIODIC ;
KS-0009 SIMULATED FLIGHT ;
KS-0016 OWS CLOSEOUT
ES-O0_5 END-TO-END TEST
KS-7000 EXPERIMENT STOWAGE ;
>
-i
c
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D. Mission Results
1/ An experiment accomplishment summary was compiled in Table
2.2.10.1-7.
L,
2/ Or the three missions, the composite OWS experiment accomplishment
percentage of planned versus actual was 87 percent. Flight
planning, rescheduling due to the loss of the meteoro£_ snield
and the maneuver limitations due to gyro malfunctions resulted
in the deletion of some experiment activities.
3/ OR experiment accoweaoa_tions smomalies which occurred on
SI-i/SL-2 are listed below: i
a. The crew was unable to obtazn the proper calibration
adjustment of -0.gK factor for the M_87 Sound Level bleter.
%
A -0.TK factor was obtained. The readings on the instru-
ment is +2 db so the 0.2 db correction was not considered !
to present a problem.
b. The ways mechanism of the backup SAL tripod which was
bolted to the adapter plate was drilled in a mirror image
with the holes misaligned about twr in. (5.08 cm). The $1_2
:_ crew had to rotate the SAL tripod legs and had to realign the
, adapter under the T027 canister to accomplish the tripod
; installation. The tripod did perform its intended function
although two of the tripod legs were bolted to open _rid
; floor, instead of using the fixed nut-plate locations. The :
: SL-3 crew transferred the backup tripod to the solar SAL
where all the legs were successfully bolted into the fixed " "-_
nutplates on the floor.
c. The crewmen stated that the SAL pressurization and re- :
,°
pressurization times for experiment hardware
)
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installed in the SAL Were greater than expected. They
expected two minutes but the actual pressurization and
depressurlzation times were five to eight minutes.
MDAC analysis verified that the longer times were
: actually realistic and the flight plans were revised
; to allow more crew time for these operations.
d. The crew reported a bent bonding strap on the Slh9
•_ stowage container. The strap was hand-bent back to its
v
original shape without any damage to the strap.
r
e. The crew reported that the two Experiment Mode Select
Switches on Panel 617 were loose. Using an alle.
wrench, the crew tightened the knobs on the switch and j
the switch operated properly after this operation.
h/ The only experiment accommodations anomaly reported on the SL-3
mission was the M092 propulsive vent problem previously des- >
cribed in Section 2.2.10.I.B.6/. The problem was alleviated by
the SL-h crew by rerouting the venting to the common bulkhead,
using a penetration previously used by a urine dump probe.
c
5/ No additional experiment accommodation anomalies were reported
during the SL-h mission.
6/ The only test performed to support mission operations was a
verification of the M092 vacuum line redesign hardware kit
to be utilized on SL-_.
!,
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:, E. Conclusions and Recommendations
i/ The experiment accommodations subsystem performed per design
requirements except for the few non-significant items men-
tioned above. Verification of compatibility of _q interface,
such as the backup SAL tripod, should be a basic groundrule
for future programs.
F. Development History
i/ The initial program requirement was to provide mountin_ and
L
system interface provisions (power, data, _as, and vacuum) for
twenty-two experiments _id a scientific airlock (On Position
I). Ilardware for six additional experiments plus ii student
f
experiments and a second scientific airlock were subsequently
added. Three of the original experiments were deleted and one
of these three was later reinstated.
2/ As development of the experiments progressed, numerous modifi-
cations to OWS systems and hardwere were reauired to support •
experiment requirements a_ redesign. This was especially "
evident in modifications to sz,d special configurations of the
mounting provisions required to attach the reouirements to the
OWS. Mounting locations and hardware were continuously chan_ed
to incorporate experiment additions, deletions, and volume _
requirements as well as flight crew interfaces. A tripod support _
.
assembly was provided to support the T027 Photometer canister
at the scientific airlocks in order to prot,ct the OWS w_ll
integrity.
i ,'!,.P. ] O-ll
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fVacutu. and Kas lines were modified in order to accommodate new
i :
! hardware and safety requirements in the biomedical ex_,eriments.
P
_ These were necessary in order to provide for the blood pressure
measurin_ system sr.d to provide for venting, of methane from tile
metabolic aJ_alyzer.
Modifications to electrical connectors and wiring harness were :_
required to incorporate power and instrumentation cham:es as :
• well as connector relocations in the experiments.
: 3/ During,the integrated test nhase, minor modifications were
required to accommoaate incompatibilities in mountin_ and
system inter_aces.
10.2 Film Storage System
A. Design Requirements
l/ General Design Requirements - A film storage system (Film !
vault) with the following capabilities was to be pro,'ided:
o Insure a maximum film temperature of 80°F (26.7°C) after
film storage.
o Maintain relative humidity in vault of 145 + 15 percent
from film stowage until mission completion (including
launch, unmanned and manned phsses). 7
o Provide radiation protection for the film.
o Provide individual, removable film drawers for ease of
fzlm stowage and on-oroit film handling.
o Dimensions of approximately 55 x 140x 26 in. (139.7 x
lO1.6 x 66 cm).
2' Specific Design Re0uirements - The film vault was designed as L
a passive thermal and humidity control unit capable of main-
taining the specified environment for the flight film. Htm_i-
dlty control (prior to OWS on-orblt activation) was maintained
by the use of potassium-thiocynate salt pads.
/ Radiation protection for the film was to be obtaln_ by using
various well thicknesses in the design and manufacture of the
J
7
2
Special design considerations were required to insure that
_he materials used in the manufacture of the film vault were _
2.2.10-33 _;
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compatible with the film. Also, launch and flight induced
loads were to be evaluated to insure that the vault design
would protect the film through these environments.
L_
B. System Description - The vault is a simple alumintur casting of
four cells, each with a different wall thickness. Each cell wall
thickness is commensurate with the degree of radiation protection i
required for the period of film stowage mld its sensitivity.
There are two doors, also of aluminum, vertically hinged at the
center with thickness equal to the _Tall of each cell. These
wall thicknesses are 0.25 in, (0.6h cm), 1.90 in. (4.8 cm), 2.90
in. (7.4 cm), and 3.40 in. (8.6 am). The center hinge line of
the doors is to reduce access volume required. Figures 2.2.10.2-1
through 2.2.10.2-3. The vault contains 12 drawers in two vertical
columns of six. Each drawer is approximately 15 x 18 x 6-1/2 in.
(38,1 x _5.7 x 16.5 cm) high. The heights of the drawers have
been adjusted for special experiment packages to as much as 8 in.
(20.3 cm) high. Access to the film containers is obtaine_ by i
opening the vault drawer 180 deg1'ees and sliding out one of the
six drawers. Each drawer is mounted on a single, side mounted
slide with a detent for both closed and open positions. In addi-
tion, each drawer may be released from the slide to permit bench
loading of the film or serve as a travel container to the experi-
ments during on-orbit usage. Within each drawer, individual film
containers are restrained by on-orbit restraints, normally of
machined teflon, which provides the ability to extract a single
film container without handling other containers. All restraints
within the drawers were designed for toolless removal and
1974020216-370
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i: reconfiguration if necess_-v on-orbit. To accommodate launch
c
loads, the film vault doors were bolted closed. T_ contents of
each drawer were packed with corrugated cardboard to minimize
vibration during boost.
There were no unique febrication techniques used in the film
vault. The size of the base casting [i,_30ibs (6_7 kg)] may b_
t
considered di_ ferent, but it was definitely not unique. The doors
were machined, the internal drawers were sheet metal, and the
: restraints within the drawers were machined teflon, as was the
humidity control assembly.
Although the use of potassium-thiocyna_e salt pads for humidity
control of film was not without precedent in _pace applications,
: the use of the fibrou_ teflon filter material (Zitex) to control '
the potentially poison_.us solution was a new application. Within
the humidity control assembly hJ lders, each salt pad was sealed
in a Zitex pouch. The Zitex _llowed the water vapor from the sslt
pad to pass through with very little impedance, at the aame time :
_ the Zitex retained the liquid so_u'.icn. This new application
resulted in a patent disclosure.
The material_ _elected for the film vault did not represen_ _ con-
tamination control problem to the re." of the OWS because they
. were picked for their inert qualities. The one e._ception was the "
potassium-thiocTnate salt pads described in the previous paragraph.
There was one slight contaminatio_ problem between the vault _d
b
the film, that is, undA.r high humidity, high %_nperature, and lot _ _
duratinns, it is possible for unfinisl-! aluminum to contaminate "
!'
2.2.10-38
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or ruin film. However, tile interior surface had been sealed,
either with anodize, alodine, or plating, eliminating +.he poten-
tial source of free aluminum ions ruining the silver haloid
i
emulsions.
C. Film Vault Testing
k
i/ Development Tests - There were four development tests, ident-
ified as CX7, WSTM-17, xCS, and XCll that were associated
with the film vault.
i a. CX7 - Film Vault Humidity Contrcl- This test established
the hum .... . diffusion rate for the OWS Film Vault com-
tr__d t:,e theoretical d/ffusion rate that was used for
designing the humidity control assembly and an actual
expected rate demonstrated by the XC_ _est fixture. In
Zhis test, the humidity diffusion opening with tolerances, _
i.e., the crack between the two doors, was simulated and
the Aesu±tant, diffusion raze for the various tolerance
conditions established. The results of this test showed
excellent correLstioh between the theoretical calculation
and the demonstrated diffusion rates and confirmed the
i
design of the humidity control assemblies.
b. WSTM-I7 - This test used _h_ XC.7 film vault humidity \
control test specimen to d_monstrate that sealing the
saSt pads in Zitex did not adversely affect their ability
to c_'trol humidity The Zitex encased salt pads con- -_
trolled humidity and., therefore, allowed MDAC to seal
._ the _al_ pads to control the potentially poisonous
l
aqueous solution of pota_sium-thiocynate.
, 2._.. 3.0-39 2
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I c. CX8 - This test demonstrated the c_npatibility of the
materials u_ed in the film vault with the five sensitive
films to be stored in the vault. The materials for the
film vault interior defined at the time all proved to be
compatible with the five sensitive films. As a result of
design reviews (CCSR) and potential material selection
problems, it became necessary to r_n a second test.
= d. CXII - CXII was the second materials compatibility test.
None of the new materials presented a compatibility
problem with the film.
2/ Special Tests (ST-23) - This special test qualified the film
vault drawer contents to the expected vibration levels.
=
3/ Acceptance Test - The fit and function of the film vault was
verified during stowage subsystem checkout at Huntington
f
Beach and daring film stowage at the Kennedy Space Center
(Ksc).
4/ Test Results - There we2e no waivers or deviations issued
L
for the film vault during 0WS tests.
D. Mission Results - The film vault adequately protected the major-
ity of flight film despite the environment (excpssive dry heat) .i
encountered in the OWS interior until the crew deployed the
therc_l protection device. 0nly a few fi1.,sthat were extre_Dxy
--'T
sensitive to heat deteriorated and were resupp]ied by the first
crew. Th_ humidity control assemblies pe',-formedsuccessfully.
These salt pads were recharged by the first crew and the returned
2.2.10-o! .
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films have not exhibited any humidity damage. Radiation damage
on returned films for all missions was within expected limits.
The only anomaly associated with the film vault occurred in
Drawer B, where some restraints were not being retaiz,cd by the
detent mzd were taped in place. Three other drawers with the
same restraints performed satisfactorily.
The versatility of the film vault design was proven in that as
mission planning required more and different film resupply
requirements, the vault was reconfigured in orbit by the crew.
E. Conclusions and Recommendations Th_ OWS film vault, as used in
conJuncuiou-_ith the Cluster Atmosphere Control System, was
successful in providing temperature, humidity, and radiation pro-
te'tio_- to the over 600 lbs (2"(2kg) of film used for the Skylab
experiments. Future programs which require protection of hardware
from humidity and radiation could also successfully use the same
approach of potassium-thiccynate salt pads and aluminum walls.
The use of standard commercial fasteners such as a "dialatch"
should be scrutinized carefully and tested thoroughly before use.
F. Deve!_pment Histor_ - The film stor_e system began with two
efforts. The first was to ma_e ac:ommodations, or scars, in the
Workshop to accommodate a film vault and the second was to study
and _resent to NASA a proposed design for the film va1_it. This
resulted in a study that examined elev,n diffez._nt methoa_ of
film protection and selected at. approach that included some
eleven slabs of aluminum to be removed from the vault in order
to spread out the concentrated launch loads associated with mass
1974020216-377
of the vault at the time. The initial requirements specified
internal volumes and seven differ,nt protection levels specified
as equivalent aluminum thickness of as thick as 7.8 inches (19.8
cm). The _otal vault at this time weighed 5,500 ibs (2,495 kgm).
Subsequently the thickness requirements were changed to only three
different thicknesses with a maximum being 3.h inches (9.6 cm)
i of aluminum. Before the design was finished there was a fourth
thickness added. The resulting vault weighed approximately 2,700
ibs (1225 kgm). Due to the decrease in weight, it became possible
to launch the vault in one piece. About the time the vault design
became reasonably firm, a requirement that had been deleted ear-
lier because of potential complexity was re-imposed; the humidity
had to be controlled between 40 and 60 percent R.H. A humidity
_ control system was studied, proposed, and implemented into the
vault design. The humidity control system involved using potassium
thiocynate solution in dexter paper called salt pads. These pads
: act as an ambivalent desiccant; i.e., they take on water if the
r
I
t humidity is too high, and give Ap water if the humidity is too
J
low.
A considerable effort was spent in designing an interior configur-
ation that could be modified on-orbit without tools. The initial
I concept called for a series of armalon bags that would be attached
i to the drawers by velcro and would provide the packing control, in
addition to cardboard for launch packing, to separate and maintain ....:
• c mpl te cce s to the individua film magazines stored i the
; vault. After review with the crew, it was determined that this
L 2.2.10-IL2
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was not acceptable and a system of m _'ninedteflon film restraints
was developed. These restraints coulc be inserted and removed
without tools and when supplemented with cardboard would hold the
contents satisfactorily during the vibration experienced dming
latmch. During checkout o5" the vault, the interfaces between the
machined teflon restraints and the sheet ma_.al drawers were modi-
fied _o conform with the specified toleran(:o,so they could be
interchangeable throughout the vault.
: 2.2.1U-_3
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2.2.10.3 Solar Flare Notification System
A. Design Requirements - An audible alert was to be provided to the
crew when a predetermined level of solar activity was present.
This alert was to be audible throughout the OWS.
B. System Description - The alert signal is activated by a contact
closure in the ATM and routed to the GFP supplied flare alert
7 box located in the experiment comoartment of the OWS. The power
source of the signal is supplied from OWS power Bus 2 through
the power distribution console (see Figure 2.2.10.3-1).
Contact closure and the subsequent flare alert signal is provided
in the S05h X-Ray Spectrogra;hic Telescope. A beryllium shielded
sodium iodide crystal coupled to a photomultiplier monitors the
x-ray emission from the sun and when a pro-set level is exceeded,
indicating a flare activity initiates the flare alarm system.
In addition to the flare alarm in the 0WS, visual and audio
indication is present in the AM/MDA.
C. Testing - The alert unit was tested at the OWS module level during
z
post-manufacturing checkout at Huntington Beach and at the inte-
grated level during the integrsted test phase of the SWS cluster
\
checkout at KSC. There were no waivers or deviations issued for
the alert unit.
D. Mission Results - The alert unit in the OWS performed s_tisfac-
toriS_ during the mission. There were no adverse crew cc_ments
regarding the alert signal, i :
2.2.10-1_k
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The detector in the S054 experiment was capable of identifying
the presence of a solar flare and initiating the flare alarm.
However, this detector also triggered whenever the Skylab entered
the radiation belt of the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA). Instruc-
tions were provided to the crew to inhibit the detector prior to
entering the SAA in order to p_'event inadvertent alert
indications.
E. Conclusions and Recommendations - The alert unit performed as
required during ground checkout and mission operations.
F. Development History - The solar flare notification system as
f
initially designed was flowr,with no modifications.
,!
/
J
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2.2.10.4 Scientific Airlocks
' A. Deslgn Requiremen_ s
i/ There were two Scientific Airlocks (SAL's) located in the
0WS, one mounted on the solar side and one mounted on the
• anti-so?ar side of the spacecraft. Each experiment inter-
, facing with the SAL was enclosed in a pressure vessel whose
' external flanges mated with and sealed against the inboard :
_Z
side of the SAL. The SAL itself was a pressure vessel sealed
against the external environment by a translatable outer _
door. The inboard face had an opening which could be sealed _"
by an experiment or removable plate. The outer door had to
• be sealed whenever an experiment or the plate was installed :
or removed, to isolate the 0WS cabin from the external space /
environment. After installation, the pressure vessel became
part of the SAL pressure vessel as a system and the outer
door would then be opened s-d the experiment deployed outside
the spacecraft. The internal pressure of the SAL was eQual-
ized to either th,: 0WS cabin pressure or the external space
environment by a vent (depressurizaLlon) valve. The SAL
plates were stowed in a container near the SAL during boost
2/ The two SAL's mounted to the habitation area tank walls were
_. designed to withstand all the loads and environments associ-
ated with launch, boost, and orbital operations, During i_
liftoff and boost, the SAL's were _ubJected to random vibra-
' tion environments. In addition, the SAL outer door constituted
2.2.1_-h7
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an integral part of the ts_ikage pressure seal. As such, it
9
had to sustain a di_fferential pressure starting with 11.3
psid (77.9 kN/m2) (limit) at liftoff and increasing at about
120 seconds after liftoff to a maximum value of 26.0 psid
(179.2 ldg/m 2) (limit), whicl_ remained until orbital blowdo:,,n.
3/ On-orbit, the SAL was subjected to two different pressure
conditions. The first condition existed with the outer door
; closed and with neither an experiment nor the plate _nstalled.
This case was identical to boos'_ except that the limit pres-
sure across the door was 6.0 psid (41.4 kN/m2) maximum. The
?
second condition existed with either the plate or an experi-
ment installed on the Skl._ and the outer door open. In this
r
case the entire SAL housing was subjected to a 6.0 psid ._
(41.4 kN/m2) "crush" differential pressure. In addition to
I ressure loading in orbit, the SAL was subjected to
astronaut-applied loads in operating the outer door crank,
in the installation or removal of experiments, or from
phyEical contact of the astronaut's hand against the S_L
structure. Furthel_aore, the S/kI, had to sustain any loads
[ applied to an installed exp_ ..im_ntand carried by the tankage
_ wall. A sLLmmary of astronaut-applied loads was presentea in :
Table ? _i).10.4-1.
I Yield and ultimate factor of safety criteria a].ongwlth the ....
'1_ _ most critica.! load conditions were s_mmarized in i_
i_ Figure 2.2.10.4-1.
t
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4/ The a_ "lock was originaAly designed to ProJec_ Apollo
parameters, then reanalyzed for the more severe requirements
of the OWS. No structural changeJ were required but some
materials, components, and mechanisms were replaced, and
}
several items were added.
The following considerations made design changes or operating
• changes necessary:
a. T_a load_ and pressures were within the capabilities of "_
the airiock as designed, bat it was necessary to equal-
ize pressure across the inboard cover during the launch-
!
boost phases to prevent deformation.
b. The increased exposure to the external environment made '
thermal ccatings necesra W on both the solar and the
i
anti-solar SAL.
c. The low t_mperatures on the anti-solar side made a
desiccated rep_ssurization system necessa.y. This i:
• system has been described in Section 2.2.10.5.
d. The requirement that certain experiments be electrically
grounded and that the operating forces for loe_ing experi- '
! ments in place be minimized made redesign of the experi-
ment latching mechanism mandatory, i
2.2.10-51
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e. Precise alignment of each airloc_ proved to be impossible
b_cause of the number of varlables such as manufactur4ng
tolerances, and deflections caused by gravity, presm_re
:: changes, and thermal stresses. Correction factors were
calculated tc. ensure proper fit in the OWS.
i
f, Constraints were imposed by the _nterface requirements
with the various experiments Generally, the experi-
menters were required to conform to e.,isting airlock _
configuration, but modifications were made n the expori-1
ment latching mechanism prodthe vacuum interface fltt_ ng
_ to accommodate to experiment envelopes.
g. All materials were re_iewed fo_ compatibility with OWS
requirements. Varioua plastic components and _eo!s w r_. ?:
T
replaced and paints removed to comply with offgassing
- and fl_mmability specs.
: B, System Description
f
l/ The cverall system, installed per Stowage List 1B80701 and :
Installation Drawing iB84513, consists of two 3,%" ,_,tvo _-
plate containers, two plates, two vacuum hoses: and tw- ;
depressuzizatlon coupl!nc , IB90775-I. The components of _
the SAL system are composed of various aluminum alloys, _
corrosion-reristant steel alloys, glsss, and fluorccarbon,
butyl, and silicone ruboers. _
1| 2.2.10-52
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2/ The two airlocks (]383263-1 and -501) are identical except
for theraal coatings. Figure 2.2.10._-2 shows the basic
airlock with vacu_n fitting at the top, an experimen_ latch-
ing handle on the .right hand side, a pressure gsge at the
/ = center, and crank for opening the outer door at the lower
left. The outer door waffle pattern was seen through the
; opening on the sealing surface on the inboard side of the
airlock. An indicator mounted above the crank showed the
:_ door position relative to fully open and fully closed. A
P
lock was provided to prevent a_cidental rotation of the
crank. The valve nn the left hand side of the airloc_ per-
mitred venting the airlock cavity either overboard o," tc
the cabin. Figure 2.2.10.4-2 shows the tank wall, the
IB79018 adgpter fitting riveted to the wall, and seal plate
V16-311203, which sealed the airlock to the tank wall. The
experlment/plate latching mechanism was enclosed in the
square tubular structure; roller dogs emerged through open-
ings and engaged the flange of the exporiment/plate, forcing
the rubber seals on the flange against _he airlock sealing
sl,l.rf 8_e.
: 3/ The vacuum hose 1B869_0-1 was designed with one end attached
to an experiment through a quick-disconnect fitting and the
: other end plugging into the vacuum fitti_ _t the top of the
airlock. This allowed for evacuation of *he experiment, a
_, film canister, or a stowage container.
q
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4/ The plates, ]386327-1 (solar) and -501 (anti-solar), are
installed in plate containers IB83341-I (see Figure
2.2.10.4-3). On-orbit, the launch restraint bolts were re-
moved and the plate was installed in the airlock. It re-
mained installed in the SAL at all times, except when an
experiment was to be installed, at which time it was returned
to the plate container and kept there until the experiment
is removed.
5/ The depressurizati_ coupling, ]390775-1 was mounted on the
side of each plate container. It mated with the male quick-
disconnect on an experiment or film canister and was used to
represeurtze the container to cabin atmosphere.
6/ The airlocks and window c_tainers are installed at Position
Planes I and III, in the area from Station 445 to Station
490.
7/ The airlock interfaces with the tank wall through the ]379018
_ adorer fitting which is installed on the tank wall per
]379019 installation drawing.
_ _ C. TestlnSi
:_: i/ Phase 1 development testing consisted of the following: '
:, o Dm_,ermine the load-deflection characteristics of a typi- -
2,
_ , cal experiment flange seal, using a double Viton seal,
4 •
_ a |inEle Viton seal and a double Butyl seal.
p
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o Determine SAL experiment latching force versus experiment
flange seal deflection for Viton rubber and for Butyl
"_bber.
o Determine from the available design data whether the
latching mechanism, as designed by Rockwell International,
could be made adequate for use _-lth double Viton seals,
and whether metal-to-metal contact for a good electrical
_ bond could be a_hieved.
2/ Phase i develol_ent tests showed that obtaining a good leak-
age seal required very little force, but metal-to-metal con-
%act between the experiment flange and the SAL could not be
achieved by the existing roller method. Therefore, a progrmn
was instituted to provide a low friction t_-oe of experiment
lat,_ing mechanism similar to that used on Experiment S019.
The new mechanism was installed and tested as part of the
Phase 2 development test program.
3/ It shoul4 be noted to clarify the test program that the
original SAL design included a SAL window consisting of two
glass pane s in a frame separated by a cavity between the
\
two glass panes in the window assembly pressurized tc 14.7
psia (101.3 kN/m2). However, during th_ Design Certification
_ Review, MDAC wu directed to replace the window with an
_ alumintm plate using the same frame. The plate eliminated
'_" the possibility of viewing through the SAL br.t still pro- ....
_i_...' vide4 reduuAan_ on the oute_ door when experiments were not
_ installed in the _L, Since '_his ehan6e was i,:_rodueeA late _
2.2.10-_;7
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in the program, the development testing _:as performed on the
_-- window configuration. NG additional testing was required
for the plates beyond production _cceptanee testing since
the units were identical except for the plates replacing the
s _.ass panes. Therefore, during the test program, references
' have been made to ttwindowt* testing',_ even though the final
_: design configuration consisted of plates instead.
4/ Phase 2 development testing consisted of the following:
o Proof pressure tests at pressures which could occur during
_ checkout, boost, and on-orbit.
o _mctional tests of the window latching mechanism, pres-
sure control valve function, valve cover function, door
. o_ming and closing and indicator function, pressure gage
: function end accuracy, end hose coupling and uncoupling.
- o L_.akage tests at ambient temperature, with 5 psi (34.5
kN/m2) differential pressure at both atmospheric pressure
i and 5 psi (3_.5 kN/m 2) absolute. This included component
_: leskage where possible, and total leskage of the airlock-
window-outer door combinations. A separate test of
.:. vacuum hose leak_e was conducted.
o Vibration test of the seal and the window and window con-
tainer in the launch configuration per DAC-56620B.
o Post-vibr&tl_ functional and leakase test to determine
_ any chenges caused bF- launch for_es, ',
/3'
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o Thermal-vacuum tests, first simulating the effect of
cyclic solar radiation on the SAL having solar thermal
_ coatings. After this test was completed, the SAL was
_ recoated with the enti-solar thermal coatings and re-
ar tested in a simulated cyclic dark side environment.
• o Tests were run with outer door open, and with outer door
_ closed for each environment. Temperature measurements
were made at various points on the tank wall, SAL, and
_ window.
i
o In the experiment evacuation through SAL using the vacuum
hose, one end of the hose was plugged into a 2.1_ft 3
(0.68 mS) experiment filled with air at 5 psia (34.5
kN/m 2) and the other end into the SAL quick-disconnect.
The SAL door was in the vent position at a i x 10-3 torr
" (0.133 N) vacuum.
o The endurance test consisted of operating the SAL through
1,000 pressurization-depressuriz_tion cycles at 5 psl
(34.5 kN/m2) differential pressure (14.7to 9.71 (101.3
to 66.9 kN/m2). This provided 1,000 cycles on the outer
door crank, the experiment latching mechanism, the vent
valve, and the pressure gage.
L
; o Test leakase after 1,000 c_cles were _ompleted
i i;", , o For the cantilever beam test, loads of 0 to 125 lb (556 N)
:, wz, e applied at _ moment am of 60 in. (152.4 cm) at 5-
0_'_; plld (3_.5 N/m R) differential pressure, Lelka_e wal
:_' meaBured during test. --
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o For the yield pressure test, 9,9 psia (68.3 kN/m2) were
: applied inside the SAL chamber. Leakage was tested at
5 psid (3_.5 kN/m2) afterward.
o For the Ltltimate pressure test, 32 psid (220 kN/m2) were
_ applied across the outer door, and 12 psid (82.7 kN/m2)
inside the SAL chamber and across the plate.
' 4/ The Phase 2 development tests showed several problem areas.
In the vibration tests the following problems occurred.
o One screw in the airlock mechanism came out and its shim
was broken.
?
o One mounting screw on the window container came out and
another was loosened.
o One of the launch "retainers" for the window _as broken
and another was loosened.
i
o A thread insert loosened.
These problems were resolved in the following manner:
o The airlock mechanism was properly shimmed, and the screw
reinstalled.
o The lugs on the window container were remachined to make
the mounting surfaces parallel to the "patches" on the
tank wall se_ent.
/.
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o A metal washer with a soft pad was designed to fit under
each "retainer" so that the retainer could be torqued to
higher values.
o The loosened thread insert was removed and another
installed.
;/
The SAT_and window container were retested. A_ter the win-
dow retainers were tightened to 60 in-lb (678 N.cm) torque,
: all components passed the vibration test without incident
and were considered structurally adequate for launch.
In the proof and leak tests, the proof tests demonstrated
that the scientific airlock could withstand all pressures
: and loads that it would be subjected to including a 125-ib
(56.7 kg) astronaut load exerted (at a 60-in. (152.4 cm)
moment arm) on an experiment mounted in the airlock without
any significant leakage.
, The viewing window survived pressures well in excess of any
_ flight requirement.
; The thermal-vacuum tests showed that the inside surfaces of
t
the SAL would remain well within touch temperature limits
)_ _uring _light.
• i
In the functional tests and endurance tests, examination
i prior to test showed that the experiment latching mechanism
_ ! did not meet the electrical bonding requirement because the
• I Belleville wuhers providing the sealing force had been
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assembled incorrectly. A representative of the manufacturer
....... reassembled the unit properly so that it would exert enough
force to produce metal-to-metal contact, and agreed to make
sure that this was done on all future units.
During endurance testing, several problems appeared.
o The detent that holds the vent valve in position became
sticky at approximately 72 cycles, and again at 104
cycles. At 740 cycles, the pin holding the detent cam
ca the valve stem sheared off. The pin _as pushed back
in, and the test continued to 1,000 cycles. (This was a
failure of the detent, not of the valve.) When the test
was complete, a small amount of oil was applied to the
detent. The stickiness immediately disappeared, and the
valve operated smoothly again. Disassembly showed that
the problem was galling of stainless steel on stainless
steel; this caused a burr to be thrown up which inter-
feted with smooth operation. The flight parts have been
lubricated to prevent recurrence of this phenomenon.
o Seven of the eight roller shafts on the experiment
latching mechanism showed a tendency to work out of the
pivot housing. This happened continually after about
500 cycles. By design, they were to be held in place by
set screw friction. Although the set screws remained
tight, they did not restrain the shafts sufficiently.
This was not a serious problem, since the roller could
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|be pushed back into place. The vendor agreed to eliminate
o
the problem for the flight units by machining a depres-
sion in the roller shaft so that the set screw would
engage it to produce a positive lock.
• 5/ The flight unit of the SAL is identical to the test unit
_ except in the following details:
a. The "Micatex" paint on the exterior airlock surfaces and
the markings were not on the test _nit.
• b. The vacuum hose stowage clips were not on the airlock,
_ the hose stowage location was on the window container.
c. The windows on the flight unit include a shim designed
to compensate for manufacturing tolerances and permit the
• _roper seal preload.
/
_ 6/ Qualification tests were not applicable. The SAL was pre-
viously flight qualified by Rockwell International testing,
7/ No waivers or deviations were required for the SAL.
_, D. Mission Results - There were no anaaalieM of the SAL reported
during the three missions. During all cre'_ debrteftngs, the
,, Skylab crews stated that the SAL's performed flawlessly.
E. Conclusions and Reco_endationb -MDAC was successful in adapting
a previously designed Apollo airlock to meet all the objectives
of the Sk_lab ProKrsm. In regsrds to things to be done differ-
I ent_ in future mi_|ion$, the Sk_lab crew hall recommended that
1
! t_ SAL's c_,_: not sufficient and consideration sh_d be given to
f
o hsvins more _, any future |paceoratt.
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i F. Development History
l/ The scientific airlocks were provided as GFP items to the
0WS Program.
2/ Modifications were required to insure compatibility with the
_ OWS and the experiments. All materials that were to be
• exposed to the habitation environment which did not meet
" tlpe i flammability requirements of MSFC-SPEC-101A were re-
placed in order to protect the experiments. An indicator
was provided to show outer door/closed position. Gauges and
4 indicators were modified to provide protecticn from lens
breakage.
The handle assembly of the experiment canister latching
" mechanism and the roller mechanism were redesigned to limit
the force required to provide metal-to-metal contact of the
faying surfaces. A common vacuum interface was provided for
the venting of the experiments.
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!2.2.10.5 SAL Repressurization Subsystem
A. Design Requirements
i/ The SAL repressurization subsystem was designed to prevent
condensation from forming on experimert hardware during their
removal from the anti-solar side SAL. "Fne:-upressuriz_tion
subsystem also prevented contamination of certain experiments
which had minute openings that could be clogged by foreign
p_rticles. On the antl-solar side SAL, the reprebsurizs_ion
_ subsystem utilized dry gas and consisted of a desiccanl
canister, filter assembly, flex hoses, valve and tube assem-
bly as shown in Figure 2.2.10.5-1. On the solar side, the
l
, subsystem consisted of a filter assembly, flex hoses, valve,
and tube assembly as shown in Figure 2.2.10.5-2. Failure of
5
any component did not preclude operation of the SAL's. Any
part can be disconnected or bypassed.
,: 2/ The repressurization subsystem w_s designed _;o withstand the
rand_ and sinusoidal vibration environments at liftoff and
_oost which are represented in Table 2.2.10.5-1.
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Table 2.2.10.5-1
RANDOM AND SI[FU_{OIDALVIBRATION LOAD
FACTORS (LIMIT) AT LIFTOFF AND BOOST
/
Direction
!
/ Thrust Radial Tangential
: 20 g's 20 g's 20 g's
_ During liftoff and boost, a crush-type differential
pressure of 11.3 psld (77.9k H/m2) (limit) occurred i:
Iacross the subsystem. The effects of this differential
pressure were superimposed on vibration loads. The
subsystem was also designed for a burst-type pressure
differential of i_.3 psid (98.6k N/m2) which occurred
during the on-orbit blowdown period. No vibration
occurred during this period.
An astronaut applied load of 125 ibs (56.7kg) (limit)
was used for on-orbit conditions. The 125 ibs (56.7k8)
was applied over a 3 in 2(19cm2) area.
Factors of safety used for design were:
• Random and sinusoidal vibrations only
: Ultimate factor of safety is 1.20
_ Yield factor of safety is i.i0
• Interaction of random and sinusoidal vibrations and
pressure
Ultimate factor of safety is 1.kO
_.-, Yield factor of safety is I.I0
)'
• Pressure only, for production accept_nc_
Ultimate factor of Safety is 2.50
_ Yield factor of safety is 1.65
_L
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,I 3/ The main functions of the repressurization system were to _-
t desiccate the air entering the anti-solar SAL to minus 50°1.` (10°C) _
I
devpolnt or lover and to filter the air entering both anti-
• !
solar and solar SAL'R to S microns absolute. The system was
connected to the inlet port on the SAL repressurization valve.
Mating parts were sized to permit interconnection SO that the
SAL could al1_ys be operated. For exawple, if the filter at
the anti-solar SAL were plugged,, the desiccant unit outlet
hobs could be connected to the filter outlet hose. This was
strictly an emergency type operation. The inlet valve on the
desiccant unit would be closed at all times when not in use.
To minimize interference _rlth astronaut accessibility to the
SAL's, the filters were located under the SAL plate con-
tainers. Also, the desiccant units were mounted on the floor
as close as possible to the habitation area tank wall to mini-
mize a_7 interference with crew movement.
Relative movement between the repressurization system mounted
on the floor and the habitation area tank _s accommodated by
means of flex hoses.
B. Syltem Description
1/ The anti-solar SAL repressurtzation subsystem consisted aainl_ T'_"
! of a desiccant unit (1B91817-1) and filter ass_b_y
(_928_-i)whichwereconnectedby a convolutedOREShose
: (3165-0123). A hose (31_5-I-0_2_) lead frc_ the filter outlet
:/ to a CRES tube asmeabl_ (1B_32_.-1), mounted on the SAL bodM_ ...._i
_ ' and the SAL repressuriBtion valve Refer to Fi_tre 2e2,10,5"3.
N
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, The solar SAL repressurization subsystem consisted mainly of
E
a filter assembly (IB928_-501) which was connected in a
-'- similar manner to the tube assembly (IB9_32_-I) and repres-
s surization valve on the SAL body as shown in Fig-
gure 2.2.10.5-3. The outlet of each repressurization system
_ connected to the inlet port on the SAL pressurization valve.
2/ The major c_nponents of the SAL repressurization system were
as follows :
• Desiccant Unit (IB91817-I)
The desiccant unit consisted of a cylindrical canister
made of welded aluminum construction. The unit was
filled with Linde 13][molecular sieve and was preloa_ed
by a sprlng-loaded system to prevent channelling. Fil-
ters were located at the inlet and outlet to prevent par-
-_ ticles from escaping. An inlet valve and an outlet
qulck-disconnect maintained the unit in an air-tight
condition when not in use. The quick-_isconnect would
: not be disconnected once it was installed.
• Filter Assembly (1B928_4-1, -501)
The filter consisted of a filtering element and a hous-
ing, both of which were m_de from stainless steel.
C. Testing
i/ This subsystem was t_sted under Line Item XC-9. The objective
/ I
_, _ of the development test program was to verify that the desic-
-_ , cant unit and filter assembly were suitable for operation with
-i the SAL experiments. "'"
J •
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The test program was conducted as follows:
=- Functional test of Specimen No. 1 at 5 psta (3k.SK N/mi)
or 5 psid (3k,SK N/m2 ) to flow at S ft 3 (.085m 3) for each
100 cycles to show that the desiccant bed discharge would
consistently have a __ minus 50°F (10°C) dewpoint. Functional
test of the filter was performed. Dry bulb temperature shall
.be 65°F (18.3°C) to 80°F (25o7°C)o
• Proof and burst tests of the canister would verify its
structural capability to withstand 0WS environment.
• Leakage test would verify that the desiccant unit leak-
age was within requirements.
• Vibration test would verify that the components were
structurally sound and that the desiccant bed had not
deteriorated.
• Flow versus pressure drop would be determined during the
functional testing of the desiccant unit and the filter
individually and the combined solar and anti-solar
subsystems.
• Response time testing would determine whether the time
, to repressurize the SAL was satisfactory with either
_ subsystem.
J
• Desiccant bed density would determine that the density
: remained uniform and that channelling had not occurred
_ during cycling or vibration.
._ 2/ There were no significant problems encountered during the
SAL pressurisation system test program.
' 2,2.10-72
1974020216-408
i 3/ There were no waivers or deviations required for the system.
D. Mission Results
i/ During Mission SL-3, the SAL door was inadvertently left
open for an extended period, with the SAL desiccant system
hooked up. MDAC analysis resulted in the conclusion that
this operation had no deleterious effects on the operation
of the system. In addition, a vapor plume appeared at the
wardroom window. Analysis of the formation of the plume con-
cluded that it was the result of wardroom window vent plug
leakage, and was not caused by any anomaly of tile SAL desiccant
system.
E. Conclusions and Recommendations - The SAL repressurization system
• has worked per specified performance throughout the three missions.
It has performed its function of preventing condensation from
forming on experiment hardware.
F. Development History - The SAL repressurization system was necessi-
tated because those experimenters with hardware containing critical
optical surfaces were concerned that the optics would become con-
tamlnated if the experiments were repressurized with OWS cabin
atmosphere. It was determined that this contamination could be
eliminated if either a long term experiment warmup period would be
planned during each use or if a desiccant/filter system was used
in line.with the cabin atmosphere. Since the long term warmup
_I period could not be tolerated by the flight planners, it was decided
_r--_f_ tO incorporate a desiccant/filter system,
The |y_tem as 17,_itiall_ designed was flown with no modifications,
Z.z. 10-73
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